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ABSTRACT 
Sometimes people ought to do something for the sake of equality but it 
would be wrong to force them to do it. Contrariwise, sometimes it would 
be permissible to force people to do something for the sake of equality but 
it is unclear whether they ought to do it without coercion. 
This gives rise to moral obstacles to redistributing benefits and burdens in 
unequal situations of different degrees and kinds. In these situations, what 
are individuals required to do, permitted to do, and forbidden from doing 
for the sake of equality? In this thesis, I address four aspects of this 
problem. I defend the following central claims. 
When we fall short of realising equality using the coercive power of the 
state, individuals have an egalitarian reason to take up the moral slack and 
voluntarily redistribute their own wealth, even when this makes them worse 
off than they would be if society were equal. 
It is sometimes permissible for individuals to flout property laws in the 
name of equality by dispossessing people of things that they are legally, but 
not morally, entitled to. This is often true when property laws are severely 
unjust and is sometimes true when property laws are only partially unjust. 
Egalitarian justice requires people to benefit each other by making a 
productive contribution to society in order to realise a Pareto optimal level 
of equality. This is neither implausibly morally demanding, nor commits 
one to the view that justice licences legally coercive job allocation. 
Sometimes, due to brute bad luck, indivisible harm will occur and cannot be 
fairly divided. Some views say that it is wrong to harm innocent people in 
the course of defending yourself from an equivalent harm, but permissible 
to “duck” harm even though you foresee that doing so will lead to an 
innocent person being harmed as a result. I argue that, by the lights of such 
views, the mode of agency used to impose or redistribute harm makes no 
difference to permissibility. 
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Sometimes people ought to do something for the sake of equality but it would be wrong 
to force them to do it. Contrariwise, sometimes it would be permissible to force people 
to do something for the sake of equality but it is unclear whether they ought to do it 
without coercion. 
For example, it is permissible to tax the rich in order to bring about a more egalitarian 
society but it is unclear whether the rich ought to voluntarily redistribute their wealth. 
To give another example, one might believe that people have an egalitarian obligation to 
make a productive contribution to society but think it is impermissible for the state to 
legally conscript people into certain occupations in the name of equality. 
This gives rise to moral obstacles to redistributing benefits and burdens in unequal 
situations of different degrees and kinds. What are individuals required to do, permitted 
to do, and forbidden from doing for the sake of equality in these situations? In this 
thesis, I address four aspects of this problem. 
In this introductory chapter, I explain why I think this central problem is of interest and 
set out the four central questions I will answer. Then, I provide some remarks on the 
philosophical methodology that I use throughout. Finally, I state the central claims of 
each chapter and briefly summarise my supporting arguments. 
I Bringing About Equality 
Most philosophical attention on inequality has focused on the following questions: does 
inequality really matter, or is it a surrogate for a concern to give priority to benefitting 
the worse off? Is our concern for equality about distributive fairness, or ensuring that we 
are socially equal? If the former, what should we equally distribute? Between whom is 
inequality bad? What is the relationship between equality and justice? 
For the most part, I set aside these problems in order to focus on a different one which 
has received comparatively little attention.1 When faced with unfair inequality, what 
should individuals do insofar as they are concerned to reduce it? And, given that 
1 A notable exception is G. A. Cohen’s If You’re An Egalitarian, How Come You’re So Rich? 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002) Chapter 10. 
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equality is not the only thing that matters, what are individuals required to do, 
permitted to do, and forbidden from doing about inequality, all things considered? 
I think that these questions are interesting because while we want to know what an 
ideally egalitarian society would look like, we also want to know what we ought to do 
when faced with inequality of different degrees and kinds. And as individuals, most of 
us cannot determine what our social institutions are like or what other people do. But 
we can determine what we will do. These considerations give rise to an abundance of 
interesting subsidiary questions and I can only begin to answer a handful of them. In 
this thesis, I provide answers to the following four.  
First, when we fall short of realising equality using the coercive power of the state, do 
individuals have an egalitarian reason to take up the moral slack and voluntarily 
redistribute their own wealth? This question is of special interest to people with 
egalitarian convictions. Is it okay to be a rich egalitarian in an unequal society, or a 
“champagne socialist”? Or does a belief in egalitarianism commit you to making certain 
choices in an unequal society? I think that everyone, other than the worst-off person(s) 
in society, has an egalitarian reason to redistribute benefits until doing so further would 
worsen inequality, relative to the factual status quo. 
Second, is it ever permissible for individuals to reduce unfair inequality by unilaterally 
dispossessing people of things to which they are legally, but not morally, entitled? Such 
flouting of property laws can take many forms, including banditry, embezzlement, 
fraud, looting, occupation, and trespass. I think that sometimes it is. This question is of 
interest because although much has been said about the justifiability of civil 
disobedience in response to injustice, less has been said about the justifiability of uncivil 
disobedience which neither is intended as a political protest, nor involves the willingness 
to submit to punishment. 
Third, does egalitarian justice require individuals to benefit others by making a 
productive contribution to society? And, given that egalitarians are typically willing to 
coercively enforce equality through taxation, are they also committed to endorsing 
legally coercive job allocation in the name of equality? I think that the answers are “yes” 
to the former question and “no” to the latter. These questions are of interest because 
many attempts to change society in the name of equality have come at the price of 
economic efficiency or legal freedom of occupational choice, with devastating human 
costs. 
Finally, sometimes, due to brute bad luck, harm will inevitably occur and cannot be 
fairly divided. What are the moral differences between the modes of agency that 
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individuals can employ in order to avoid being the one who suffers it? At first glance, 
this question may not seem closely related to the problems described above. But I think 
it is closely related because it concerns the moral obstacles to imposing and 
redistributing the burden of brute bad luck when fair distribution is not possible. I think 
the mode of agency used to distribute indivisible harm makes less of a difference than is 
often supposed. 
II Remarks on Methodology 
Because this thesis concerns how to respond to unfair inequality, I have been asked if I 
am working on “non-ideal theory”. Before proceeding further, I briefly summarise my 
understanding of the difference between “ideal” and “non-ideal” theory. Then I will 
explain where my approach fits in, insofar as it does. Finally, I clarify the philosophical 
methodology I will use throughout the thesis. 
As I understand it, the debate about “ideal” and “non-ideal” theory is a set of 
methodological questions about the right or best way to do political philosophy, 
including, at least, the following ones.2 
First, should we work out what our rights and duties are in a world in which everybody 
is able and willing to comply with them? Or should we deduce what our rights and 
duties are under the realistic assumption that some people will transgress them? We can 
call this the difference between deducing our rights and duties under the assumption of 
full compliance and under the assumption of partial compliance. 
Second, does what we ought to do depend on facts about what we can do, under 
realistic conditions? Or is the truth about moral values and principles independent of the 
facts about whether or not we can put them into practice? This is sometimes called the 
difference between realistic views and utopian views. 
Third, should we expend our philosophical efforts on trying to work out what a perfect 
society should look like, or should we concentrate on working out what would make the 
world better, in comparison to the status quo? We can call this the difference between 
2 See Zofia Stemplowska, “Non-ideal Theory” in A Companion to Applied Philosophy, ed. by Kasper 
Lippert-Rasmussen, Kimberley Brownlee and David Coady (Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, 2017), 284-
96, and Laura Valentini, “Ideal and Non-Ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map”, Philosophy Compass, 7.9 
(2012), 654-64. 
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thinking about the ends of an ideal society and the transition from the status quo to 
something imperfect but better.  
I think these questions are of special interest for methods of moral reasoning which 
construct principles by asking what rules people could or would accept under 
hypothetical conditions in view of certain facts. When conducting such forms of 
reasoning, we need to know what facts to include and exclude from the hypothetical 
conditions. For example, should we include basic facts of economics and human 
behaviour? And should we go further and include facts about what is practically 
possible, in light of the status quo? The answers to these questions will partly depend on 
whether we think the primary purpose of moral and political philosophy is to work out 
what we ought to do, or to work out what we ought to believe. 
They are also of special interest insofar as we want to determine what rules our social 
institutions should enforce. Perhaps we shouldn’t make our institutions enforce rules 
which are based on false or unrealistic assumptions. Instead, perhaps we should ensure 
that our institutions enforce rules which take into account the fact that sometimes 
people won’t or can’t comply with them. And perhaps we should ensure that our 
institutions enforce rules which take into account what the factual status quo is like. 
But the questions are less significant for other forms of moral reasoning which do not 
derive principles in this way, I think. And insofar as what we ought to do as individuals 
goes, these questions are less important. I think that what we ought to do as individuals 
depends upon a wide spectrum of considerations, not all of which can be reduced to 
rules that we could or would accept under hypothetical conditions. I do not try to 
formulate a theory which tells us how individuals should respond to all kinds of 
inequality. Instead, I try to illuminate the moral considerations that are at stake in 
different unequal situations in order to work out what this tells us about the moral 
requirements, permissions, and prohibitions that apply to us. 
For what it’s worth, I do not think that what we ought to do depends on what we can 
do, or that we should exclusively expend our efforts on trying to judge what would 
make the world better, relative to the factual status quo. On the contrary, I think moral 
and political philosophy is mostly about what we ought to believe, and that it is 
important to abstract away from the actual world in order to reason about values and 
principles independently what would happen if we tried to realise or implement them. 
That being said, I also think that the complexity of the actual world gives rise to an 
interesting and largely neglected set of questions that are of both philosophical interest 
and practical importance. This thesis is concerned with “non-ideal” situations, insofar 
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as that is understood as thinking about what is morally at stake in the face of injustice 
and inequality, including the fact that some people do not, or will not, do as they ought, 
but not insofar as it is understood as employing a particular kind of reasoning about 
moral and political philosophy.  
III Chapter Summaries 
In what remains of this introduction, I summarise the main claims and supporting 
arguments of each chapter. The first three chapters of the thesis address questions in the 
domain of distributive justice. The fourth chapter steps outside the domain of 
distributive justice and considers a related problem in the domain of normative ethics 
concerning the imposition and redistribution of harm.  
1 Fair Shares & Degrees of Inequality 
When faced with unfair inequality, what should individuals do insofar as they are 
concerned to reduce it? I argue that there are at least three appealing answers to this 
question, and, given the diversity of reasons to object to inequality, the logic of different 
egalitarian views will imply different answers. 
The first answer, which I call the institutional thesis, says that individuals in unequal 
societies have no egalitarian reason, or only a very trivial one, to try to reduce inequality 
unilaterally because isolated redistribution will only make a negligible difference, and, 
under realistic conditions, only institutions can ensure mass conformity with the 
demands of equality. I argue that the institutional thesis is supported by some varieties 
of instrumental egalitarianism, deontological egalitarianism, procedural egalitarianism 
and contractualist egalitarianism. But those views do not capture the full spectrum of 
egalitarian concern. 
The second answer, which I call the fair shares thesis, says that individuals should give 
away everything above their “fair share”, where one’s fair share is defined as the 
amount of goods that one would have in a counterfactual world in which that which is 
captured by the metric of equality is equally distributed. I argue that the fair shares 
thesis is supported by left-libertarianism and luck egalitarianism combined with rule 
consequentialism. It is also supported by combining luck egalitarianism with some 
implausible measures of inequality. But, I argue, the view depends on the idea that the 




The third answer, which I call the maximisation thesis, says that everyone, other than 
the very worst-off person in society, has an egalitarian reason to redistribute benefits to 
those who are worse off until doing so any further would worsen inequality, relative to 
the factual status quo. An implication of this is that there is still an egalitarian reason to 
redistribute benefits even if this makes a person worse off than they would be in the 
counterfactual world in which all existing goods were equally distributed. I argue that 
this view is supported by luck egalitarianism and the competing claims view, at least. All 
told, I believe the maximisation thesis to be the most thoroughgoing answer. 
2 If You’re An Egalitarian, Why Not Rob a Bank? 
It is sometimes permissible to reduce unfair inequality by dispossessing people of things 
that they are legally, but not morally, entitled to, without the informed consent of the 
legal owner and without providing compensation. I call this egalitarian vigilantism. I 
start by considering the dimensions across which acts of egalitarian vigilantism are 
easier or harder to justify, independently of the degree of injustice in society as a whole. 
I conclude that the most justifiable kinds of vigilantism are those which dispossess group 
entities of money, food, and disused land and buildings, absent special attachment 
claims, where any losses suffered by individuals are indirect and widely dispersed. 
I then turn to consider how the extent to which property laws are unjust affects the 
justifiability of vigilantism. Unsurprisingly, I conclude that vigilantism is almost 
impossible to justify when property laws are just or just enough, and much easier to 
justify when they are severely unjust. The most interesting and difficult questions about 
vigilantism emerge when property laws, and societies as a whole, are partially unjust. 
I claim that there are three additional moral presumptions against redistributive 
vigilantism in partially unjust situations. First, law-abiding citizens have a claim-right 
that others respect legal property entitlements that were allocated in a reasonably 
democratic way. Second, vigilantism is a disproportionate response to injustice when 
democratic or other legal courses of action are available. Third, widespread acts of 
vigilantism would often make things worse rather than better. 
I argue that, taken together, these arguments do not rule out the expropriation of 
property from groups or people who culpably perpetrate injustice, when democratic or 
other legal forms of recourse are highly unlikely to be effective, provided that such acts 
do not become too widespread. 
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3 Optimal Equality & Forced Labour 
G. A. Cohen claimed that we could bring about an egalitarian society without sacrificing 
economic efficiency or legal freedom of occupational choice if most people, motivated 
by an egalitarian ethos, freely and efficiently allocated their labour in exchange for an 
egalitarian wage. In the third chapter, I defend this claim from two counterarguments. 
The first counterargument, the efficiency dilemma, says that on the one hand, a merely 
egalitarian ethos would not suffice to induce people to efficiently allocate their labour, 
and, on the other hand, a productive ethos, which induced people to efficiently allocate 
their labour, is beyond what justice could plausibly require. 
In reply, I argue that egalitarian justice requires the realisation of a Pareto optimal level 
of equality and, accordingly, the free realisation of egalitarian justice requires a 
productive ethos. I argue that a productive ethos is not an implausibly demanding 
requirement of justice because when the currency of justice is access to advantage, it is, 
generally speaking, in the rational self-interest of each person to allocate their labour 
efficiently. 
The second counterargument, the forced labour objection, says that Cohen cannot 
consistently advocate the use of coercive taxation for the sake of equality but oppose 
legally coercive job allocation for the sake of equality. In reply, I argue that we can 
distinguish between the coercive enforcement of a just distribution of income and the 
enforcement of a just distribution of labour in a number of different ways. 
4 Killing & Ducking: Self-Defence & Moral Equivalence 
I start by contrasting two cases in which a person who is endangered by an innocent 
threat can defend themselves using different modes of agency in each case: by killing the 
innocent threat in the first case and by ducking the threat in the second case. According 
to the moral immunity thesis, it is wrong to kill a person who innocently threatens your 
life, on the grounds that doing so is morally indistinguishable from killing an innocent 
bystander when defending your life. By contrast, proponents of the account plausibly 
hold that you may permissibly evade, or “duck”, harm when doing so will foreseeably 
lead to the death of an innocent person. 
I then set out my central claim: if killing an innocent threat is morally equivalent, in 
terms of permissibility, to killing an innocent bystander, then both are equivalent to 
ducking a threat. As a result, if the moral immunity thesis is correct, then ducking the 
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threat is impermissible. Since this is highly counterintuitive, I suggest that we should 
instead reject (or revise) the moral immunity thesis. 
I defend this claim in two stages. First, I offer an intermediate case which falls between 
killing and ducking. I claim that we can proceed, by a transitive relation of moral 
equivalence, from the view that killing an innocent threat is wrong to the claim that 
ducking is wrong. Second, I consider five ways in which a proponent of the moral 
immunity thesis might try to resist my claim: by appealing to the right of self-ownership, 
the side-effect principle, the redistribution principle, the distinction between killing and 
letting die, and the moral significance of fair chances and property rights. Using 
counterexamples, I argue that all five attempts are unsuccessful.
15 
 
1 FAIR SHARES AND DEGREES OF INEQUALITY 
1.1 Introduction 
The distribution of benefits and burdens in the actual world is unjustly unequal and will 
continue to be unjustly unequal for the foreseeable future. For the fortunate, life is better 
than it would be if our unequal world were transformed into a justly egalitarian one. By 
contrast, many people are worse off than they would be if inequality were reduced 
through redistribution, and some of us find it morally repugnant that people enjoy 
extravagant riches in a world where others struggle to make ends meet. 
Some of us believe that we ought to reduce inequality by redistributing benefits and 
burdens using the coercive power of the state. But when, as is actually the case, we fall 
short of realising equality through redistributive public policies, it is unclear whether 
and how individuals ought to take up the moral slack and do what they can to reduce 
inequality on their own. What does egalitarianism demand of individuals in unequal 
societies? In this chapter, I consider three answers to this question and examine which of 
the answers are supported by different varieties of egalitarianism, widely understood. 
The first answer, which I will call the institutional thesis, is that individuals in unequal 
societies have either no egalitarian reason to unilaterally redistribute benefits, or only a 
very trivial one, because isolated redistribution will, at best, only negligibly reduce 
inequality, and, under realistic conditions, only institutions can ensure that everybody 
contributes to widespread redistribution. I argue that this view is supported by some 
instrumental, deontological, procedural, and contractualist varieties of egalitarianism, 
but that these views do not capture the full spectrum of egalitarian concern. 
I will call the second answer the fair shares thesis. This is the view that individuals do 
have an egalitarian reason to reduce inequality, but this only extends to redistributing or 
foregoing goods which are in excess of one’s fair share, where one’s fair share is defined 
as the amount of goods that one would have in a counterfactual world in which the 
metric of equality is equally distributed. The fair shares thesis has intuitive appeal and 
enjoys argumentative precedent when it comes to our moral duties to help the needy. 
However, I argue that this view is unsupported by most strands of egalitarian thought, 




I call the third answer the maximisation thesis. This is the view that everyone, other 
than the very worst-off person in society, has an egalitarian reason to redistribute 
benefits to those who are worse off until further doing so would worsen inequality, 
relative to the factual status quo. The maximisation thesis appears to lack common sense 
support; it does not seem widely believed that everybody, including people of average or 
below average means, has an egalitarian reason to redistribute benefits to those who are 
worse off. Yet somewhat surprisingly, this answer is implied, I believe, by at least two of 
our best egalitarian views: luck egalitarianism and the competing claims view. 
The chapter is divided into four main parts. In what remains of the first part, I provide 
some preliminary remarks, explain how the problem differs from some other questions, 
and then explain why it matters. In the second part, I set out the institutional thesis, and 
explain which varieties of egalitarianism support it, and point out that these views do 
not capture everything that egalitarians care about. In the third part, I set out the fair 
shares thesis, explain which varieties of egalitarianism support it, and then point out 
that, contrary to what some have assumed, the view is not supported by most varieties 
of egalitarianism. In the fourth part, I set out the maximisation thesis and defend the 
claim that the maximisation thesis gains support from combining some our best 
egalitarian views with some of our best ways of measuring the badness of inequality. 
Following that, I address some problems for the maximisation thesis before concluding. 
1.2 Preliminary Remarks 
I focus on the question of what individuals in unequal societies have egalitarian reason 
to do, or what people should do insofar as they want to act upon egalitarian beliefs. I set 
aside the question of what people in unequal societies are morally required to do, and 
the question of what people have most reason to do, all things considered. Other 
reasons, values, constraints, and agent-centred options will sometimes permit, or forbid 
people to do what is best from an egalitarian perspective.1 
That being said, many of us take equality to be a conception, or aspect, of distributive 
justice, and reasons of justice are often taken to carry special weight, even if they may 
sometimes be overridden by other concerns. So, if individuals in unequal societies do 
1 I set aside the difficult but important question of how individuals should decide what to do in light of 
empirical uncertainty about the distribution of benefits and burdens in society and moral uncertainty 
about which choices people are morally responsible for, insofar as that affects their distributive shares. 
Individuals in the actual world would need a decision procedure to help them decide how to best carry 
out egalitarian redistribution, given these epistemic and normative obstacles. 
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have an egalitarian reason to redistribute or forego goods, this is not to be taken lightly 
and there will sometimes be a decisive reason to act upon it when the costs of doing so 
are not too onerous and no other good reasons tell against doing so. 
Surprisingly, this question has not received much attention from philosophers, despite its 
practical significance, and despite its significance for a range of further questions. For 
example, the answer has a bearing on whether it is permissible to be extremely rich in an 
unequal society and whether it is hypocritical to be a rich egalitarian, although complete 
answers to such questions will require further premises about the correct metric of 
equality and what one has most reason to do, all things considered.2 
Now, individual egalitarian acts will typically take the form of redistributing benefits 
from oneself to the worse off. By “redistribution”, I mean any actions in which a person 
imposes losses in the metric of equality on themselves in order to bestow benefits in the 
metric of equality on another person or persons.3 However, egalitarian acts could also 
take the form of foregoing benefits which will worsen inequality. The reason in favour 
of foregoing benefits may sometimes be stronger than the reason in favour of 
redistributing benefits because it is plausibly a greater sacrifice to give up what one has 
than it is to forego things one doesn’t have (although I will consider a problem with this 
claim towards the end of the chapter). I will set aside acts which reduce inequality by 
imposing losses on others. 
This question is distinct from some other important questions which have been more 
widely addressed. For instance, sometimes the culpable and innocent beneficiaries of 
injustice ought to redistribute things in order to rectify wrongdoing, including 
wrongdoing by omission.4 But on some views, an unfairly unequal distribution can arise 
without anybody acting wrongly, and without anybody’s rights being violated. So, we 
might sometimes have an egalitarian reason to redistribute benefits to others even when 
2 The question of whether it is hypocritical to be a rich egalitarian is examined in Cohen, If You're an 
Egalitarian, How Come You're So Rich?, Chapter Ten, and Saul Smilansky “On Practicing What We 
Preach”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 31.1 (1994), 73-79. 
3 Apart from where otherwise stated, I do not take a stand on the metric of equality, whether it is 
welfare, resources, opportunity sets, income, primary goods, capabilities, and so on. Since some of 
those currencies cannot be directly transferred, any egalitarian reason to redistribute benefits will 
typically require the redistribution of the sources of those goods. I also set aside the question of the 
scope of egalitarianism, whether that is the set of individuals within a nation state or the set of all 
human beings. 
4 For a defence of this view, see Daniel Butt, “On Benefitting From Injustice”, Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy, 37.1 (2007), 129-52. 
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rectification is not required because nobody has acted wrongly and nobody’s rights have 
been violated. 
Moreover, we sometimes have reasons to aid the needy (those who are badly off, in 
absolute terms) when we have no egalitarian reason to do so. We would, for example, 
have reasons to aid everyone even when everyone, including the aiders, is equally needy. 
And we sometimes have an egalitarian reason to redistribute benefits even when we have 
no humanitarian reason to do so; for example, when needs have been satisfied, hardship 
has been alleviated and everyone's life is sufficiently good.5 That being said, duties to 
rectify wrongdoing and to aid the needy may sometimes overlap with reasons to reduce 
inequality such that our reasons to redistribute benefits are overdetermined. 
Aside from being practically significant, this problem is significant for normative ethics 
because the soundness of some egalitarian views has been questioned on the grounds 
that the views do not directly tell us anything about how we ought to act in the actual 
world. These problems are sometimes taken to be shortcomings which undermine the 
plausibility of those accounts. But that conclusion is premature, or so I shall suggest. 
1.3 The Institutional Thesis 
The institutional thesis, as I shall call it, consists of three claims: (1) there is no 
egalitarian reason for individuals to unilaterally try to reduce inequality, or only a very 
trivial one, because (2) unlike widespread redistribution, isolated egalitarian acts, at 
most, only negligibly reduce inequality and, (3) under realistic conditions, only coercive 
institutions can ensure mass conformity with the demands of equality.6 
5 The question of what we are morally required to do to help the needy is widely addressed. For 
examples, see Garrett Cullity, The Moral Demands of Affluence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), and 
Peter Singer, "Famine, Affluence and Morality", Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1.1 (1972), 229-43. 
Arguments for a moral requirement to help the needy often proceed by parity of reasoning from cases 
in which one ought to save a life at little cost to oneself. No comparable argument can be made on the 
part of equality. Helping people who are badly off is morally urgent. By contrast, sometimes reducing 
inequality, important though it may be, is not always morally urgent. For example, unfair inequality 
between two people who are very well off, in absolute terms, seems morally significant but it does not 
seem morally urgent to redress it. 
6 By “negligible”, I mean “unimportant”, rather than numerically negligible. This distinguishes the 
institutional thesis from what we can call the “drop in the ocean” claim, which says: “Yes, I could 
reduce inequality through my own choices, but by doing so, I would only make a tiny difference in the 
grand scheme of things.” 
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To illustrate, suppose, for the sake of argument, that the metric of equality is wealth, 
and suppose further that the timespan of egalitarian concern is whole lives. If the 
institutional thesis is correct, then we would have, at most, a very trivial egalitarian 
reason, over the course of our lives in an unequal society, to redistribute wealth to 
people who are worse off than us (though we may have other reasons to do so). 
This is practically significant because if egalitarian reasons in favour of independent 
redistribution are very trivial, then these reasons would rarely, if ever, cross the 
threshold of moral requirement. I take claim (3) to be true, so I will explore which 
varieties of egalitarianism make the conjunction of claims (1) and (2) true.  
Now, on distributive egalitarian views, the institutional thesis is false. For example, on 
views which hold that a state of affairs containing distributive inequality is intrinsically 
bad, in one respect, when and because some are unfairly or arbitrarily worse off than 
others,7 it is clearly not generally true that only widespread egalitarian action would 
reduce inequality in a significant way, since there are many circumstances in which 
independent redistribution would do a great deal to reduce inequality. 
However, people object to inequality on a variety of grounds and the different objects of 
egalitarian concern provide different answers to the question of whether reducing 
inequality in small degrees makes a moral difference or whether the badness or injustice 
of inequality can only be removed by widespread action. For example, one might believe 
that equality would be good for society as a whole, but not believe that reducing 
inequality in small ways between individuals would do anything to promote that ideal. 
In fact, I think the institutional thesis is supported by at least four egalitarian views. 
First, while people think distributive inequality is intrinsically bad, others think it is only 
instrumentally bad insofar as it leads to bad effects like divided communities, hierarchies 
of social status and power, or morally troubling attitudes which undermine solidarity. 
For example, Martin O’Neill has proposed a variety of egalitarianism which he calls 
non-intrinsic egalitarianism.8 He claims that distributive inequality is bad, regardless of 
the effect of inequality on individual well-being, but this badness does not reside in the 
7 G. A. Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 
Shlomi Segall, Why Inequality Matters: Luck Egalitarianism, Its Meaning and Value (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016), and Larry Temkin, Inequality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003). 
8 In Martin O’Neill, “Constructing a Contractualist Egalitarianism: Equality After Scanlon”, The 
Journal of Moral Philosophy, 10 (2013), 429-61, and “What Should Egalitarians Believe?” Philosophy 
and Public Affairs, 36.2 (2008), 119-56. 
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relational property of some being worse off than others in some metric of equality. 
Rather, distributive inequality is bad when and because it causes these kinds of social 
and political inequality. 
On this view, we should redistribute from better to worse off as a means to remove 
these bad effects. So if redistributing or foregoing benefits would serve to reduce social 
or political inequality, then there would be an egalitarian reason for individuals to do 
so. But typically, isolated acts of redistribution will do nothing to remedy social and 
political inequality, since that is a systemic feature of societies. Voluntary redistribution 
may even be counterproductive when and because it humiliates or undermines the 
dignity of the recipients. 
Although it certainly makes sense to talk about social and political equality in degrees 
(we can say that one society is more socially and politically equal than another), 
individual contributions to reducing social and political equality will typically take the 
form of holding certain attitudes towards others or refraining from treating people in 
certain ways which undermine egalitarian relationships. 
A worry about this view is that it becomes difficult to see why we should favour 
widespread redistribution of things from the better to worse off in degrees, where doing 
so will not also reduce social or political inequality. Of course, these egalitarians may 
favour redistribution for non-egalitarian reasons as well (to alleviate hardship for 
example). But on this view it seems that unless redistribution reduces social inequality, 
there is little egalitarian reason to favour it. 
Second, the institutional thesis gains some plausibility from deontological egalitarian 
views which object not to distributive inequality itself, but rather to the way it was 
brought about. For example, some believe that inequality matters when and because it 
results from treating people unequally, and we should aim to reduce distributive 
inequality when and because that is what treating people equally requires. 
To give one example of such a view, A.J. Julius has argued, roughly speaking, that 
distributive equality is morally relevant only insofar as we need to justify treating each 
other fairly through our shared institutions. He says that we have an egalitarian reason 
to refrain from inducing each other to act in ways which unfairly benefit us, including 
promoting or perpetuating institutions which unfairly advance our own interests.9 On 
this view, we should aim for distributive equality in order to refrain from treating each 
9 A. J. Julius, "Basic Structure and the Value of Equality", Philosophy and Public Affairs, 31.4 (2003), 
321-55 (p.347). 
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other unfairly, and there is no egalitarian reason to redistribute benefits when the failure 
to do so does not constitute unfair treatment. 
This view does, however, hold that we have egalitarian reasons to refrain from 
promoting or supporting coercive institutions which work to our unfair advantage. For 
example, we have an egalitarian reason to refrain from lobbying for changes to taxation 
policies which unfairly benefit us. So, while we may have no egalitarian reason to 
redistribute things we already possess, if we are responsible for distributing some new 
benefits and burdens, then we should distribute them equally. 
A third way in which the institutional thesis could be true is if equality only requires 
ensuring the metric of equality is distributed through fair procedures or rules. The 
following metaphor captures such a view. “I deplore the fact that the cards are stacked 
against some people in life, and in favour of others. We should establish rules and 
procedures which deal everyone a fair hand and even out everyone’s life prospects. If 
everyone had a fair hand and played by fair rules, it wouldn’t matter morally if it led to 
unequal outcomes.” On this view, trying to promote a more equal outcome will not 
reduce inequality in a morally relevant respect. Instead, we should aim to make our 
procedures and rules fairer.  
A deontological formulation of this claim could say that we should aim for fair rules 
and procedures because that’s what treating people equally requires. This coheres well 
with the hypothesis that we ought to reduce inequality through the coercive power of 
the state but have no reason to do so in our own lives. When acting together through the 
state, we ought to treat each other impartially by playing by the same rules, but people 
need not treat each other impartially in their own lives.10 
We can distinguish between two ways of understanding procedural views of this variety. 
On one formulation, the unfairness of procedures is grounded in the fact that they 
produced an unfair outcome. One might not object to the same procedure if it produced 
a fair outcome accidentally, for example. On this view, we should aim to change our 
10 Ronald Dworkin locates the justice of equality in the way the state treats its citizens, in Sovereign 
Virtue (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000). One might grant that that reducing 
inequality through redistributive personal choices would make an outcome better, but not more just. 
One might maintain that the kind of inequality that is brought about through social institutions is a 
distinctive kind of injustice, which the state has reasons to reduce through its tax and transfer policies, 
but individuals have no equivalent reason to reduce through their voluntary choices. The distinction is 
significant because we typically have stronger reasons to remove injustice than we do to remove (mere) 
disvalue. 
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institutional procedures because they tend to produce maldistributions. But if we take 
that view, then it doesn’t matter whether a distribution is brought about by a change in 
procedures or voluntary redistributive acts. 
On a second, more distinctive, formulation, the badness of unequal outcomes is 
grounded in the unfairness of procedures; inequality is bad when and because it was 
produced by unfair procedures. On this view, there is no fact of the matter about what a 
fair distribution would look like in the absence of fair procedures and there is no 
independent standard for a fair outcome.11 
All that being said, we can ask what would have happened had a fair procedure taken 
place. Even if there is no unique fact of the matter about the distribution that would 
have resulted from a fair procedure, there is a set of possible distributions that might 
have been produced by fair procedures. Of those possible distributions, we could either 
aim for the one which was most likely to occur, or minimise expected injustice or 
minimise the maximum possible injustice done to any one individual by bringing about 
a more equal, rather than less equal, distribution.12 
Finally, one might defend the institutional thesis by offering a contractualist defence of 
the claim that equality is concerned with fair rules and procedures. On a contractualist 
formulation of this claim, we could say that we should aim for fair rules and procedures 
because that’s what we would agree to in a fair hypothetical situation in which our 
individual interests are set aside; when distributing benefits and burdens across 
individuals, we do so in accordance with rules and principles that can be justified to 
each. 
Consider John Rawls’s claim that the basic structure of society is the primary (though 
not only) agent of justice within his free-standing contractualist theory of justice.13 For 
several reasons which are specific to Rawls’s contractualist theory, a distribution is fully 
just, if, and only if, and because it is brought about by full compliance to principles, 
rules, and institutions that would be in everybody’s rational self-interest to agree to 
11 These two ways of formulating a deontological concern with how inequality is produced are 
distinguished in Derek Parfit, “Equality or Priority?” in The Ideal of Equality, eds. Matthew Clayton 
and Andrew Williams (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), p.89. 
12 David Miller defends this justification for bringing about equality under uncertainty in “Equality and 
Justice”, Ratio, 10.3 (1997), 222-37 (pp.227-228), although he argues against the claim that 
distributive equality under certainty is morally significant. 
13 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999). 
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behind a non-probabilistic veil of ignorance, on the condition that everybody else would 
comply as well. 
It would not be fair, nor would it be in everybody’s common rational interest, to agree 
to principles if they could not be assured that others would reciprocate in terms of 
compliance with those principles. That is one reason why the basic structure of society is 
the primary agent of justice in Rawls’s theory; the coercive power of the state can ensure 
that most people will comply with the principles of justice and ensure the fairness and 
rationality of agreeing to adhere to those principles behind the veil of ignorance. On this 
view, one might think that, as a matter of distributive justice, individuals are duty-
bound to comply with legally enforced obligations to institutions that are just, to refrain 
from supporting and sustaining institutions that realise unjust inequality, and perhaps 
play a part in the reform or abolition of those institutions, but no more.14 
Whether Rawls is right about the significance of the basic structure of society within the 
scope of his own theory has been widely discussed.15 But that discussion concerns the 
question of whether individuals can do more to promote justice through their personal 
choices when social institutions are fully just (or, put another way, whether a society can 
be less than fully just even when the basic structure of society is fully just). 
The present question is of interest regardless of one’s stance on the significance of the 
basic structure within Rawls’s theory of justice which is restricted in scope to the choice 
of principles for institutions in sufficiently developed societies. The claim that that 
individuals could do nothing more to promote equality through their personal choices in 
a society with a just basic structure differs from, and is consistent with, the claim that 
individuals faced with unjust inequality can reduce inequality through voluntary 
egalitarian acts, even if individual action alone cannot bring about a fully just 
distribution. 
In order to deny that individuals faced with inequality have an egalitarian reason to 
carry out direct redistribution, one must affirm a different view. One must hold that 
14 Rawls does of course also say that individuals can have further natural duties which fall outside the 
sphere of interaction with the basic structure of society. A Theory of Justice (pp.98-101). 
15 For example, see Michael G. Titelbaum, "What Would a Rawlsian Ethos of Justice Look Like?", 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 36.3 (2008), 289-322, David Estlund, “Liberalism, Equality, and 
Fraternity in Cohen’s Critique of Rawls”, The Journal of Political Philosophy, 6.1 (2008), 99-112, Kok 
Chor Tan, "Justice and Personal Pursuits", Journal of Philosophy, 101.7 (2004), 331-62, and Liam 
Murphy, “Institutions and the Demands of Justice”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 27.4 (1999), 251-
91. 
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only changes to social institutions and procedures can reduce unjust inequality and 
individuals are incapable of reducing distributive unfair inequality through redistributive 
personal choices. That is implausible, and it is not a claim that Rawls explicitly 
defends.16 
In summary, the institutional thesis is supported by at least four egalitarian views. 
Whether these views should count as genuinely egalitarian ones, and whether they are 
plausible in their own right, are further questions. I think that some are plausible, even if 
different views ultimately turn out to be addressing different aspects or kinds of 
inequality. And even if social and political equality, treating people equally, fair 
procedures, and governing our interactions on egalitarian terms which can be justified to 
each are important aspects of egalitarian concern, they are not, in my view, the whole 
truth about egalitarian justice. In any case, these views certainly do not exhaust the 
spectrum of egalitarian views, and I now turn to examine a different answer to the 
question with which I began: the fair shares thesis. 
1.4 The Fair Shares Thesis 
The fair shares thesis holds that individuals faced with inequality have an egalitarian 
reason to redistribute or forego benefits, regardless of what others do, but only goods 
which are in excess of their fair share. For example, suppose, for the sake of argument, 
that the metric of equality is resources and suppose further that the timespan of 
egalitarian concern is whole lives. If the fair shares thesis is correct, then we have an 
egalitarian reason to redistribute resources in excess of our fair share to those with less 
than their fair share, over the course of our lives. 
But a problem with this view is that there are several ways in which one might define 
what one’s fair share is and no immediate way of determining which is the most 
plausible. For example, each person has a fair share of the metric of equality relative to 
the factual status quo. That is, by the amount of goods one would have in the 
counterfactual world in which existing benefits and burdens were equally distributed. 
But this assumes that amount of the metric of equality is fixed. We should not make this 
assumption. For counterfactual worlds may contain different amounts of the metric of 
16 For an argument in support of this conclusion, see Thomas Porter, "The Division of Moral Labour 
and the Basic Structure Restriction", Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 8 (2009), 173-99. 
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equality.17 For example, a counterfactually egalitarian society may contain fewer goods 
due to less being produced. Alternatively, it may contain more goods, due to talents 
being more efficiently harvested and labour being more efficiently distributed.18 Now, 
we shouldn’t dismiss the fair shares thesis for this reason alone because we might be able 
to determine a plausible baseline for fair shares from the nature of different egalitarian 
views. There are at least four egalitarian rationales for the fair shares thesis, some more 
plausible than others. 
First, according to the family of views called left-libertarianism, which combine a right 
of self-ownership with a luck egalitarian principle of distribution, each individual is 
rightfully entitled to an egalitarian share of the world’s resources.19 Egalitarianism based 
on natural rights and entitlements could straightforwardly include a moral duty to 
redistribute benefits as part of a theory of rectification, since, on these views, each 
person has a right to a fair share of existing resources, and inequality violates the 
natural rights of those who are deprived of their rightful entitlements.20 Fair shares, on 
this view, could be determined relative to the facts concerning the amount of resources 
in the world and each person’s ability to transform resources into welfare. 
Second, we might adopt the fair shares thesis if we were to combine a luck egalitarian 
view about the comparative unfairness of outcomes with a rule consequentialist account 
of the duty to follow rules which, if internalised and acted upon by everyone, would 
make things go best.21 On this view, fair shares would plausibly be determined by the 
17 The assumption is relatively plausible if the metric of equality is natural resources or natural 
resources are the only source of the proper metric of equality. But even then, natural resources can be 
depleted and replenished. 
18 A further peculiarity is that teleological views like luck egalitarianism are sometimes taken to be 
unlimited in scope across time and space. So a teleological fair shares view, without further auxiliary 
premises to limit the scope of egalitarianism, suggest the possibility that one’s fair share is relative to 
the amount of the metric of equality that will exist in total throughout time and space. 
19 See, for example, Michael Otsuka, Libertarianism Without Inequality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2003). An egalitarian share can be defined in several ways, including an equal distribution of non-
human resources, or an equally advantageous distribution, that is, a distribution of resources which 
realises equal opportunity for welfare, which is what Otsuka defends. 
20 Note, however, that according to left-libertarian views, possessing an inegalitarian share of the 
world’s resources would be a form of benefitting from injustice. So a duty to redistribute resources may 
be better described as a form of rectifying wrongdoing than an egalitarian reason to redistribute. 
21 See, for example, Brad Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of 
Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000). See pp.44-51 for a discussion of equality, fairness and 
justice. 
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shares one would have in a counterfactual world in which everybody followed rules 
which would bring about the optimal possible outcome (this would typically be a higher 
fair share than one’s fair share relative to the factual status quo). 
Both left-libertarianism and luck egalitarianism combined with rule consequentialism 
plausibly support the fair shares thesis. But some have also suggested luck egalitarianism 
might support the fair shares thesis without a rule consequentialist criterion of rightness. 
For example, Peter Vallentyne has proposed that a luck egalitarian account of the 
redistributive duties that we owe to each other could hold that 
an agent with more than her fair share owes (at least a pro tanto) duty, to each 
of those with less than his fair share […] to make the distribution as good as 
possible without the agent leaving herself less than her fair share.22 
Similarly, G.A. Cohen asked why rich egalitarians faced with unjust inequality do not 
“pursue equality by donating the extra that [they] would lack in a just society to poor 
people” and assumes that “no one is obliged to sacrifice so much that she drops to a 
level worse than she would be at in an egalitarian society”.23 
I suspect that some people are attracted to this view because it is intuitive that, from an 
egalitarian perspective, people are owed equal shares of that which is already unequally 
distributed. This view also seems to naturally cohere with the belief that an ideally 
egalitarian government ought to redistribute everything above their fair share through 
taxation. This view might be explained in two ways.  
1.4.1 The Fair Shares Thesis and Inequality Measurement 
One could try to defend the fair shares thesis by combining luck egalitarianism with 
some ways of measuring the badness of inequality. If the amount of inequality in a 
distribution is determined wholly by (1) the number of individuals who are worse off 
than average (relative to the amount of the metric of equality in the factual status quo), 
(2) the deviation from a state in which all existing goods are equally distributed, or (3) 
the aggregation of the differences between people’s counterfactual fair share and their 
22 Peter Vallentyne, “Justice, Interpersonal Morality, and Luck Egalitarianism” in Distributive Justice 
and Access to Advantage ed. by Alexander Kaufman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 
p.9. 
23 Cohen, If You're an Egalitarian, How Come You're So Rich?, p.161 and p.176. 
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actual shares, then a transfer which makes someone worse off than their fair share might 
worsen inequality. 
However, we should be sceptical about whether these measures of the badness of 
inequality are plausible. All three contradict the Pigou-Dalton principle, which states 
that all even, non-rank-switching transfers from a better off individual to a worse off 
individual, which leave others unaffected in an absolute sense, reduce inequality.24 Many 
transfers which satisfy the Pigou-Dalton principle would not reduce inequality on each 
of these measures because they would not reduce the number of people who are worse 
off than average or alter the aggregate deviation from a state in which the metric of 
equality is equally distributed.25  
For example, redistribution from the best-off person to someone who is just above the 
average, or redistribution from a person who is just below the average to the worst-off 
person would neither alter the amount of people who are worse off than average nor the 
deviation from a state in which existing goods are equally distributed, but such transfers 
would satisfy the Pigou-Dalton principle. 
The first two measures of inequality also counterintuitively imply that it is better, from 
an egalitarian perspective, to raise someone who is just below their fair share up to their 
fair share rather than benefit someone who is much worse off whom we cannot raise to 
the level of their fair share, because only the number of people with their fair share is 
what determines the amount of inequality in society as a whole. 
None of our better ways of comparing unequal outcomes imply that individuals have no 
reason to redistribute benefits any further once they reach or fall below their fair share. 
More plausible ways of comparing unequal outcomes turn out to support the 
maximisation thesis (I will postpone defending this point for now). 
24 See Hugh Dalton, “The Measurement of the Inequality of Incomes”, The Economic Journal, 30 
(1920), 348-61, revisited in Anthony B. Atkinson and Andrea Bandolini, “Unveiling the Ethics Behind 
Inequality Measurement”, The Economic Journal, 125 (2015), 209-34. 
25 A similar discussion, in relation to distributive justice and the Pigou-Dalton Principle can be found in 
Matthew Adler, “The Pigou Dalton Principle and the Structure of Distributive Justice” (Working 
Paper, 2013). 
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1.4.2 The Fair Shares Thesis and Partial Compliance 
Luck egalitarians might be tempted to adopt the fair shares thesis by drawing on 
arguments about duties of beneficence (requirements to promote the well-being of 
others) and duties to avert harm in situations of partial compliance. Situations of partial 
compliance are situations in which members of a group of people have a moral duty to 
act to bring about a good outcome or avoid a bad outcome, where responsibility is fairly 
divided between each member of the group, and at least one person does not carry out 
their fair share of this duty. I will set out two ways of thinking about such situations in 
more detail and then explain why I don’t think they work in the case of inequality. 
In Moral Demands in Non-Ideal Theory, Liam Murphy argues, against act 
consequentialism, that the moral requirements of beneficence are constrained by 
fairness.26 He points out that when some people do not bring about the best outcome, 
an individual acting on the requirements of beneficence will be doing more than their 
fair share, since they would be making sacrifices that they would not be asked to make if 
everybody did as they ought. He concludes that each person is only required to make the 
same sacrifices for the sake of promoting the well-being of others that they would make 
in the counterfactual world in which everybody did as they ought in order to bring 
about an optimal outcome. 
Similarly, in “Taking Up the Slack”, David Miller considers the requirements of justice 
in situations in which several agents share a duty to avert an unjust harm at moderate 
cost and some agents do not do not carry out their fair share of that responsibility.27 
Examples of these kinds of situations in the actual world mentioned by Miller include 
the alleviation of world poverty, the conservation of natural resources, and the aversion 
of environmental catastrophe. Miller concludes that in situations of partial compliance, 
individuals are generally only duty-bound, as a matter of justice, to do what they would 
be required to do under full compliance because that that fully serves their 
responsibility; people are not responsible, as a matter of justice, for what others do or 
26 Liam Murphy, Moral Demands in Non-Ideal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
27 David Miller, “Taking Up The Slack? Responsibility and Justice in Situations of Partial Compliance” 
in Responsibility and Distributive Justice ed. by in Carl Knight and Zofia Stemplowska (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011). Miller discusses what he calls duties of justice, but these are duties of 
justice in the sense of the duties that we owe to each other as a matter of right, rather than distributive 
justice. 
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not do. (Miller grants that there might be a humanitarian obligation to take up the slack 
in morally urgent cases, for example, when the lives of innocents are at stake.) 28 
However, there are at least three respects in which reducing inequality differs from 
duties of beneficence and duties to avert harm, and these differences provide good 
grounds to deny that these arguments support the fair shares view when it comes to 
reducing inequality. 
First, while the objection to taking up the slack in cases of beneficence or averting harm 
is made on the grounds of fairness, fairness is an aspect of the very thing we are trying 
to promote in the case of reducing inequality. Fairness seems to pull us in different 
directions. Which situation is more unfair: asking someone to take up the slack in order 
to ameliorate the unfairness or leaving some worse off than they could be in the name of 
fairly distributing the responsibility for reducing inequality? In many cases, the latter 
answer will be more unfair. Consider cases in which the costs of doing more than one’s 
fair share are modest and the benefits to the worse off are large.29 More plausibly, the 
requirements of fair redistribution are set by ratio of prospective costs to the distributor 
and benefits to recipients. 
Second, in the case of averting harm or promoting the well-being of others, there is 
typically one optimal outcome to aim for, even if we can move closer to the outcome in 
degrees. For example, when it comes to harm aversion, the optimal outcome is one in 
which harm is completely averted, although in some cases we may be able to reduce 
harm in degrees (for example, if there are multiple lives at stake). And when it comes to 
promoting the well-being of others, there is one optimal state (or multiple optimal states 
which are equally good), although we will typically be able to promote the well-being of 
others in degrees. In these cases, a person’s fair contribution can be identified with 
reference to what they would have to do if everybody fairly contributed to the 
realisation of the optimal outcome. (There seems to be no reason for an agent to do 
their fair share in situations of partial compliance in which a threshold needs to be 
passed, which could not be passed by an agent doing only their fair share). 
By contrast, there are many different outcomes which could reduce inequality. When it 
comes to teleological views, it is mistaken to attach moral significance to the absolute 
28 Miller also observes that “[e]veryone can agree that in these cases compliers have a strong reason to 
take up the slack” in “Taking Up The Slack”, p.242. 
29 Keith Horton raises this objection to Murphy in “Fairness and Fair Shares”, Utilitas, 23.1 (2011), 
88-93 (p.92). 
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level of advantage people would have in any counterfactually egalitarian world since 
equality is concerned with how individuals fare relative to others, rather than how they 
fare absolutely. Inequality can be reduced in degrees, or by increasing or decreasing the 
amount of goods to be distributed (by levelling up or down), in addition to 
redistributing the goods that already exist, and so there is no uniquely egalitarian 
counterfactual alternative. 
One might say that there is something morally special about the “closest state of 
equality” with the implication being that is the state in which existing goods are equally 
distributed. But one could also think of the closest egalitarian state as being the one in 
which the least amount of the metric of equality has to be added or removed from the 
distribution in order to realise equality.30 
The third difference is related to the second. The idea that one ought to do one’s “fair 
share” derives its force from the idea that some moral obligations are collective or 
shared, in a way which is irreducible to individual moral obligations.31 There are 
situations where it is clear that people ought to act together to avert harm or promote a 
good outcome. This seems plausible in cases in which the harm to be averted, or the 
good outcome to be brought about, could not be achieved by individuals acting alone. 
But it is not clear that inequality, as a feature of states of affairs, is something that we 
are collectively responsible for removing.  
To say that inequality is a bad feature of an outcome is to imply that there is reason to 
reduce or remove the inequality, but it does not imply, by itself, that people are 
collectively responsible for doing so. Whether one ought to reduce inequality will 
typically depend on the balance of reasons for and against doing so. To be sure, one 
could think of the realisation of equality as a collective responsibility. For instance, one 
might think that inequality is bad only when it harms people by making some worse off 
than they could otherwise be. Then the duty to reduce inequality becomes an example of 
30 Larry Temkin, “Exploring the Roots of Egalitarian Concerns”, Theoria, 69 (2003), 125-51 (p.138). 
31 William Edmundson has argued that some group agents, like democratic states, are bound by moral 
requirements which fairly divide amongst each member of the group owing to the fact that the group 
agent roughly expresses the will of the group (provided that sufficient standards of democratic 
legitimacy are met), and each member is morally required to fulfil their share and only their share, 
regardless of what others do, in “Distributive Justice and Distributed Obligations”, The Journal of 
Moral Philosophy (2017) and “Ought We Do What We Ought to Be Made to Do?” in Reasons and 
Intentions in Law and Practical Agency ed. by George Pavlakos and Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
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harm aversion, in the sense that Miller discusses. But that is not a feature of teleological 
views like luck egalitarianism. 
In my view, the arguments in defence of doing one’s fair share in terms of beneficence 
and averting harm do not readily export to the problem of reducing inequality in 
situations of partial compliance with its requirements. Aside from left-libertarian views 
and teleological views combined with rule consequentialism, there is little egalitarian 
reason to support the fair shares thesis. Some of the reasons for rejecting the fair shares 
thesis point us towards a different, and, in my view, better answer: the maximisation 
thesis. 
1.5 The Maximisation Thesis 
The maximisation thesis says that everyone, other than the worst-off person in society, 
has an egalitarian reason to maximise their contribution to reducing inequality by 
redistributing or foregoing benefits until doing so any further would worsen inequality, 
relative to the factual status quo. On this view, there may well be an egalitarian reason 
to make oneself worse off than one would be in counterfactual worlds in which the 
metric of equality is equally distributed, and there may sometimes be an egalitarian 
reason to redistribute benefits until one is no better off than the worst-off person in 
society.  
For example, suppose, for the sake of argument, that the metric of equality is welfare 
and suppose further that the timespan of egalitarian concern is whole lives. If the 
maximisation thesis is correct, then we have an egalitarian reason, over the course of 
our whole lives, to sacrifice our own welfare in order to improve the lives of the worse 
off than us until any further sacrifices would worsen inequality. 
The maximisation thesis is supported, I believe, by luck egalitarianism (or equality as 
comparative fairness) and equality as competing claims. These two views compare how 
people fare relative to each other, and, on these views, there is no uniquely egalitarian 
counterfactual distribution which we can use to determine fair shares; we can either 
increase or reduce inequality by increasing or decreasing the extent to which people’s 
shares of the metric of equality differ. To illustrate this point, consider two of our best 
ways of comparing the relative injustice or badness of different unequal distributions, 
neither of which support the conclusion that there ceases to be an egalitarian reason for 




1.5.1 Distributive Patterns & Egalitarian Complaints 
The first way of comparing unequal distributions is to adopt Larry Temkin’s account of 
equality as comparative fairness. On this view, the badness of inequality resides in the 
impersonal disvalue of the pattern of welfare that obtains across a population. Temkin 
proposes that we measure the badness of inequality in a situation by assigning each 
individual an egalitarian complaint, the size of which is determined by how they fare 
relative to others. 
Temkin suggests that the size of an individual complaint may be determined by the size 
of the gap between each individual and (1) the best-off person within the population, or 
(2) each of the individuals who are better off than them, or (3) the average level of 
advantage. On the first two views, everybody, other than the best-off person, has an 
egalitarian complaint. On the third view, everybody below the average level of 
advantage will have an egalitarian complaint and everyone above the average level will 
not.32 The size of the inequality in any distribution is a function of these egalitarian 
complaints. 
Temkin also proposes three ways of determining the overall amount of inequality in a 
distribution: (1) an additive view, in which one distribution is more equal than another 
if the sum of complaints is smaller, (2) a weighted additive view in which one 
distribution is more equal than another if the sum of weighted complaints is smaller, 
and (3) a maximum view, in which one distribution is more equal than another if the 
largest complaint is smaller. 
An implication of the additive and weighted additive views is that if a complaint can be 
reduced or removed without giving rise to an equivalent or larger complaint elsewhere 
in the distribution, then inequality has been reduced (on the maximum view, only 
reducing the size of the largest complaint would reduce inequality). There is nothing 
about this view which precludes inequality from being reduced by redistributions which 
cause a person’s goods to fall below their fair share, as I will shortly illustrate. 
1.5.2 Competing Claims & Justifiability to Each 
Another way of measuring the badness of injustice of inequality is to adopt Thomas 
Nagel’s competing claims view.33 In contrast to Temkin’s view, on this view injustice 
32 Temkin, Inequality, Chapter 2. 
33 Thomas Nagel, “Equality” in Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). 
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does not reside in distributive patterns, or outcomes, but rather in the extent to which 
individuals’ competing claims are fairly satisfied. 
The size of each individual claim is determined by the following features: (1) each 
individual has a claim to an outcome, or benefit, if it makes them better off, (2) the 
larger the possible increase in advantage available to them, the stronger their claim, and 
(3) the lower the absolute level of advantage they are at, the stronger their claim. One 
distribution is more just than another if, and only if, it more fairly satisfies everyone’s 
competing claims in proportion to their strength. 
An implication of this view is that if a claim can be satisfied without giving rise to an 
equivalent or larger claim, then the outcome will more fairly satisfy people’s competing 
claims. But again, there is nothing about this view which precludes unfair inequality 
from being reduced by redistributions which cause a person’s benefits to fall below their 
fair share, providing a claim is satisfied without giving rise to an equivalent or larger 
claim.  
So, on Temkin’s complaint view, redistribution from better to worse off reduces 
inequality if it reduces the aggregate magnitude of egalitarian complaints, and on an 
adaptation of Nagel’s competing claims view, redistribution from a better off to a worse 
off person reduces inequality if it results in a fairer satisfaction of claims.34 Neither of 
these views imply that individuals can do nothing more to reduce injustice once they 
have done their “fair share” relative to the status quo or any counterfactual state of 
equality.35 
Consider the following illustration, making the simplifying assumptions that that each 
person has an equal claim to a share of the goods to be distributed and (perhaps 
contrary to fact) that people do not have special claims or entitlements to things they 
have already legally earned or been given under the distribution which constitutes the 
status quo. 
34 There is some evidence that these conclusions are not widely supported by people’s intuitive 
judgements. Yoram Amiel and Frank Cowell’s Thinking About Inequality (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), (pp. 39-46), reports that respondents to questions about the Pigou-Dalton 
principle disagreed over whether all even transfers from a person who has more of a good to a person 
who has less, where the absolute positions of others remained unchanged, reduced inequality. 
35 A third way of comparing unequal distributions is to ask how an agent acting in their rational self-
interest would rank the distributions behind a non-probablistic veil of ignorance which strips them of 
all knowledge of who they are. On this view, one distribution is more just than another if it would be 
rationally preferred behind the veil of ignorance, but I shall set aside this measure. 
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 Person A Person B Person C 
D1 1 3 5 
D2 2 2 5 
Each of the following is true. (1) The “fair share” of each individual within these 
distributions, relative to the status quo, is 3. (2) D2 could be brought about from D1 by 
a transfer from Person B to Person A. (3) When comparing the distributive patterns, D2 
is more equal than D1 on the “relative to everyone” view of complaints combined with 
the additive and weighted additive views, and on the maximin view combined with any 
of the ways of determining the size of an egalitarian complaint.36 
D2 also more fairly satisfies competing claims than D1, due to the fact that, being worse 
off in absolute terms in D1, A has a stronger claim to benefits than B. What this 
example shows is that on each of these ways of measuring the badness or injustice of 
inequality, there is still an egalitarian reason for a person to redistribute benefits to the 
worse off even when they reach, or fall below, their fair share. 
We can also go further and say that D2 is more just than D1, since it is plausibly true 
that, other things being equal, for any two Pareto incomparable distributions concerning 
the same population and roughly the same overall amount of goods, the distribution 
which is more equal is more just.37 
36 It is true that D1 and D2 do not differ in terms of inequality on the “relative to average” and 
“relative to best-off” view of complaints combined with the non-weighted additive view. These 
measures support the fair shares thesis, although, as I have argued, they have counterintuitive 
implications which should lead us to be suspicious about their plausibility. 
37 For example, a pluralist egalitarian would consider an equal distribution more just than an unequal 
distribution containing the same amount of goods. An equal distribution would be more justifiable to 
each person than an unequal distribution containing the same amount of goods, other things being 
equal. 
This definition of unjust inequality is consistent with the claims that (a) equality is only one aspect of 
distributive justice to be balanced alongside other, distinct values, (b) inequality is only unjust when, 
and because it makes some worse off than they could otherwise be, and (c) an equal distribution is less 
just than an unequal, Pareto superior distribution.  
Moreover, prioritarianism would also favour a more equal distribution over a less equal one when the 
amount of goods to be distributed remains fixed. It would also be in everyone’s rational self-interest to 
prefer a more equal distribution to a less equal distribution containing the same amount of goods 
behind a non-probabilistic veil of ignorance. 
 
                                                             
35 
 
Of course, people in unequal societies are differently located with respect to inequality 
and it is always best, from an egalitarian perspective, for transfers to go from the best-
off person possible to the worst-off person possible. Furthermore, it is plausible that 
absolute gaps between people’s shares of the metric of equality are morally worse at low 
levels than high levels. For example, the inequality in (10, 20) is worse than the 
inequality in (100, 110), even though the absolute size of the gap between the two 
individuals is the same in each. Accordingly, the egalitarian reason is scalar: one’s 
egalitarian reason to redistribute benefits is stronger the better off you are in comparison 
to others for the simple reason that the more one has to redistribute, the greater the size 
and amount of egalitarian complaints that one can reduce or remove, and the harder it 
is to justify retaining one’s holdings in light of the greater claims of others. 
I should acknowledge some of the further complexities raised by these measures of 
inequality. On the complaint view, not all transfers from a better off person to a worse 
off person will reduce inequality for the following reason: any transfer will alter the 
relative levels of individuals whose absolute share of goods is unaffected by the transfer. 
That is, a transfer from one person to another could increase or decrease the size of the 
egalitarian complaints of otherwise unaffected individuals, and, indeed, the overall 
number of egalitarian complaints within the distribution. By contrast, on the competing 
claims view, this makes no difference. For that reason, the two accounts are not 
extensionally equivalent. All transfers that reduce inequality on the complaints account, 
however, will form a subset of the transfers which reduce injustice on the competing 
claims account. 
Finally, many possible redistributive acts do not meet the simplifying assumptions I 
introduced in the illustrative example. The example shows an even redistribution in 
which the value of the transferred good does not increase or decrease during the transfer 
and, consequently, the total amount of goods to be distributed remains fixed.  
Redistributive acts can also be efficient or inefficient (leaky), rather than even, and thus 
increase or decrease the total amount of the metric of equality. For example, if money 
has diminishing marginal utility, and the metric of equality is welfare, then transfers of 
money from a better off person to a worse off person will be efficient and increase the 
total amount of the metric of equality. Redistributive transfers can also result in the 
parties to the transfer changing location within the distribution, that is, a person who 
has more of a good than the recipient ends up with less than the recipient.  
These are all interesting complexities that require additional examination. But as far as 




and the competing claims view goes (at least when it comes to even transfers), my 
argument concludes here. 
1.6 Two Problems 
In this final section, I confront some problems for the maximisation thesis which are of 
practical importance and offer an interesting route for further enquiry. If either problem 
is insurmountable, then some of the above conclusions are practically insignificant in a 
range of realistic situations. Since this is a result I wish to avoid, I explore some ways of 
overcoming them. 
The first problem concerns the egalitarian reason to redistribute benefits for the sake of 
equality. When some patterns of inequality obtain across large populations, the 
maximisation thesis faces a practical trilemma. To repeat, the maximisation thesis says 
that everyone, other than the worst-off person(s), has an egalitarian reason to reduce 
inequality, relative to the factual status quo.  
To illustrate the trilemma, consider the following situation in which there is a small 
group of very well-off people and a much larger group of worse off people. The 
illustration depicts a population of 100 people. Suppose for the sake of illustration that 
the metric of equality is wealth. In D1, which represents the status quo, two individuals 
A and B, are equally well-off and 98 individuals are equally badly-off. Suppose B is 
unwilling to redistribute anything for the sake of equality and A must choose whether to 
unilaterally redistribute. A faces at least three options. 
 Person 1 Person 2 … Person 98 Person A Person B 
D1 1 1 1 1 100 100 
D2 1 1 1 10 90 100 
D3 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 90 100 
D4 2 2 2 2 2 100 
The first option, represented by D2, is to transfer a fixed amount of wealth which falls 
short of a maximal sacrifice (in this example, 10 units) to one of the worse off 
individuals (this could also be modified so that A disperses a fixed amount of wealth 
across a small subset of the worse off members population). But by doing so, inequality 
is worsened in some respects. Although the gap between A and all of the worse off 98 
people has been reduced, there is now unfair inequality where none existed previously: 




The second option, represented by D3, is to transfer a fixed amount of wealth which 
falls short of a maximal sacrifice (again, in this example, ten units) and equally disperse 
it across all 98 of the worse off people. But this only very trivially reduces the gap 
between the worse off and the better off and it introduces unfair inequality between A 
and B where there was no inequality before. 
The third option, represented by D4, is to make a maximal sacrifice by transferring 98 
units of wealth and equally dispersing it across all of the 98 worse off people. But again, 
this only trivially reduces inequality. Although it completely removes the gap between A 
and the rest of the population, it does not do much to close the gap between the worse 
off and the best-off, and it introduces a new large gap between A and B where none 
existed previously. 
Although D4 is probably the best distribution from an egalitarian perspective (though 
this is by no means obvious) the cost to A of bringing it about is extremely high. And, 
other than act consequentialists, most people believe that people cannot be morally 
required to make great sacrifices in order to bring about trivial improvements in 
outcomes. Although there is an egalitarian reason to widely disperse benefits, this reason 
is extremely trivial, and is unlikely to ever be of sufficient weight to become a moral 
requirement. 
What this shows is that in certain unequal situations containing some patterns of 
inequality, unilateral redistribution may worsen inequality, or only reduce it very 
trivially. This is a problem because one might assume that situations with a small 
wealthy elite and a much larger population of worse off people are paradigmatic 
examples of situations in which the rich have an egalitarian reason to unilaterally 
redistribute benefits. Yet the opposite seems to be sometimes true: the more unequal the 
society, the more defensible it is to retain benefits. 
Now, depending on how the facts of the illustration are filled out, the benefits to the 
lives of the worse off people may be fairly substantial, and there would be clear reasons 
of beneficence to make the transfer. But from an egalitarian perspective, the 
improvement in terms of reducing unfair inequality is very small. The trilemma is 
magnified across much larger populations in which the ratio between the worse off and 
better off is roughly the same as depicted in the example. The example, recall, concerns 
a population of only 100 people. The implications of the trilemma are much more 
pronounced across populations of thousands or millions because the egalitarian reason 
to independently redistribute benefits would become increasingly trivial as the size of the 




I think there are at least three responses to this problem. First, it is much more of a 
worry for some metrics of equality than others. If the metric of equality is wealth, then 
in circumstances of extreme inequality of wealth, this problem would be acute. But if the 
metric of equality is welfare, for example, then the problem is typically likely to be less 
acute. That is because, since welfare cannot be transferred directly, the egalitarian 
reason to redistribute benefits will take the form of transferring the sources of welfare, 
like money. And given its diminishing marginal utility, transfers of money will not be so 
trivial, from the perspective of reducing inequality of welfare. 
Second, in these situations, we should conclude that direct transfers of the metric of 
equality are not the best way to serve egalitarian ends as individuals. Instead, the best 
way to reduce inequality may be to direct resources to schemes which help to eliminate 
the sources of unfair inequality by directing resources into better health-care, education, 
housing, and so on. Again, the best way of doing this will depend on the metric of 
equality. 
Third, we should concede that there are only very trivial objective egalitarian reasons for 
the well-off to carry out direct transfers in these kinds of cases. But we might still think 
that people with egalitarian beliefs still have good reasons to redistribute benefits, 
despite the fact that doing so would only make the outcome trivially better from an 
egalitarian perspective. 
To draw an analogy, suppose, for the sake of argument, that refusing to purchase and 
eat factory farmed meat made absolutely no causal difference to the amount of suffering 
endured by non-human animals. I think that people who believe that factory farming 
animals for meat is morally abhorrent still have a subjective reason to refrain from 
participating in, and financially contributing to, a practice that they regard as deeply 
wrong, even if so refraining makes no causal difference to the amount of suffering 
endured by non-human animals. But people who falsely believe that factory farming is 
permissible do not obviously have any reason to refrain from contributing to that 
suffering when doing so would make no causal difference (although there might be 
objective reasons to refrain from individual complicity in collective wrongdoing even 
when one’s own contribution is neither necessary nor sufficient). 
Similarly, people with egalitarian beliefs have a reason to refrain from benefitting from 
what they regard as an unfair distribution of the metric of equality. There may be 
reasons to avoid complicity in something that one considers unfair or unjust. There are 
of course salient differences between the factory farming example and inequality. For 




Whereas in the case of unfair inequality, people with egalitarian beliefs may regard 
inequality as bad, but not think it wrong. Moreover, to purchase or consume factory 
farmed meat is to actively take steps to contribute to wrongdoing, whereas to benefit 
from unfair inequality takes the form of allowing or sustaining something that one 
objects to. Nevertheless, I would suggest that this gives rise to a reason to refrain from 
complicity, even if doing so only makes trivial improvements to the distribution of the 
metric of equality. 
Finally, I think that the competing claims view is better placed than luck egalitarianism 
to deal with this problem. That is because the competing claims view doesn’t, or at least 
doesn’t merely say that we should reduce inequality because it improves states of affairs. 
What’s essential to the view is that we should reduce inequality when and because it 
cannot be justified to those who are worse off. The inability to justify retaining benefits 
in the face of the greater claims of others seems to give rise to a more significant reason 
to redistribute benefits than negligibly improving outcomes. 
The second problem for the maximisation thesis concerns foregoing benefits for the sake 
of equality. Foregoing benefits can occur in at least two ways. First, it can take the 
counter-Paretian form of refusing to accept a benefit which would worsen inequality but 
with the result that the benefit will not be bestowed upon anybody. This would be the 
case, for example, if someone refrained from using expensive private healthcare or first-
class seats on planes and trains even though doing so would not benefit anybody. (One 
could, of course, use the money to pay for someone else who is much worse off to secure 
the benefit, but that would be redistributive.) 
Second, it can take the form of refusing to accept a benefit when doing so will result in 
another equally well-off individual securing the benefit instead. This would be the case, 
for example, if someone refused to pay for an expensive education but this made no 
difference to the number or social composition of people who are unfairly well-
educated. 
From the perspective of fairness, it does not make a difference whether or not one 
foregoes benefits that will be enjoyed by other equally well-off people anyway. And 
from an all things considered perspective, there does not seem to be a decisive reason 
make counter-Paretian decisions. The problem implies that foregoing benefits is 
pointless from an egalitarian perspective and unnecessary from an all things considered 
perspective. Of course, in some cases, foregoing a benefit will reduce unfairness without 




instead be bestowed on a worse off person, there is an egalitarian reason to forego the 
benefit. But often, this will not be the case. 
I think that luck egalitarianism and the competing claims view are ill-equipped to 
explain how there could be a sufficient or decisive reason to forego benefits for the sake 
of equality in the kinds of situations described above (although I would again suggest 
that people with egalitarian beliefs have subjective reasons to refrain from accepting 
benefits that they consider unfair). 
However, other aspects of egalitarianism are better able to explain why there could be a 
sufficient or decisive egalitarian reason to forego benefits in these kinds of situations. 
For example, I think social egalitarianism, or “non-intrinsic egalitarianism”, is better 
equipped to explain why there is an egalitarian reason to forego benefits for the sake of 
equality. To accept unfair benefits is to make an exception of oneself, to enjoy things 
that others can’t, and in many cases, never will. Accepting a large amount of unfair 
benefits insulates oneself from some of the hardships that others face, whereas foregoing 
benefits avoids that moral taint. 
Moreover, deontological egalitarian views which object to distributive inequality when 
and because it results from treating people unequally may imply that there is an 
egalitarian reason to forego benefits. One form of treating people unequally is to 
causally perpetuate institutions which work to the unfair advantage of some at the 
expense of others. Accordingly, when accepting unfair benefits contributes to the 
perpetuation of unfair institutions, there is an egalitarian reason to refrain from doing 
so. 
Individual aspects of egalitarianism, considered in isolation, will, in various situations, 
imply that individuals have no egalitarian reason to unilaterally redistribute or forego 
benefits. However, if we take into account the full arsenal of egalitarian considerations, 
there is a wide spectrum of reasons to do so.  
1.7 Conclusion 
I started by asking what egalitarianism demands of individuals in unequal societies. I 
said that there are at least three appealing answers to the question, and, given the 
diversity of reasons to object to inequality, it is unsurprising that different egalitarian 




The institutional thesis is supported by some varieties of instrumental egalitarianism, 
deontological egalitarianism, procedural egalitarianism and contractualist 
egalitarianism. If the entirety of egalitarian concern was captured in those views, as 
some believe, then there is only a very trivial egalitarian reason for individuals in 
unequal societies to redistribute or forego benefits for the sake of equality. But those 
views do not capture the full spectrum of egalitarian concern. 
The fair shares thesis is supported by left-libertarianism and luck egalitarianism 
combined with rule consequentialism. It is also supported by combining luck 
egalitarianism with some implausible measures of inequality, but otherwise lacks 
support. The rationale for adopting the fair shares thesis in the case of beneficence and 
the duty to avert harm do not extend to the case of reducing inequality. This is a 
surprising result, since some have mistakenly assumed that the fair shares thesis is 
supported by luck egalitarianism. 
The maximisation thesis is supported by equality as comparative fairness and the 
competing claims view, at least. On these views, there is an egalitarian reason for each 
individual in an unequal society to maximise their contribution to reducing inequality, 
relative to the factual status quo. An implication of this is that there is still an egalitarian 
reason to redistribute benefits even if this makes a person worse off than they would be 
in the counterfactual world in which all existing goods were equally distributed. 
So what does egalitarianism demand of individuals in unequal societies? In my view, 
because the institutional thesis derives support only from views which do not capture 
the full spectrum of egalitarian concern, and the fair shares thesis is unsupported by the 
logic of most egalitarian views, we should regard the maximisation thesis as the most 




2 IF YOU’RE AN EGALITARIAN, WHY NOT ROB A BANK? 
2.1 Introduction 
There are many ways of reducing unfair inequality. Some are morally permissible. It is 
permissible for a legitimate government to impose coercive taxation in order redistribute 
money from the better to worse off. Others are impermissible. It is wrong to forcibly 
redistribute kidneys, eyeballs, or bone marrow for the sake of equality. Sometimes rights 
stand in the way of fairness. 
In some cases, however, the moral status of egalitarian redistribution is less clear. One 
class of difficult cases are those in which individuals reduce unfair inequality by 
possessing or redistributing money and property which legally belongs to somebody else, 
without the informed consent of the legal owner, and without providing compensation.1 
I will call this egalitarian vigilantism. Such flouting of property laws can take many 
forms, including banditry, embezzlement, fraud, looting, occupation, and trespass. Here 
are two examples. 
In April 1932, over 400 people, led by Benny Rothman, an activist in the Young 
Communist League of Manchester, conducted a deliberate mass trespass of Kinder 
Scout, a moorland plateau in the Peak District in the North of England, legally owned 
by the Duke of Devonshire. According to a report in the Manchester Guardian: 
Triumphant, the marchers gathered on the peak before returning to Hayfield 
singing The Red Flag and The Internationale and shouting “Down with the 
landlords and ruling class and up with the workers!” and “Down with the 
bobbies!” By the time they reached Hayfield the police presence had grown 
considerably and five “ringleaders” were arrested.2 
1 Although typically such vigilante acts are illegal, some legal regimes permit the intentional 
infringement of legal property rights in the right circumstances. For example, the legal doctrines of 
adverse possession, acquiescence, and necessity all allow people to acquire the legal title to property 
through infringing the legal entitlements of others. 
2 Reported in the Manchester Guardian, 25th April, 1932. Trespass was not actually a criminal offence 
in the United Kingdom in 1932. The arrests were made because the trespassers were involved in a 
violent skirmish with gamekeepers armed with sticks. 
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The stated purpose of the trespass was to protest against the Enclosure Acts, a series of 
Acts of Parliament which confiscated common land and bestowed legal rights of 
ownership onto private landowners, as well as to draw attention to the inequality and 
poverty of the 1930s.3 The trespass contributed to the eventual enactment of legislation 
which curtailed the legal rights of landowners to prevent the general population from 
accessing land, including the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949, 
and the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000. 
In 2010, the Greek economy was in crisis which was partly caused, some believe, by 
financial corruption in state-owned banks. In February of that year, an armed man 
walked into a branch of the Greek National Bank and stole 250,000 euros. In October, 
the same man carried out two additional bank raids and escaped with 240,000 euros. It 
is alleged that the culprit was Vassilis Paleokostas, also known as the “Greek Robin 
Hood”. 
Paleokostas was known to the police because he was responsible for carrying out a 
crime spree over the course of three decades, during which he stole millions from state-
owned banks, kidnapped rich tycoons in order to extort ransoms, and then redistributed 
the proceeds to impoverished rural farmers. According to his family and friends, 
“Vassilis suffered his bosses’ capitalist exploitation, working as a wage slave in a 
factory. So, he turned against those bosses. [He] may have been a thief, but never a 
criminal”. At the time of writing, he remains a fugitive.4 
I take it that while many would regard the mass trespass of Kinder Scout as a 
paradigmatic example of permissible direct action against the unequal distribution of 
land, many would have some reservations about whether the bank robberies and 
extortions were permissible forms of retaliation to the unequal distribution of wealth. 
Do these judgements withstand scrutiny and, if so, how are they best explained? 
3 Benny Rothman, The 1932 Kinder Trespass: A Personal View of the Kinder Scout Mass Trespass 
(Altrincham: Willow Publishing, 1982), p.11. 
4 Reported in Jeff Maysh, ‘The Uncatchable’, BBC News Magazine, 25 September 2014. 
It appears that Paleokostas took to heart the Greek proverb: “If you steal something small, you are a 
petty thief, but if you steal millions, you are a gentleman of society”. There are many other examples of 
“modern day Robin Hoods”. To give one, in the early and mid-20th century, some Spanish and 
Argentinian anarchists practiced a doctrine of “expropriative anarchism”, and employed robbery, 
scams, and fraud as a means of financing rebellious activities. See Eric J. Hobsbawm, Bandits (London: 
Abacus, 2001), Chapter 8 for that example and others. 
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In this chapter, I examine the variables governing the permissibility of egalitarian 
vigilantism and, although I do not pretend to reach a complete or precise set of 
conclusions, I try to illuminate what is morally at stake in order to justify judgements 
about clear cases and inform deliberations about more difficult ones. My central 
conclusion is that in partially unjust societies, individuals may sometimes permissibly 
expropriate money and disused property from groups (like banks, corporations, and the 
state) which culpably perpetrate injustice when democratic or other legal forms of 
recourse are highly unlikely to be effective, provided that any property losses 
experienced by individuals are indirect and widely dispersed, and such acts are not so 
widespread as to be counterproductive. 
The chapter proceeds in two stages. In the first part, I consider features of egalitarian 
vigilantism which make such actions easier or harder to justify independently of the 
justice or injustice of property laws. I argue that there are at least six dimensions across 
which an act of vigilantism may be easier or harder to justify. 
The second part of the chapter is divided into three smaller sections and explores how 
the permissibility of egalitarian vigilantism varies in accordance with the extent to which 
property laws are unjust. 
In the first section I point out that, in some situations, flouting property laws in order to 
reduce inequality is clearly impermissible. It would be morally wrong, as well as illegal, 
to expropriate money and property when property laws protect all and only moral 
property rights, property laws are decided upon through sufficiently fair procedures, or 
the distribution of the currency of justice is fair enough.  
We can, however, certainly rule out the view that egalitarian vigilantism is always 
wrong. In some situations, flouting property laws is clearly permissible. For example, 
Robin Hood’s acts of brigandage, real or imagined, are typically believed to be not only 
justified, but admirable acts of resistance against arbitrary inequality, as well as the 
injustice of tyranny and oppression. In the second section, I examine the reasons for 
thinking that egalitarian vigilantism is easier to justify when property laws are severely 
unjust. 
Intermediate cases between these two extremes are more difficult to judge. In the third 
section, I turn to the more interesting, complex and murky question of when it would be 
permissible to expropriate things which are legally owned when property laws are 
partially unjust. This question is more interesting because some legal property regimes in 
the actual world plausibly fall into this category. But it is also more complex and murky 




2.2 Preliminary Remarks 
Throughout, I make the following three assumptions.5 First, I take it for granted that 
reducing unfair inequality makes things better in one respect, and I assume that equality 
is one aspect of distributive justice. Other things being equal, reducing inequality 
reduces injustice.6 What distributive justice requires must be balanced against other 
moral considerations in order to determine what is morally required, permitted, and 
forbidden, all things considered. I assume that there are moral constraints which 
prohibit people from treating others in certain ways, without their consent. It is wrong 
to reduce inequality by transgressing these constraints. 
Second, we are sometimes morally permitted to disobey unjust laws. There is no general 
duty or obligation to obey all laws merely because they are laws. However, we are 
sometimes morally required to obey laws for some other reason.7 I will qualify this 
assumption by noting that the state may permissibly enforce a law even though it is 
permissible to disobey it. The permissibility of vigilantism does not entail anything 
about whether or not the state may permissibly arrest, convict, and punish vigilantes. 
Third, although people have moral property rights, under realistic conditions, people are 
sometimes not morally entitled to everything that they legally own.8 I understand 
5 Given alternative assumptions, the permissibility of egalitarian vigilantism would be more 
straightforward. For example, if act consequentialism is true, then the permissibility of an act of 
vigilantism would simply be determined by whether the act brings about consequences which are at 
least as good as any alternative act. If rule consequentialism is true, then the permissibility of an act of 
vigilantism would be determined by whether it would be required or prohibited by rules which, if 
followed by everyone, would make things go impartially best (even if a particular act of vigilantism 
which broke those rules would make things go impartially best). And if we do have a general moral 
obligation to obey all laws, then vigilantism would always be wrong. 
6 My arguments should apply whether inequality is bad when and because it is unfair, where the 
badness resides in the relation of some being worse off than others, or whether inequality is bad when 
and because it cannot be justified to each. My arguments could also be modified in accordance with the 
assumption that equality is not an aspect of distributive justice, but sufficiency is. With this 
modification, most of my arguments would still apply, but there would be a reason of justice to carry 
out vigilantism only in order to raise people to, or towards, a sufficiency threshold. 
7 See Christopher Heath Wellman and A. John Simmons, Is There a Duty to Obey the Law? For and 
Against (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
8 I will restrict my discussion to the dispossession and redistribution of tangible property and exclude 
intellectual property, although the permissibility of expropriating intellectual property is also of 
interest. Suppose, for example, that a vigilante could acquire information about how to manufacture a 
patented medicine that could improve the lives of many people. 
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property as a relation between persons regarding an object. If I have a cluster of legal 
rights to possess, use, derive income from, and transfer something, then you are legally 
forbidden from possessing, using, deriving income from, or transferring that thing. 
Similarly, if I have a set of moral rights to possess, use, derive income from, and transfer 
something, then you are morally prohibited from possessing, using, managing, deriving 
income from, or transferring that thing. 
If I have a legal right, but not a moral right, to something, then you have a legal duty to 
refrain from taking it, but you may have moral permission to take it. Similarly, if I have 
a moral right to something, but that right is not legally recognised, then you have a 
moral duty to refrain from taking it, even if that moral duty is not legally enforced.  
Taken together, these three independently plausible assumptions yield the possibility of 
circumstances in which a vigilante could reduce unjust inequality by breaking laws 
which are not morally binding, without violating moral property entitlements. If it 
would be wrong to do so, there must be some further factors at stake which act as 
overriding presumptions against egalitarian vigilantism. I now turn to consider what 
those presumptions may be. In order to set aside unnecessary complications throughout, 
I will assume that in each example, vigilantism reduces inequality both non-trivially, and 
in the most effective possible way.9 
Furthermore, I take moral property rights to be independent of the moral justification of a system or 
institution of legal property rights. The establishment of an institution of legal property rights may be 
morally justified on the grounds that, compared to possible alternatives, property rights secure stability 
in society. Nevertheless, as a matter of logical possibility, a legal system of property rights may be 
morally justified even though moral entitlements and legal entitlements do not perfectly correlate and 
some individual acts of lawbreaking are morally permissible. And although stability and order are 
important, another desideratum of a system of property rights is that it is responsive to reform and 
change in response to justified civil disobedience and changing social attitudes. 
9 A worry about my approach is that one might think that if you’re going to resort to dispossessing 
people of what they legally own, you ought to use the money to do the most impartial good that you 
can rather than using it merely to reduce unfair inequality. I grant this worry, but would add that if the 
arguments presented in the preceding chapter are correct, the demands of equality would often 
correlate with what is impartially best. In any case, my arguments still apply if we assume that vigilante 
action is aimed at doing what is impartially best rather than aimed at reducing inequality. 
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2.3 Dimensions of Vigilantism 
In this part of the chapter, I consider six dimensions across which the moral status of 
egalitarian vigilantism varies, independently of the degree to which property laws are 
unjust.  
2.3.1 Violence and Coercion 
It is easier to justify non-violent or non-coercive forms of vigilantism than violent or 
coercive ones (which is not to say that politically motivated violence and coercion is 
never justified). Recall the Greek bank robberies described at the outset. Although 
Vassilis Paleokostas did not physically harm anybody, he did terrorise innocent bank 
employees while armed with a weapon. He also kidnapped rich tycoons in order to 
exact ransoms.10 But not all forms of vigilantism take a violent or coercive form. 
Contrast Paleokostas’s bank robberies with the following made up case. 
Harmless Hacker 
A vigilante computer hacker gains access to the records of an exclusive bank. 
The hacker transfers large amounts of money from the accounts of the bank’s 
millionaire clients into another account, before withdrawing and redistributing it 
to the least well-off. 
This act of direct redistribution is intuitively more justifiable than the Greek bank 
robberies. Violent coercion, and the threat of it, violates moral constraints against 
interference. Treating people in such a way does not properly respect them as a person. 
Accordingly, there is a very strong presumption against it, even if doing so reduces 
unjust inequality. 
2.3.2 Varieties of Property 
It is harder to justify the forcible dispossession of some kinds of goods than others. 
Other things being equal, it is much worse to redistribute personal possessions, or 
property with special attachment claims, than disused buildings and land, food, and 
money, absent special attachment claims. 
10 He did not physically harm the people he kidnapped. One of his victims is reported to have said: 
“My kidnappers’ behaviour was not bad at all. I was not scared for myself. Actually, I enjoyed some 
wide-ranging discussions with the kidnappers.” 
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Some believe, and I agree, that personal possessions and property with special 
attachment claims are akin to an extension of one’s personhood, and control rights over 
them are a part of one’s personal sovereignty.11 Like violence, the expropriation of 
personal possessions, or the intrusion of property with special attachment claims (like 
home invasion) fails to respect the victim as a person. It would be presumptively wrong 
for even a democratically legitimate government, let alone an outlaw, to forcibly 
redistribute personal possessions or property with special attachment claims. For similar 
reasons, it is very hard to justify taking anything which is in someone’s current 
possession.  
By contrast, sometimes the link between property and personal sovereignty is weak or 
non-existent. Taking things which are not in the actual possession of the legal owner 
and lack special attachment claims, like money in a bank account or land and buildings 
which have long been left disused, is not an equivalent violation of personal sovereignty. 
It is also easier to justify the expropriation of money or food than property of either 
kind. There can be no special attachment claims to food and money (with the exception 
of collector’s items).  
Accordingly, the presumption against redistributing money, food, and disused buildings 
and land, absent special attachment claims, is much weaker than the presumption 
against the redistribution of personal possessions. There is a clear moral difference 
between poaching pheasants and pilfering gooseberries from the estate of a wealthy 
landowner and sneaking into the landowner’s home to steal a family heirloom of 
equivalent value.12 The mass trespass of Kinder Scout cannot plausibly be described as a 
violation of the 9th Duke of Devonshire’s personal sovereignty. 
2.3.4 Direct and Indirect Losses 
In my view, it is harder to justify directly imposing property losses on individuals, 
relative to the factual status quo, than to indirectly make people worse off than they 
would have been had vigilante action not occurred. The imposition of indirect losses 
takes at least two forms. First, it can take the form of diverting funds from intended 
11 For example, see Margaret Jane Radin, "Property and Personhood", Stanford Law Review, 34.5 
(1982), 957-1015 (p. 986). 
12 According to James C. Scott in Two Cheers for Anarchism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2012), p.11: “For the two centuries from roughly 1650 to 1850, poaching […] from Crown or private 
lands was the most popular [frequent and approved of] crime in England”. 
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recipients. For example, consider a clerk who is able to divert bequests to the arts or 
charities for pets and instead donate the money to organisations which help the needy. 
Second, it can take the form of imposing losses as an unintended side-effect. Consider 
the following example. 
Victimless Fraud 
An egalitarian vigilante has a variety of fake identities. He uses the fake 
identities to request personal and commercial loans from many different banks 
but has no intention of repaying them. Instead, once he has fraudulently 
obtained the money, he redistributes it to the least well-off. The losses are 
covered by the bank’s insurance, and are not directly passed on to individuals. 
The insurance company voluntarily chose to accept the risks of covering losses 
imposed by expropriation. 
In this case, no losses are directly imposed on individuals by the vigilante’s action. Other 
examples of “victimless” vigilantism are deliberate overpayment of welfare benefits by 
state employees, the embezzlement of funds by corporate employees, welfare fraud, 
minor tax evasion, and some transactions in the underground economy.13 
That being said, such acts may make people worse off than they would otherwise have 
been as a side-effect. For example, fraud may raise the price of insurance premiums. 
Minor tax evasion or welfare fraud takes funds that could have been otherwise 
distributed, and state action to tackle these transgressions gives rise to administrative 
costs, diverting funds that could have been distributed otherwise. 
However, imposing indirect losses as a side-effect is intuitively easier to justify than 
imposing direct losses. I would posit that this is explained by the fact that indirect losses 
are typically more causally distant from the point of action than direct losses and, in at 
least the examples described above, there is another agent in the causal chain that bears 
some responsibility for the outcome. 
2.3.5 Consolidated and Widely Dispersed Losses 
It is easier to justify egalitarian vigilantism when property losses are widely dispersed 
across people and time than when they are consolidated into a small number of people 
or imposed suddenly. 
13 See Tommie Shelby, “Justice, Deviance, and the Dark Ghetto”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 35.2 
(2007), 126-60 (p.152). 
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Plausibly, it is worse to impose a large harm on one person in order to benefit others 
than it is to widely disperse tiny harms on many people in order to benefit others.14 
Likewise, other things being equal, it is worse to impose large property losses on few 
people in order to benefits others than to widely disperse equivalent aggregate property 
losses across many people for the same purpose.  
Similarly, I think it is typically worse to impose a sudden property loss on someone in 
order to benefit others than it is to disperse the same loss gradually over a long period of 
time. Consider the following modification of the Harmless Hacker case. 
Harmless Hacker II 
A vigilante computer hacker gains access to the records of an exclusive bank. 
Gradually, over a period of first weeks, then months, and then years, the hacker 
transfers small amounts of funds from the accounts of each of the bank’s 
millionaire clients into another account, before withdrawing the money and 
redistributing it to the least well-off. Each individual transfer is so small that it 
goes undetected, even when the gradual accumulation of transfers amounts to 
millions of pounds. 
This act of vigilantism seems much easier to justify than the act described in the former 
Harmless Hacker case, which imposed sudden, non-trivial, property losses. This is 
plausibly because of the disruption to people’s lives that occurs when they suffer a 
sudden, non-trivial loss of holdings.15 It is not always wrong to impose sudden property 
losses: such a strong view attaches too much moral significance to the status quo. But I 
think it counts to some extent. 
2.3.4 Individuals & Group Entities 
It is harder to justify imposing property losses on individuals than imposing them on 
entities like banks, corporations, or the state. Vigilantism which targets individuals is 
14 Larry Temkin calls this the “Disperse Additional Burdens View”, Rethinking The Good: Moral 
Ideals and the Nature of Practical Reasoning (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), Chapter 3. 
15 In "Prerogatives to Depart From Equality", Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 58 (2006), 
95-111 (p.110), Michael Otsuka writes: “If [...] the better off in the actual world really have a moral 
entitlement to that which they legally own, this would most plausibly be explained by the hypothesis 
that present legal entitlements have moral force because of the disruption to people’s lives which would 
occur if the status quo were overturned and transformed into a justly egalitarian society. There may be 
limits to what one can, in the name of equality, force a person to give up which he already possesses.” 
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especially egregious because it shows a disregard for their moral status as a person, 
especially when doing so violates widely accepted social norms and attracts widespread 
disapproval. 
But this does not extend to vigilantism targeted at group entities. Group entities may 
sometimes be agents, but they are not persons, and we are not required to treat them as 
such, except when the effects of actions directed at group entities indirectly trickle down 
to the persons who are members of the group. Consider the following variation of the 
Harmless Hacker case, in which property losses are imposed on the bank, rather than on 
individual customers. 
Harmless Hacker III 
A vigilante computer hacker gains access to the records of a major retail bank. 
Gradually, over a period of first weeks, then months, and then years, the hacker 
erases small amounts of consumer debt from the bank’s records. Each individual 
act of tampering is so small that it goes undetected, even when the gradual 
accumulation of the erasures wipes millions of pounds of consumer debt. 
In this case, no losses are directly imposed on persons, although indirect losses could be 
widely dispersed side-effects. Intuitively, it is easier to justify than each of the former 
two Harmless Hacker cases. 
2.3.6 Redistributive and Expressive 
Finally, we can divide such acts of expropriation into those which are expressive and 
those which are acquisitive or redistributive.16 Expressive acts of egalitarian vigilantism 
are those which are intended to draw public attention to unfair inequality in order to 
bring about a change in people’s attitudes towards the legal status quo, and to 
ultimately bring about changes in the law itself. They may also be intended to spark 
widespread emulation. 
Typically, expressive acts of defiance are also acts of civil disobedience, although they 
need not always be, depending on how the parameters of civil disobedience are defined 
(for example, some believe that a necessary condition of civil disobedience is a 
willingness on the part of the perpetrators to submit to punishment, but one may 
16 These terms are used in Eduardo Moises Penalver, and Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws: How 
Squatters, Pirates and Protestors Improve the Law of Ownership (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2010). 
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expressively flout the law without being so willing to submit). The mass trespass of 
Kinder Scout was an expressive act of vigilantism. 
Acquisitive, or redistributive, acts of expropriation are not intended to influence public 
opinion or bring about a change in the law, Although those things might be regarded as 
welcome side-effects, the primary purpose of expropriation is to reduce inequality by 
transferring things from the better to worse off. The Greek bank robberies were a 
redistributive act of vigilantism. 
Given that they are intended to help to bring about widespread and lasting change, 
expressive acts seem more easily justifiable than acts which are merely redistributive. I 
myself believe that this difference is relatively trivial, or, insofar as it matters, it matters 
when and because expressive acts do more good, in the long term. 
2.3.7 Summary 
Acts of vigilantism which contain all of the six factors identified on the left will be very 
difficult to justify in comparison to acts which contain all of the eight factors on the 
right. 
Harder to Justify  Easier to Justify 
 
Harmful or Coercive 
 






















In order to act with the strongest possible justification, egalitarian vigilantes should 
peacefully exact money or disused property from group entities, and ensure that any 
losses imposed on individuals are indirect and widely dispersed. That being said, acts 
containing all of the more difficult to justify features could be permissible in some 
situations, for example, when property laws are severely unjust. On the other hand, even 
acts containing all of the more easily justifiable features may nevertheless be wrong in 





This concludes my examination of the variables governing the permissibility and 
justifiability of different acts of egalitarian vigilantism, independently of the justice or 
injustice of the law. What does this reveal about the examples I described at the outset? 
The mass trespass of Kinder Scout was mostly accomplished without violence or 
coercion (apart from the skirmish with game-keepers). It was also “out in the open”, 
both figuratively and literally. It was a transgression of land, rather than personal 
possessions and was an expressive act of civil disobedience. Although losses were 
eventually imposed on one individual, the Duke of Devonshire, the only losses imposed 
were the eventual curtailment of legal rights to prevent others from accessing land, 
rather than legal title. All of these features help to justify the judgement that the trespass 
was a clear instance of permissible, indeed, admirable, vigilantism. 
Reconsidering Vassilis Paleokostas, it is easy to see why his vigilante acts were more 
difficult to justify than the trespass of Kinder Scout. Terrorising bank employees and 
kidnapping tycoons involved the violation of innocent people’s rights. On the other 
hand, he targeted a bank and dispersed losses widely through taking mere money. So 
was he justified in robbing the bank? I think to answer that question we need to think 
about how degrees of injustice make a moral difference. 
2.4 Degrees of Injustice 
The more unjust the law, the easier it is to justify vigilantism. But what more can be 
said? People mean different things by “injustice”. So let me delineate three respects in 
which a property law may be unjust. 
First, justice is partly concerned with moral rights that are, in principle, permissibly 
enforceable (this excludes impersonal wrongs and rights that are not, in principle, 
enforceable). Second, justice is partly concerned with the fair distribution of the 
currency of justice (whatever that is). Third, justice is partly concerned with procedural 
fairness, or fairness in the way things are decided upon. 
Property laws are unjust when they fail to legally prohibit people from violating rights, 
unjustifiably sustain an unfair distribution of the currency of justice, or were unfairly 
decided upon (for example, because not everyone had a fair say in the decision, the 
decision lacked actual or hypothetical agreement, or was not justified by appeal to 




exactly counts as procedural fairness in order to set aside introducing further 
complexity).17 
The extent to which property laws are unjust across each of these dimensions is relevant 
because the permissibility of vigilantism partly depends upon whether or not it is a 
proportionate form of retaliation to injustice and whether there are other courses of 
action available which could achieve the same objectives. 
2.4.1 Just Enough 
Let’s say that property laws are just enough if and only if all of the following necessary 
and jointly sufficient conditions are satisfied: (1) moral rights, including property rights, 
roughly correlate with legal rights, (2) the distribution of the currency of justice is fair 
enough, (3) property laws were decided upon by sufficiently fair procedures. 
I think that these conditions are individually necessary because plausibly, property laws 
imposed by a benevolent dictator are unjust even if they fairly distribute the currency of 
justice and otherwise perfectly reflect everyone’s rights. And property laws decided upon 
with fair procedures can be unjust if they distribute the currency of justice unfairly. My 
use of the words “enough” and “sufficient” are vague and imprecise. But a degree of 
imprecision and vagueness is inevitable when discussing non-ideal situations. I assume 
that, with due examination, a more precise specification could be provided, but I do not 
provide one here. 
Many people think that moral property rights can arise, in various ways, independently 
of institutions to recognise and enforce them.18 Imagine a society in which the set of all 
legal property entitlements is roughly extensionally equivalent to the set of all moral 
entitlements. In that situation, by stipulation, each person has a moral right to most of 
the things they legally possess, and people are morally prohibited from taking the 
17 Each of these considerations is independent of the question of whether or not the law in question is 
permissibly enforceable through the threat of punishment and whether or not people have a moral 
obligation to comply with it. 
18 For example, some people believe that people acquire moral entitlements to unowned parts of the 
world that they appropriate, provided that they leave “enough and as good for others”. Others believe 
that desert may ground moral property entitlements. It is also plausible that people are morally entitled 
to unequal shares of the currency of justice which arise from a state of fair equality through gifts, 
consensual, non-fraudulent transfers, and freely chosen optional gambles. 
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property of others, except under exceptional circumstances (for example, when doing so 
is the only way to save lives or avoid some other moral catastrophe).19 
It is very hard to justify vigilantism when property laws ensure that the distribution of 
the currency of justice is fair enough. For one thing, if the degree of unfair inequality in 
society is very small, then there is only a relatively trivial reason to reduce it. For 
another, if property laws are sufficiently just, then there is a very strong presumption 
against vigilantism. 
Finally, if property laws are decided upon by sufficiently fair procedures, then there is 
clear legal and procedural recourse for reducing unfair inequality. It would be 
disproportionate to resort to vigilantism when other courses are available which can 
achieve the same objectives. A society in which property laws satisfies these conditions 
could contain unfair inequality. But it would nevertheless be impermissible to reduce it 
through vigilantism. 
2.4.2 Severe Injustice 
I now turn to the opposite extreme. Let’s say that property laws are severely unjust if 
any of the following sufficient conditions hold: (1) respecting legal property entitlements 
requires the violation of people’s basic moral rights, like rights of bodily integrity and 
other basic freedoms, (2) respecting moral property entitlements require sustaining a 
morally intolerable degree of inequality, or (3) the procedures which determine legal 
property entitlements are severely unfair. 
We are usually permitted to disobey property laws when respecting them requires 
tolerating the violation of people’s moral rights. A slaveholder is not morally entitled to 
the body and labour of a person who they have legally but forcibly enslaved, even if 
their entire life revolves around the assumption that the legality of the enslavement 
would continue in perpetuity. It is permissible for an enslaved person to disobey the law 
by escaping, if they can, and a third party could permissibly assist their escape. 
We are also usually permitted to flout property laws when the degree of distributive 
unfairness in society exceeds a morally tolerable degree. For example, we may flout 
property laws when that is the only way to satisfy people’s basic needs. It is very 
19 For example, it is permissible to steal someone’s rightfully owned luxury yacht, even if compensation 
is not possible, in order to save a drowning person, as Peter Unger argues in Living High and Letting 
Die: Our Illusion of Innocence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 63-64. 
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plausible that the satisfaction of basic needs has moral priority over legal entitlements.20 
If stealing from the well-off is the only alternative to starvation, then it is permissible to 
steal. Although strictly speaking, these are not egalitarian reasons to flout the law, they 
are reasons of distributive justice. 
Laws imposed by severely unfair procedures are not morally binding. For example, we 
are not morally required to obey laws imposed by a tyrannical or oppressive dictator 
(though we would still be required to act in accordance with tyrannically imposed laws 
which happen to correlate with what morality requires). Each of these considerations 
goes some way to explaining why social bandits in peasant or feudal societies, who, 
against a backdrop of famine or political oppression, steal from the rich in order to give 
to the needy, are upheld as admirable vigilantes. 
2.4.3 Partial Injustice 
I am sure that many would agree with me that it is sometimes permissible to break 
property laws when they are severely unjust, and typically impermissible to break them 
when they are sufficiently just. The interesting questions about vigilantism really arise 
when property laws are partially unjust.  
We can say that property laws are partially unjust when (a) none of the sufficient 
conditions for severe injustice obtain and at least one, but not all, of the necessary 
conditions of sufficient justice obtain, or (b) when none of the sufficient conditions for 
either severe injustice or sufficient justice obtain (in other words, property laws exceeds 
neither the threshold for severity or sufficiency across each of the three dimensions).21 Is 
20 Aquinas thought that taking from another’s “superabundance” in order to satisfy need was simply 
taking that to which the needy are morally entitled, in virtue of their need. Jeremy Waldron has said 
that “nobody should be permitted to use force to prevent another man from satisfying his very basic 
needs”. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologia, 2.2, 66.7, Jeremy Waldron, Liberal Rights: Collected 
Papers, 1981 – 1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.240 to 241. 
21 More exactly, we can say that partial injustice obtains if and only if (1) property laws do not permit 
the violation of deontological constraints, but (2) some people are not morally entitled to everything 
that they legally possess, (3) the currency of justice is not distributed fairly enough, but nor is it 
unfairly distributed to a morally intolerable degree, (4) procedures are neither severely unfair nor 
sufficiently fair. To these, we should add: (5) the realisation of more just property laws is possible 
through people acting in ways in which they are capable of acting, and (6) the legal status quo with 
respect to property rights makes everybody better off than they would be if there were no laws. 
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egalitarian vigilantism permissible when property laws are merely partially unjust? A 
tempting response to this question is the following.  
When property laws are partially unjust, the moral presumption against 
vigilantism is much stronger than when they are severely unjust but much 
weaker than when they are sufficiently just. And the case for vigilantism is 
weaker than when property laws are severely unjust, but stronger than when 
they are sufficiently just. 
The best we can do is to try to judge whether vigilantism against partial injustice 
is justified or permissible on a case-by-case basis. We can compare the strength 
of the reasons for complying with the unjust law with strength of the reason for 
disobeying the law, and act in accordance with the stronger reason, other things 
being equal. But we should not expect to find any general underlying principles 
which tell us whether or not vigilantism is permissible in a given case.22 
I agree with the general spirit of this claim, but we are not straightforwardly entitled to 
it. There are at least two additional considerations in partially unjust situations which 
strengthen the moral presumption against vigilantism. 
2.5 Two Moral Obstacles to Vigilantism 
The first presumption is established by what I call the argument from fair democratic 
procedures, or the democracy argument for short. The argument has two aspects. First, 
it says that citizens who respect legal property rights are morally entitled to demand 
similar acquiescence on the part of others. Second, it says that that vigilantism is a 
disproportionate response to partial injustice when there are democratic alternatives 
which could serve the same aims. 
The second presumption is established by what I call The Kantian Argument. This 
argument says that there is a decisive deontological reason to refrain from vigilantism 
because it could not be universalised: if everybody resorted to vigilantism, or believed 
vigilantism to be permissible, then egalitarian vigilantism would make things worse, 
rather than better. 
22 A defence of a similar view applied to all forms of resistance to unjust social institutions can be 
found in Gabriel Wollner’s On Permissibly Resisting Injustice (Working Paper). 
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I will present each of these arguments in turn, and argue that, although they succeed in 
ruling out some forms of vigilantism that would be morally permitted in the face of 
severe injustice, they do not comprehensively rule out all forms of vigilantism in the face 
of partial injustice. In the course of rejecting the arguments, I will argue that there are, 
in fact, some underlying considerations which govern the permissibility of vigilantism 
against the backdrop of partial injustice. 
2.5.1 The Democracy Argument 
Some people object to vigilante redistribution in a democratic society because it unjustly 
imposes one’s own idea of distributive fairness onto others who reasonably disagree. 
They think that, when they conflict, the demands of procedural fairness override the 
demands of distributive fairness. Thomas Christiano writes 
Citizens who skirt democratically made law act contrary to the equal right of all 
citizens to have a say in making laws when there is substantial and informed 
disagreement. Those who refuse to pay taxes or who refuse to respect property 
laws on the grounds that these are unjust are simply affirming a superior right to 
that of others in determining how the shared aspects of social life ought to be 
arranged […] only by obeying the democratically made choices can citizens act 
justly […] Each citizen has a right to one's obedience.23 
On this view, procedures gain overriding moral credentials from their ability to resolve 
reasonable disagreements in a publically egalitarian way, and vigilantes act with a moral 
abandon that is incompatible with each person’s claim-right that others acquiesce to the 
outcomes of fair procedures. Law abiding citizens can raise the following complaint 
against vigilantes. 
What right do you have to act above the law? Most of us respect legal property 
entitlements, even though they do not perfectly reflect what justice requires, and 
you owe it to us do likewise. The distribution of legal entitlements is not, after 
23 Thomas Christiano, The Constitution of Equality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp.250-
252. Note that one can think that democratically made decisions have moral credentials which, 
provided that they meet other conditions, make them permissibly enforceable. But one can believe that 
it is permissible to coercively enforce democratically made decisions and also think that it is permissible 
to disobey them. Christiano’s view is challenged by Gerhard Øverland and Christian Barry, “Do 
Democratic Societies Have a Right to Do Wrong?” in The Journal of Social Philosophy, 42.2 (2011), 
111-31. 
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all, unjust to a severe extent. We all owe it to each other to respect the outcomes 
of our democratic procedures. 
These claims are plausible when our procedures are reasonably but imperfectly just. But 
I doubt that anyone believes that severe injustice imposed by fair procedures gives rise to 
claim-rights which bind everyone to obey the law. So does this argument have any force 
when our procedures are partially unjust? I think there are two problems with it. The 
claim can be understood in at least two ways. 
First, it can be understood as the claim that each individual has a claim-right against 
everyone that they do not interfere with legal property entitlements (and laws in general) 
that followed from partially fair democratic procedures. But that is too restrictive. It 
rules out some forms of vigilantism which are intuitively permissible, and seems to rule 
out civil disobedience in general. Consider again the mass trespass of Kinder Scout. 
Should we believe that the protesters impermissibly acted contrary to the claim-rights of 
other citizens? I think that is implausible. 
Second, it may be understood as the claim that individuals who themselves comply with 
the outcomes of partially fair democratic procedures hold a claim-right that others do 
not interfere with their legal property entitlements. But this is insufficiently 
comprehensive. While it establishes a presumption against vigilantism which is carried 
out at the expense of innocent, law-abiding people (even if they are unfairly much better 
off than others) it does not rule out the egalitarian expropriation of things legally owned 
by individuals or groups who perpetuate injustice to their own advantage. To develop 
this idea, consider two ways in which individuals can be situated with respect to 
procedural injustice.24 
Let’s say that perpetrators of injustice are those who perpetuate injustice in ways which 
are legally permissible but morally wrong. Consider groups which intentionally corrupt 
procedural fairness by using their wealth and power to exert an unfair influence on 
democratic decisions or intentionally avoid making a fair contribution to society, for 
example, by avoiding taxation. Innocent bystanders to injustice are people who are not 
culpably responsible for the perpetuation of injustice and do not have an unfair say over 
how laws are decided or democratic decisions are made. 
24 These categories do not exhaust the logical space of ways in which individuals can be situated with 
respect to injustice. For example, we could also distinguish between culpable and innocent beneficiaries 
of injustice, and victims of injustice. 
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The democracy argument, if successful, establishes that vigilantism which targets 
innocent bystanders would violate their claim-rights that others do not interfere with 
legal entitlements that followed from partially fair procedures. I do not, however, 
believe that vigilantes act contrary to the rights of culpable perpetrators of injustice. 
How could perpetrators of injustice who do not themselves respect the outcomes of fair 
procedures, or undermine the fairness of procedures themselves, hold a claim-right that 
others do so? 
This idea derives further justification from its ability to explain the difference between 
the following two cases from the actual world. Both of the cases involve fraud, which 
one may regard as an additional moral taint that makes vigilantism much harder to 
justify, but since this factor is held equal between the cases, it plays no part in explaining 
the differences between them. 
In 2010, an NHS bereavement services advisor was convicted of stealing over £750,000 
from the estates of dead patients by forging documents in order to obtain bequests. 
Allegedly, £250,000 of the misbegotten funds was given to charitable causes, a further 
£10,000 was given to a homelessness project and, according to the defendant, some was 
directly handed out to prostitutes, asylum seekers, refugees, and the homeless.25 
Contrast that case with the following one; in 2003, Rev. Ozell Clifford Brazil of Los 
Angeles was sentenced to 41 months in a federal prison and ordered to pay $716,179 in 
restitution on seven counts of federal student financial assistance fraud. He assisted 
hundreds of disadvantaged college applicants in filing fraudulent student aid forms 
involving understatement of family income or false claims to be orphans or wards of the 
court. Due to his crimes, many disadvantaged people were able to afford to go to 
college.26 
I am strongly inclined to see the latter act of fraud as more justifiable than the former 
(even if they are both ultimately impermissible due to the deception involved). In the 
first case, while it would have been permissible for a legitimate government to confiscate 
the estates through inheritance taxation and use the money to help the worse off, it was 
wrong to take the money fraudulently. Doing so betrayed the trust of (what we assume 
to be) innocent people (as well as the dereliction of professional duties). 
25 Some of the money was used for personal enrichment: the perpetrator bought two flats, a 
narrowboat, and a musical organ. The case was reported in The Daily Telegraph, 2nd May, 2010. 
26 Reported in The Los Angeles Times, 22nd February, 2003. As is usually the case in examples from the 
real world, the case is tainted by additional details, such as the fact that he charged prospective college 
applicants to attend seminars in which he counselled them to cheat the system. 
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By contrast, I think the latter case was much more justifiable. I would posit that this is 
primarily explained by the fact that the fraud was carried out at the expense of the state, 
rather than at the expense of individuals, combined with the thought that, in this 
example, the state is culpably responsible for the inequality which the fraud sought to 
ameliorate. It may also be partly explained by the fact that I am inclined to regard the 
crime as “victimless”, although it may have had the side-effect of making people worse 
off than they would have been if they missed out on state aid as a result. 
I think that the democracy argument rules out vigilantism which targets innocent 
bystanders to injustice, who merely play by the rules. It does not, however, rule out 
vigilantism against perpetrators of injustice, because they lack the right to demand that 
others refrain from interfering with their legal property entitlements. 
The second aspect of the democracy argument says that although people may sometimes 
justifiably resort to vigilantism as a last resort, it is a disproportionate response to 
partial injustice when one can turn to democratic or otherwise legal means instead. To 
illustrate, assume, for the sake of argument, that western democracies in the actual 
world are partially unjust, rather than severely unjust, and recall again the Greek bank 
robberies. One could say the following: 
Yes, the distribution of wealth in Greece and other Western democracies is 
unjust. But we live in a democracy. Although our democratic procedures are less 
than fully fair, they are not severely unfair either. You should try to change 
property laws through them, rather than taking the law into your own hands. 
Vigilantism may be a last resort. But it’s a disproportionate form of resistance in 
a democratic society. 
I think that this argument is insufficiently comprehensive. It is very plausible when 
democratic and legal forms of recourse are sufficiently fair or have a non-negligible 
probability of being effective. But it is less plausible when the degree of procedural 
unfairness is large enough that legal forms of have no chance, or very little chance, of 
being effective. Consider the following example as an illustration.27 
27 Exploring these problems through simplified cases raises a dilemma. On the one hand it helps to strip 
away realistic details in order to cleanse our judgements of bias in favour of the status quo. But on the 
other hand, stripping away realistic details may hinder our capacity to form judgements which are 
practically relevant. In other circumstances, this would not matter, but when the purpose of the 
enquiry is to identify conclusions that are of practical relevance, abstracting away from realistic cases 
may be counterproductive. Nevertheless, I think that the example is sufficiently informative to be 
worthy of consideration. 
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Imagine that five people wash ashore on an unowned and uninhabited desert island 
which contains a fixed amount of resources. Assume, for the sake of argument, that 
distributive fairness requires that the island’s resources be equally distributed. Suppose 
that the islanders all agree to hold a simple majority vote to determine how to distribute 
the island’s resources. 
All five islanders believe that justice requires an equal distribution, but three of the 
islanders collaborate and vote to unequally distribute the island’s resources in their 
favour, granting them access to the large sandy beaches, pineapple plants and coconut 
trees (call them the rich islanders). The remaining islanders (the poor islanders) are 
confined to small, rocky beaches and subsist on seaweed from rock pools, but 
nevertheless have enough resources to live a decent life. Suppose that the unequal 
distribution is coercively enforced through threat of punishment and that, at periodic 
elections, the status quo is perpetually reinforced by the voting majority of the three rich 
islanders. 
The aspect of justice concerned with procedural fairness is sufficiently realised on the 
grounds that it was decided by a majority vote that each islander expressly consented to 
and willingly participated in. The aspect of justice concerned with distributive fairness is 
not ideally realised but nor can it be described as severely unfair. In this case, it is 
plausible that the poor islanders are morally bound to the outcome of reasonably fair 
democratic procedures that they willingly agreed to and participated in. We can 
conclude that when procedural fairness is satisfied to this extent, there is a very strong 
presumption against vigilantism. 
But to test the democracy argument in full, we need to identify a variation on the case in 
which the procedural aspect of justice is partially unfair. Let’s add some additional 
details to the case to make it more closely resemble a realistic one which warrants the 
label of partial unfairness. Imagine that two of the islanders are replaced by two new 
islanders. The two new islanders do not expressly agree to the form of government and 
are unable to leave the island. 
Imagine that there is a permanent majority in favour of unequally distributing the 
island’s resources because it is in the rational self-interest of any three islanders to 
collude in favour of it. Although there are democratic procedures in place which offer 
the possibility of overturning the distributive status quo, egalitarian reform is, in 
practice, blocked. The form of government does not enjoy the express consent, or tacit 




participates in democratic votes on equal terms. I think we can say that the democratic 
procedures are partially unfair. 
Suppose further that the identity of the rich and poor changes periodically. There are 
always three rich islanders and two poor but the composition of each group changes.28 
However, one of the new islanders is always among the poor. Call him the unlucky 
islander. Now consider the following case. 
 Harmless Poacher 
At night, the unlucky islander sneaks onto the rich part of the island while the 
other islanders sleep. He trespasses on the sandy beaches and swipes fruit that 
will be partially, though not wholly, replenished. The covert raids go some way 
to reducing inequality of both resources and welfare between the islanders. The 
other islanders never find out about the trespass and never notice that the fruit 
has gone missing. 
I am strongly inclined to believe that harmless poaching by the unlucky islander is 
permissible. Bear in mind that this is not equivalent to saying that the majority of the 
islanders had no right to unfairly distribute benefits and burdens in their own favour. It 
may have been wrong for them to do so, but they may have a right to do wrong which is 
grounded in the partial fairness of the voting procedure. Even if they had such a right, 
and even if they may permissibly enforce the outcome of their decision, it can still be 
permissible for the unlucky islander to resort to vigilantism. Those possibilities are all 
consistent. 
The purpose of these examples is to illustrate that even in a reasonably “pure” case, it is 
not completely clear that vigilantism is prohibited when democratic and other legal 
forms of recourse are highly unlikely to be effective. Some might be unconvinced by 
these sparse examples so let me try to strengthen my claim by considering a real world 
example. 
In August 2012, Juan Manuel Sánchez Gordillo, mayor of the small Andalusian town of 
Marinaleda, led farm labourers into supermarkets to expropriate food and then 
distributed the spoils to local food banks. This act of vigilantism ticks all of the boxes to 
make it more easily justified. It targeted a group entity without violence or coercion and 
it is unlikely that any individuals were made worse off as a result, or, if they were (for 
28 This allows us to set aside the problem of a permanently disadvantaged minority who did not 
expressly consent to the form of government, which can be described as an instance of severe 
procedural injustice. 
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example, due to supermarkets increasing their prices to recoup the costs of theft), any 
burdens were widely dispersed. It was also both a redistributive and an expressive 
protest. This makes it a good test case for the permissibility of vigilantism in partially 
unjust situations. Now consider the backdrop. 
Unemployment [was] at 25% nationally (higher than Greece), 34% in Andalusia 
and 53% for 16-to-24-year-olds; […] the collapse of the construction industry 
[…] left 800,000 empty homes, and, [in] May, the 8 million-strong indignados 
protest movement, a forerunner of Occupy, announced its total lack of faith in 
parliamentary democracy to solve any of these problems.29 
In a range of realistic situations like this one, there are obstacles to legal and procedural 
forms of addressing injustice which render them highly unlikely to be effective. In these 
situations, egalitarian vigilantism cannot be described as disproportionate on the 
grounds that better means to the same aims are available. While some varieties of 
vigilantism, for example, violent and coercive ones, may remain disproportionate 
response to inequality in a partially unjust society; they are disproportionate when and 
because peaceful and non-coercive forms of vigilantism are available. 
One might respond to this claim by exploiting the ambiguity in my definition of 
“partial” injustice, and suggesting that the society in this case should count as severely 
unjust, rather than partially unjust. One might maintain that once unfair inequality 
exceeds a certain degree, or democratic procedures become inert and unable to bring 
about effective change, the procedures deserve the label of severe injustice. I would be 
happy to concede this point and accept a more expansive set of conditions for severe 
injustice, since my argument here is primarily intended to demonstrate that vigilantism is 
not disproportionate when democratic or other legal alternatives are highly unlikely to 
be effective. Nothing, in particular, depends upon the exact parameters of severe and 
partial injustice. 
In summary, the democracy argument rules out vigilantism in the range of partially 
unjust situations in which there are legal alternatives to vigilantism which have a 
reasonable probability of being effective. I do not think, however, that it rules out 
vigilantism in the range of partially unjust situations in which there is little to no 
probability of legal and democratic means proving effective. 
29 Reported in The Guardian, 12th August 2012. 
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2.5.2 The Kantian Argument 
One might maintain that even if my replies to the above argument succeed, there is still a 
decisive deontological reason to refrain from resorting to vigilantism against partial 
injustice, which can be roughly encapsulated in the slogan: what if everybody did it? We 
could say 
It is wrong to resort to vigilantism because we could not rationally will it to be 
true that everyone did so (or, alternatively, because we could not rationally will 
it to be true that everyone believes such vigilantism to be morally permitted). 
One might maintain that we could not rationally will it to be true that everybody 
resorted to vigilantism, or believed it was permissible to turn to vigilantism, because this 
would lead to widespread disorder which would make things worse, rather than better. 
But this claim, applied generally to all kinds of egalitarian vigilantism, is too restrictive. 
It would incorrectly render the mass trespass of Kinder Scout impermissible. 
I agree that if extreme forms of vigilantism, like armed robbery, were pervasive, then it 
would be highly likely to lead to widespread disorder which would make things worse, 
rather than better. But if a handful of people covertly carried out acts of vigilantism like 
the Harmless Hacker and Harmless Poacher cases, the effects would be good. I think it 
therefore faces what Parfit calls the Threshold Objection. 
In some cases […] whether some act is wrong depends on how many people act 
in this way […] if too many people acted on this maxim, these people’s acts 
would have bad effects, but when fewer people act on this maxim the effects are 
neutral or good […] [T]hough such acts would be wrong if too many people 
acted on this maxim, when fewer people act on this maxim such acts are 
permissible, and may even be morally required […] [M]ost of us could not 
rationally will it to be true that everyone acts on these maxims.30 
Vigilantism is only justified when, in tandem with what everyone else does, it achieves 
the effect of reducing unfair inequality without making things worse, all things 
considered. At best, I think this argument establishes that it might be good if most 
people believe redistributive vigilantism to be impermissible, even though it is 
sometimes, in fact, permissible. 
30 Derek Parfit, On What Matters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p.308. 
 




I defined egalitarian vigilantism as possessing or redistributing money or property which 
legally belongs to somebody else, without their informed consent, and without providing 
compensation. I pointed out that flouting property laws in this way is one way of 
reducing unjust inequality. I said that although there are presumptions against such 
vigilantism, it is also true that, under realistic conditions, we are often morally permitted 
to break the law, and that people sometimes lack moral rights to what they legally 
possess. 
I argued that the most justifiable acts of vigilantism are those which, without violence or 
coercion, expropriate money, food, or disused real estate from group entities like banks, 
corporations, and the state, where any individual losses are indirect and widely 
dispersed. 
After that, I distinguished between sufficiently just property laws, severely unjust 
property laws, and partially unjust property laws. Unsurprisingly, I argued that 
egalitarian vigilantism is very difficult to justify when property laws are sufficiently just 
but is fairly easy to justify when property laws are severely unjust.  
When societies are partially unjust, there are additional presumptions against vigilantism 
which imposes property losses on innocent bystanders to injustice and when there are 
legal forms of resistance to injustice which have a non-negligible probability of proving 
effective. But there is no overriding presumption against the expropriation of property 
from groups which culpably perpetrate injustice when the prospects for reducing 
inequality through democratic or otherwise legal means are remote. So, if you’re an 





3 OPTIMAL EQUALITY AND FORCED LABOUR 
3.1 Introduction 
G. A. Cohen argued that we could bring about a justly egalitarian society without 
sacrificing economic efficiency or legal freedom of occupational choice.1 He said that 
such a society could be realised if people were motivated by an egalitarian ethos to work 
in productive occupations for an egalitarian wage. But two counterarguments purport to 
show that Cohen’s vision is incoherent, or, along with auxiliary premises, morally 
tyrannical. 
The first counterargument, which I call the efficiency dilemma, says that a merely 
egalitarian ethos would be insufficient to induce people to freely choose productive 
occupations in order to realise a Pareto optimal level of equality. Realising a Pareto 
optimal level of equality would require both an egalitarian ethos and a Paretian ethos 
(or, as I shall call it, a productive ethos).2 Accordingly, Cohen faces a dilemma. First, a 
society with a merely egalitarian ethos would not bring about a Pareto optimal level of 
equality, leaving everyone worse off than they could otherwise be. Second, if justice 
requires an egalitarian ethos and a productive ethos, then justice is not merely equality, 
contrary to what Cohen claims. 
The second counterargument, which I call the forced labour objection, says that Cohen’s 
claims about justice and labour, along with auxiliary premises, commit him to the 
unpalatable view that a just society could contain legally coercive job allocation (forced 
labour, for short).3 This is because, so the objection goes, Cohen lacks the normative 
resources to distinguish between a society in which distributive justice is legally enforced 
with respect to money and a society in which distributive justice is legally enforced with 
respect to labour. But forced labour is intuitively inimical to justice. 
1 Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, Chapter Five. 
2 Patrick Tomlin, “Internal Doubts About Cohen’s Rescue of Justice”, The Journal of Political 
Philosophy (2010), 18.2, 228-47, and Jonathan Quong “Justice Beyond Equality”, Social Theory and 
Practice, 36.2 (2010), 315-40. 
3 Cécile Fabre, "Distributive Justice and Freedom: Cohen on Money and Labour”, Utilitas, 22.4 
(2010), 393-412, Gerald Lang, “Rawlsian Incentives and the Freedom Objection”, The Journal of 
Social Philosophy, 47.2 (2016), 231-49 (pp. 241-247), and Michael Otsuka, "Freedom of 
Occupational Choice", Ratio, 21.4 (2008), 440-53, (p.446).  
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In this chapter, I argue that, although each objection draws attention to ambiguities in 
Cohen’s arguments, both can be overcome in ways that strengthen Cohen’s claims 
without abandoning the egalitarian spirit of his arguments.4 The chapter is divided into 
three main parts. In the first part, I explain Cohen’s claims in a bit more detail. In the 
second part, I set out the efficiency dilemma and provide two arguments to show that, 
with some revisions, Cohen’s claims can be defended from both horns of the dilemma. 
In the third part, I set out two formulations of the forced labour objection and provide 
several lines of argument in reply which strip the objection of rhetorical force.  
3.2 Equality, Pareto Optimality, & Freedom of Occupational Choice 
In Rescuing Justice and Equality, Cohen claimed that distributive justice is realised by 
equality of access to advantage, where advantage includes both resources and welfare. 
But under realistic conditions, the full realisation of equal access to advantage would 
typically require sacrificing either Pareto optimality or legal freedom of occupational 
choice.5 
This is because in an equal society there would be no inequality creating incentives to 
induce people to efficiently allocate their labour by making good use of their productive 
talents. And if people do not freely make good use of their productive talents, then the 
only way to realise a Pareto optimal level of equality would be to legally conscript 
people into doing so, in violation of legal freedom of occupational choice. As a result, 
under realistic conditions, we must typically choose to sacrifice one of equality, Pareto 
optimality, or legal freedom of occupational choice. 
But Cohen pointed out that these trade-offs are typically only required because people 
are unwilling to act in ways in which they are capable of acting. Cohen argued that we 
4 I do not provide a complete defence of Cohen’s claims. There may be other objections which prove 
successful, but I set them aside. For example, some have objected that an egalitarian moral obligation 
would constrain autonomy. See Paula Casal, “Occupational Choice and the Egalitarian Ethos”, 
Economics and Philosophy, 29.1 (2013), 3-20. Others have objected that Cohen’s ethos is implausibly 
morally demanding. See Titelbaum, “What Would a Rawlsian Ethos of Justice Look Like?” For a 
wider discussion of the productive requirements of justice, see Lucas Stanczyk, “Productive Justice”, 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 40.2 (2012), 144-64. 
5 A distribution is Pareto optimal if nobody can be made better off without making at least one person 
worse off (if there is no Pareto superior distribution available). One distribution, A, is weakly Pareto 
superior to another, B, if at least one person is better off and nobody is worse off in A than B, and 
strongly Pareto superior if everybody is better off in A than B. 
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could bring about a Pareto optimal level of equality without sacrificing legal freedom of 
occupational choice if people were morally motivated by an egalitarian ethos to freely 
make good use of their productive talents. 
According to Cohen, acting in accordance with an egalitarian ethos would not impose 
intolerable demands on people because the benefits and burdens of work are, along with 
income, goods to be distributed in accordance with distributive justice. Accordingly, in a 
just society, the benefits and burdens of work would be fairly distributed as part of the 
overall distribution of access to advantage. In such a society, people are asked to make 
“good use” of their productive talents through their labour, including their choice of 
occupation, until doing so asks them to bear an unfair burden in comparison to others; 
that is, a burden which would worsen inequality beyond the permissible range of 
inequality which is granted by the existence of a personal prerogative to refrain from 
doing what equality optimally requires.6 
3.3 The Efficiency Dilemma 
Jonathan Quong and Patrick Tomlin have independently pointed out that that a merely 
egalitarian ethos would not induce people to bring about a Pareto optimal level of 
equality.7 Equality, by itself, would typically be consistent with people choosing any 
6 Cohen draws upon Joseph Carens’s ideas when proposing the egalitarian ethos. However, the two 
accounts differ in significant respects. For one, Carens is concerned to establish how an equal 
distribution of income could be maximised under feasible conditions whereas Cohen is concerned to 
establish how an equal and Pareto optimal distribution of advantage could be brought about. Second, 
Carens does not include labour burdens in his account. Third, Carens is concerned to show that 
production and distribution are independent and the amount which is produced need not be influenced 
by the principle of distribution which is in place. For Cohen, production and distribution are not 
independent. 
Carens’s view is set out in Joseph H. Carens, “The Egalitarian Ethos as a Social Mechanism” in 
Distributive Justice and Access to Advantage ed. by Alexander Kaufman (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), “An Interpretation and Defence of the Socialist Principle of Distribution”, 
Social Philosophy and Policy, 20.1 (2003), 145-77, and “Rights and Duties in an Egalitarian Society” 
in Political Theory, 14.1 (1986), 31-49. 
7 Tomlin, “Internal Doubts About Cohen’s Rescue of Justice”, and Quong, “Justice Beyond Equality”. 
Andrew Williams has also made a similar point, using the terms wide ethos and narrow ethos in 
Andrew Williams, “Incentives, Inequality, and Publicity” in Philosophy and Public Affairs, 27.3 
(1998), 225-47 (p.235). In Rescuing Justice and Equality, Cohen said that he thinks justice requires the 
wide ethos (or productive ethos), p.370. 
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occupation. In fact, equality alone does not even require each person to make a 
productive contribution to society; it merely requires that, taking into account each 
person’s overall bundle of resources and welfare, nobody is unfairly worse off than 
anybody else.  
An egalitarian ethos would induce the widespread belief across the population that each 
person must make choices which ensure that access to advantage is equally distributed. 
It would not, however, induce the widespread belief that each person has an obligation 
to make a productive contribution to society. Accordingly, a society with freedom of 
occupational choice and a Pareto optimal level of equality would require both an 
egalitarian ethos and a productive ethos. A productive ethos would induce the 
widespread belief across the population that each person has an obligation to make use 
of their productive talents in ways bring about a Pareto optimal level of equal access to 
advantage. 
Now, it does not follow from the fact that an egalitarian ethos only induces people to 
realise equality that a merely egalitarian ethos never governs occupational choice. 
Equality would still govern occupation choice when some occupational choices would 
reduce inequality. Cohen’s example of the person who can choose to become a doctor or 
a gardener illustrates this point.8 In that example, the agent in question is better off than 
the rest of the population whichever occupation is chosen, but everyone else’s access to 
advantage is improved if the agent chooses to be a doctor, so that choosing to be a 
doctor rather than a gardener both reduces inequality and brings about a Pareto 
superior distribution. 
This ambiguity over whether Cohen thought that justice requires a productive ethos 
gives rise to a dilemma. The first horn of the dilemma is as follows: if justice requires a 
merely egalitarian ethos, then, under realistic conditions, labour would be inefficiently 
distributed and Cohen would seemingly have failed to show how equality, Pareto 
optimality, and freedom of occupational choice could be realised together. As a result, a 
just society could be one in which everyone is worse off than they could otherwise be. 
The second horn of the dilemma is the following: if justice requires both an egalitarian 
ethos and a productive ethos, then this is inconsistent with Cohen’s claim that equality 
of access to advantage is both necessary and sufficient for the realisation of distributive 
justice. According to Cohen, Pareto optimality is not a requirement of justice. A society 
8 Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, pp.184 to 185. 
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could be justly equal, but Pareto suboptimal (even if, all things considered, we 
sometimes ought to bring about an unjust but Pareto optimal distribution).9 
Quong says that his observation is significant because “once we realize that the ethos 
directing people to make certain occupational choices is not required as a matter of 
equality, then Cohen cannot claim that the ethos is a matter of justice”.10 Moreover, 
according to Quong, a productive ethos is beyond what justice, or morality more 
generally, could require and so realising Cohen’s vision would require morally 
supererogatory choices on the part of each person in society. 
Now, as a matter of exegesis, it is not clear that Cohen did defend the claim that justice 
requires a productive ethos. Although there is no doubt that Cohen thought that justice 
required an egalitarian ethos, one might instead interpret Cohen as trying to show that, 
under realistic conditions, a justly egalitarian distribution could be brought about 
without sacrificing legal freedom of occupational choice or Pareto optimality. Cohen 
may be interpreted as defending the weaker conditional claim that if individuals freely 
chose occupations which helped to bring a Pareto optimal level of access to advantage 
(motivated by, for example, “principled commitment and fellow feeling”), then the 
trilemma, at the bar of state policy, of choosing between equality, freedom and Pareto 
optimality would disappear.11 
Ambiguity concerning whether Cohen thought the realisation of justice requires a 
productive ethos may be explained by the distinction between Cohen’s arguments as an 
internal criticism of the difference principle and Cohen’s arguments as an independent 
account of distributive justice. The accounts can differ in the following important 
respects. Formulated as an internal critique of the difference principle, Cohen holds that 
if people in a Rawlsian society really believed in the difference principle, then this would 
motivate them to choose occupations which maximised the economic prospects of the 
least well-off group in society without requiring inequality-creating incentives to do so.  
9 It should be noted that Cohen does not rule out the possibility that an equality conserving Pareto 
improvements are requirement of distributive justice (in Rescuing Justice and Equality, pp.322 to 333). 
However, this possibility is clearly in tension with his insistence that equal access to advantage is 
sufficient for the realisation of distributive justice. 
10 Quong, “Justice Beyond Equality”, p.328. 
11 In support of this interpretation, I would cite the following passage: “all that the […] ethos requires 
is that one does not violate equality in career choices” Rescuing Justice and Equality, p.371. 
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More precisely, the claim is that for any equal distribution D1, if there is an unequal, 
strictly Pareto superior distribution, D2, made possible by at least one person working 
more productively for an inequality-creating incentive, then there is a further possible 
distribution, D3, which is both equal and strictly Pareto superior to D1 and Pareto 
incomparable to D2, made possible by at least one person working more productively 
without an inequality creating incentive. As a result, according to Cohen, a consistently 
Rawlsian society would have a productive ethos.  
On this view, a society organised around the difference principle would not contain 
inequality-creating income incentives, other than to influence those choices which fall 
within the bounds of people’s personal prerogative to refrain from doing what justice 
requires, and those which are strictly necessary (that is, necessary apart from the 
voluntary choices of individuals) to maximise the prospects of the least well-off. More 
precisely, an unequal distribution would be just if, and only if, (1) the worse off could 
not be made better off and (2) the inequality was not produced by people intentionally 
refusing to act in ways in which they are capable of acting, aside from actions which are 
morally protected by their personal prerogative. 
Now, Cohen insists that the difference principle is not a principle of distributive justice. 
Formulated as an independent account of what a just society would look like, Cohen’s 
claims can be interpreted differently. On such a formulation, an unequal distribution 
would be unjust even if it was strictly necessary to maximise the prospects of the least 
well-off. On this view, justice requires an egalitarian distribution but is indifferent 
between equality at a high level and equality at a low level. For example, a distribution 
could be Pareto optimal, but unjust. By contrast, a distribution could be justly equal, but 
Pareto suboptimal. As a result, a just society requires (only) an egalitarian ethos. 
Exegesis aside, I will now assume, for the sake of argument, that Cohen endorses the 
following two claims. 
(Egalitarian Claim) Distributive justice is equality of access to advantage. 
(Productive Ethos Claim) Distributive justice requires a productive ethos. 
The efficiency dilemma shows that these two claims are inconsistent. I will argue that 
Cohen’s account can overcome both horns of the dilemma but only by rejecting one or 
the other of the claims. However, I argue that neither alternative is especially costly to 





3.3.1 Reply to the First Horn 
A defender of Cohen could retain the egalitarian claim, relinquish the productive ethos 
claim, but nevertheless maintain that that equality, Pareto optimality, and legal freedom 
of occupational choice would typically (though not always) be co-realised under realistic 
conditions. Once different metrics of justice are disentangled, it becomes apparent that it 
would typically be in everybody’s rational self-interest to make good use of their 
productive talents through their choice of occupation, even if justice did not require 
them to do so. This offers a way to overcome the first horn of the dilemma. 
Consider the following illustration in which the occupational choices dictated by 
equality and Pareto optimality diverge. Suppose we can move from a suboptimal state of 
equality (D1) to either a Pareto superior state of inequality (D2) or a Pareto optimal 
level of equality (D3) which is Pareto incomparable to D2. 
 D1 D2 D3 
Karl 1 4 3 
Everyone Else 1 2 3 
To fill in the details, suppose Karl is employed at the Ministry of Equality and he can 
choose to instead work at the workers’ co-operative farm. Other things being equal, 
Karl would prefer to work in the Ministry of Equality, but, as he is a talented farmer but 
an untalented clerk, his talents would be put to better productive use in the workers’ co-
operative.  
If Karl continues to work at his desk job at the Ministry of Equality, the distribution 
will remain D1. If Karl works at the workers’ co-operative for an inequality creating 
income (because he is unmoved by an egalitarian ethos, say), he would bring about D2. 
If he chooses to work at the workers’ co-operative for an egalitarian wage, this will 
bring about D3. 
The fact that D3 is Pareto superior to D1 is a reason to prefer it from an impartial 
perspective, all things considered, but there is no egalitarian reason to prefer it. So a 
merely egalitarian ethos would not move Karl to bring about D3 by changing 
occupation. Here, a merely egalitarian ethos would permit Karl to continue to work in 
the Ministry of Equality. By contrast, a productive ethos would move Karl to change his 
occupation in order to bring about D3. It appears, therefore, that a merely egalitarian 




But I believe that this conclusion is too hasty. A society with a merely egalitarian ethos 
could still realise a Pareto optimal level of equality under realistic conditions without 
sacrificing legal freedom of occupational choice. That is because it would typically be in 
the rational self-interest of each person to make optimal use of their productive talents 
when doing so would bring about an equality conserving strict Pareto improvement in 
the currency of justice. 
We must bear in mind what Jonathan Wolff has called the real Pareto maxim.12 
Distributions which are Pareto suboptimal in one currency may be optimal under 
another currency. While a distribution may be Pareto optimal in terms of access to 
advantage, where “advantage” includes both resources, including income, and welfare, 
including labour burdens, it may nevertheless be Pareto suboptimal in terms of income. 
Assume for the sake of argument that the currency of justice is income, labour burdens 
are excluded from the currency of justice, and Karl is unmoved by a productive ethos. 
Now it looks morally demanding for Karl to work at the workers’ co-operative for an 
egalitarian wage. For although Karl has a higher income in D3, we know that, unmoved 
by a productive ethos, he would prefer to work at the Ministry of Equality than to 
receive this additional income while working at the workers’ co-operative. Karl could 
only bring about a Pareto optimal level of equality of income by acting contrary to his 
preferences.13 
Now assume for the sake of argument that the currency of justice is access to advantage, 
labour burdens are included in the currency of justice, and Karl is motivated by an 
egalitarian ethos. Now the picture is different. It now appears to be in Karl’s rational 
self-interest to bring about D3 by working at the workers’ co-operative. For in D3, Karl 
receives more welfare and resources than in D1, and any additional labour burdens 
imposed in D3 are, by stipulation, included in the calculation of Karl’s share of the 
currency of justice. 
This point is made more starkly when we generalise from the case of a single individual 
choosing a job to occupational choices across an entire population. We all benefit from 
the efficient distribution of labour, even if that distribution allocates a job which would 
12 Jonathan Wolff, “Levelling Down” in Challenges to Democracy: The PSA Yearbook 2000, eds., 
Keith Dowding, Jim Hughes, and Helen Margetts (Macmillian, 2001), p.18. 
13 A requirement to bring about a Pareto optimal distribution of income would clearly run contrary to 
equality of access to advantage. Indeed, Cohen says that this “conjures up a nightmare scenario in 
which the duty I advocate is interpreted as making the productive work as much as they can to make 
the wages of the less well paid as high as possible”. (Rescuing Justice and Equality, p.402) 
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not be our first choice, other things being equal. If people were motivated both by a 
moral commitment to equality and their rational self-interest, an equal and Pareto 
optimal distribution could contingently be brought about in a society with an egalitarian 
ethos. 
To illustrate, suppose Vladimir, Leon, and Mikhail are on a camping trip and must 
decide how to divide their labour. Vladimir prefers to fish, Leon prefers to build 
campfires and Mikhail prefers to hunt for rabbits. Unfortunately they are all unskilled at 
their respective preferred tasks and the overall camping experience is generally 
underwhelming. However, Vladimir is talented at hunting for rabbits, Leon is an 
excellent fisherman, and Mikhail is skilled at building campfires. By reallocating their 
labour, they all enjoy a much better camping experience, all things taken into account, 
despite the fact that they forego their preferred tasks. 
Each person can offer the following justification for choosing an occupation which 
makes an efficient contribution to the social product. “It is in our collective and 
individual interest(s) to distribute our labour in accordance with our talents and skills. 
Although we may have to forego what would be first occupational preference, other 
things being equal, we are all much better off in terms of access to advantage when 
labour is efficiently distributed”. 
Two objections may be raised to this line of argument. First, one might object that if it is 
in the rational self-interest of Karl to bring about D3 rather than D1, this renders the 
egalitarian ethos redundant: we simply don’t need an ethos in order to bring about the 
optimal outcome. But this is mistaken. An egalitarian ethos would still be required in 
order to bring about D3 rather than D2. A commitment to both equality and self-
interest would make possible the optimal equal outcome of D3. 
Second, one might object that it is often not in the rational self-interest of a person to 
make good use of their productive talents when they would prefer to do a less 
productive job for the same income. For example, Jonathan Quong writes: “the 
relatively small increases in income that the talented would receive [by making Pareto 
improving occupational choices in an equal society] might not compensate for having to 
make radically different career choices to the ones the talented would prefer to make”.14 
But if an increase in a talented person’s income did not compensate for the decrease in 
welfare incurred by foregoing their first occupational preference, and labour burdens are 
14 Jonathan Quong, “Contractualism, Reciprocity and Egalitarian Justice”, Politics, Philosophy, and 
Economics, 6.1 (2007), 75-105, (p.86). 
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included in the currency of justice, then choosing the more productive occupation would 
not lead to an equality conserving strict Pareto improvement in the currency of justice; 
D3 would not be Pareto superior to D1. The absence of sufficient compensation would 
render the two situations Pareto incomparable. By contrast, if choosing the more 
productive occupation did constitute an equality conserving strict Pareto improvement, 
then it would generally be in the rational self-interest of the talented person to choose 
the more productive occupation. 
That being said, while the occupational choices dictated by optimal equality and 
rational self-interest would often correlate, people’s preferences could sometimes diverge 
from what a Pareto optimal level of equal access to advantage requires. So while D3 
may be Pareto superior to D1 in terms of access to advantage, it may be Pareto 
incomparable to D1 in terms of actual preference satisfaction. 
My argument would have a more comprehensive reach if we assume that the currency of 
justice is opportunity for welfare, rather than access to advantage, and we assume that it 
is always in the rational self-interest of people to increase their own opportunity for 
welfare. But I will not explore this thought any further here. The important point is that 
a merely egalitarian ethos would not be strictly inimical to Pareto optimality. 
3.3.2 Reply to the Second Horn 
A second way for Cohen to overcome the efficiency dilemma is to avoid the second horn 
of the dilemma by retaining the productive ethos claim, but relinquishing the egalitarian 
claim. Instead, Cohen could, and, in my view, should claim that distributive justice is a 
second order property which combines the values of equality and welfare (as well as 
community and legitimacy), while attaching lexical priority to equality. This offers a 
way to overcome the second horn of the dilemma while retaining the egalitarian spirit of 
Cohen’s vision. 
The claim that justice is merely distributive equality has several shortcomings, because 
not only does it imply that an equal society in which everybody is very badly-off is more 
just than an unequal society in which everybody is very well-off, it also implies that a 
society in which everybody is equally badly-off is no less just than a society in which 
everybody is equally well-off. Moreover, it implies that, when an equal distribution is 
unavailable, we should be indifferent, as a matter of justice, between a Pareto optimal 
level of inequality and a Pareto suboptimal state which is unequal to the same degree. 




fairness of outcomes, but as a complete account of distributive justice, Cohen’s 
egalitarianism has these counterintuitive implications. 
Abandoning the egalitarian claim might tempt us towards the view that equality is only 
one aspect of distributive justice, to be balanced alongside distinct, potentially 
conflicting, values. Accordingly, we might say that justice is a complex, second order 
value which includes the optimal balance of relevant first order values, like welfare, 
efficiency, and freedom. For example, we could say that (3,2) is more just than (1,1), 
because everyone is better off, even though it is worse, in one respect, because the 
former includes some unfairness whereas the latter does not.15 
However, if we were to take this route, we would be abandoning the egalitarian spirit of 
Cohen’s arguments. Cohen insists that moving from a state of equality to a Pareto 
superior state of inequality creates distributive injustice, even if we ought to bring about 
such a state, all things considered. But there is a further intermediate position available 
which allows us to insist on the primary importance of equality to justice, while 
avoiding some of the unpalatable implications outlined above. 
On Cohen’s view, we can seemingly determine whether a distribution of benefits and 
burdens is just on its internal aspects, where those internal aspects are the distributive 
pattern that obtains. In other words, we do not need to know what other distributions 
are feasible to determine whether or not a distribution is just.16 
We should, as egalitarians, instead adopt an alternative view, according to which we can 
only determine whether a distribution is just by comparing it to possible alternatives. 
One might maintain that equality is necessary for justice, so that an equal distribution 
will always be more just than an unequal one (even if the unequal distribution is 
strongly Pareto superior to the equal one). But we might also say that equality is 
sometimes insufficient for justice, when a Pareto superior state of equality is available. 
We should hold that unfair inequality is always unjust, but equality is also unjust when 
a Pareto superior state of equality is possible through people acting in ways in which 
15 This response is suggested by Tomlin (in “Internal Doubts About Cohen’s Rescue of Justice”, p.242) 
and resembles claims made by Michael Otsuka in “Equality, Ambition, and Insurance” , Proceedings 
of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volumes, 78 (2004), 151-66, p.164. 
16 The distinction between internal aspects and essential comparability is identified in Temkin’s 
Rethinking the Good, Chapter 7. 
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they are capable of acting.17 After all, the claim that distributive justice is a complex 
value with different aspects does not tell us anything about the respective strength of the 
different values which comprise it. 
This revision is supported by two powerful intuitions. First, given two outcomes 
containing the same population and roughly the same amount of goods, the more equal 
outcome is more just. Second, given two outcomes containing the same population 
which are equivalent from an egalitarian perspective (because both are perfectly equal or 
contain the same degree of inequality), in which one is Pareto superior to the other, the 
Pareto superior outcome is more just. 
Amending Cohen’s claims about equality and justice is consonant with remarks Cohen 
makes in some later works, in which he seems to soften his stance on the claim that 
equality of access to advantage is the only aspect of distributive justice. In Why Not 
Socialism?, he suggested that the egalitarian principle may need to be supplemented with 
a principle of community, because an egalitarian principle would allow large inequalities 
to be produced by responsible choices and option luck, and such distributive inequalities 
may serve to undermine fraternal social relations.18 Moreover, in “Fairness and 
Legitimacy in Justice”, he suggested that fairness and legitimacy may be two distinct 
aspects of distributive justice, because inequality brought about by option luck and 
bilateral gifts may create a distribution which is unfair but legitimate, where legitimacy 
is the property possessed by a distribution about which nobody has the right to 
complain.19 
The proposed revision to Cohen’s argument allows us to claim that a productive ethos is 
required as a matter of justice, without abandoning the egalitarian spirit of Cohen’s 
vision, while overcoming the shortcomings of equality of access to advantage as a 
complete theory of distributive justice. 
At this point, Quong might object that if the productive ethos is supposed to be required 
by justice, then this simply creates a new problem for Cohen. For a productive ethos is 
beyond what any theory of justice, or morality in general, could plausibly require. But as 
17 Indeed, Cohen contemplates this possibility, in Rescuing Justice and Equality p.322, and Quong 
offers it on Cohen’s behalf, in “Justice Beyond Equality”, p.331. 
18 G. A. Cohen, Why Not Socialism? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), Chapter 2. 
19 G. A. Cohen, “Fairness and Legitimacy in Justice, And: Does Option Luck Ever Preserve Justice?” in 
On The Currency of Egalitarian Justice, and Other Essays in Political Philosophy ed. By Michael 
Otsuka (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011). 
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I pointed out in my reply to the first horn of the dilemma, this is not so. For, if the 
currency of justice is access to advantage, and labour burdens are included in the 
currency of justice, then it is generally in the rational self-interest of each person with 
egalitarian beliefs to work productively for an egalitarian income. 
3.3.3 Summary 
We are now in a position to take stock of the potential replies to the efficiency 
objection. First, we can claim that a society with an egalitarian ethos could realise a 
Pareto optimal level of equality under realistic conditions, even if justice does not 
require it. If the currency of justice is access to advantage, labour burdens are a part of 
the currency of justice, and people are motivated by a belief in equality in addition to 
their rational self-interest (which coincides with a concern for the welfare of others) then 
a Pareto optimal state of equality could typically be brought about. 
Second, we could dispense with the claim that justice is merely equality and instead 
adopt the view that justice is a second order property encompassing a variety of values, 
including equality, welfare, community, and legitimacy, with equality enjoying lexical 
priority. Then we are in a position to claim that justice requires a productive ethos, but 
retain the egalitarian spirit of Cohen’s vision. 
3.4 The Forced Labour Objection 
While most egalitarians would welcome the removal of inequality through coercive 
taxation, most would condemn the removal of inequality through forced labour. But 
some have argued that, by the lights of Cohen’s claims, there is no moral difference 
between the legal enforcement of equality with respect to money and the legal 
enforcement of equality with respect to labour; both involve coercing the unwilling into 
bringing about equality.20 If this is so, one may regard this claim as a reason to revise 
20 Note that this differs from Robert Nozick’s claim that redistributive taxation is, or is “morally on a 
par with”, forced labour, in Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974), p.169. The 
objection to Cohen is that, given his endorsement of coercive egalitarian taxation, he cannot object to 
the use of forced labour in the name of equality. 
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one’s views on the permissibility of coerced labour, or regard the argument as a reductio 
ad absurdum of Cohen’s vision of a just society.21 
For the sake of argument, I assume that this objection, if successful, would constitute a 
reductio ad absurdum. In what follows, I will distinguish between two different ways of 
posing this objection more precisely, and argue against each in turn. The first thing we 
can ask is whether Cohen has the normative resources to oppose the realisation of 
equality through forced labour, all things considered. The second thing we can ask is the 
more difficult question of whether Cohen has the normative resources to oppose the 
realisation of equality through forced labour as a matter of justice. 
3.4.1 The First Formulation 
Cohen tried to morally distinguish between coercive taxation and forced labour by 
pointing to the fact that the latter requires the state to intrusively manipulate and 
command people through the use of intimate truths about them, while the former does 
not.  
But Michael Otsuka has objected that this way of distinguishing between coercive 
taxation and forced labour does not adequately explain the moral repugnance of the 
latter, on the grounds that if, contrary to fact, people’s talents and preferences were 
transparent to all, it would still be intuitively objectionable for the state to force people 
into occupations which bring about optimal equality, even though doing so would not 
require intrusion into people’s private thoughts.  
Moreover, Otsuka says that, on Cohen’s view, it is difficult to see why it would be 
wrong to coercively override a persons’ unwillingness to do what egalitarianism requires 
because “based as it is on mistaken ethical convictions and damaging as it is to the least 
well off, this recalcitrance does not appear to ground a decisive objection to the state’s 
so commanding him.”22 
Otsuka says that self-ownership largely provides the grounds for drawing a clear moral 
disparity between coercive taxation and forced labour, because, in contrast to property 
rights in oneself, people do not enjoy stringent rights of ownership over an inegalitarian 
21 Cécile Fabre has stated that she believes that justice does require the legal conscription of people into 
certain occupations, in Whose Body is it Anyway? Justice and the Integrity of the Person (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), Chapter 3: “A Civilian Service”. 
22 Otsuka, “Freedom of Occupational Choice”, p.446. 
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share of natural resources or income that can be derived from those resources (including 
in combination with one’s labour).23 Cohen, however, denies that we have rights of self-
ownership over our bodies and labour and therefore cannot appeal to this idea to 
distinguish between taxation and forced labour.24 
So the challenge for Cohen is the following: according to Cohen, both income and 
labour burdens are part of the currency of justice, and justice requires us to bring about 
equality. Cohen says that it is permissible for the state to coercively enforce a 
distribution of income which realises equality of access to advantage. If, as Cohen 
believed, we do not have rights of self-ownership, and the fact that forced labour 
requires the acquisition and use of private information about people is not a decisive 
reason to reject it, on what normative grounds can we advocate forcing someone to 
relinquish some of their income for the sake of equality but oppose forcing someone to 
sacrifice some of their labour for the sake of equality? 
I believe that we can answer this question in three ways that make Cohen’s position 
more palatable, without appealing either to rights of ownership over one’s labour or the 
fact that a state policy of forced labour would require intrusion into people’s private 
thoughts.  
First, one could simply concede that forced labour could promote justice but maintain 
that it would be morally repugnant to employ it, due to intolerable costs to freedom, 
autonomy and rights against interference which are not equivalent to rights of self-
ownership, costs which are not imposed by redistributive taxation.25 In this respect, 
justice is no different to other values; since maximising utility or freedom at the expense 
23 Moreover, Otsuka points out that forced labour can be morally repugnant even if it does not violate 
a person’s right of self-ownership. For example, the state could force someone into a particular 
occupation by threatening to withhold the resources necessary for their survival. He suggests that there 
is an important sense in which your life is not your own to lead when you are forced through the threat 
of starvation to spend all of your labour hours in a job which has been legally assigned to you. 
24 In G. A. Cohen, Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995). 
25 Cohen has suggested that he would, under certain circumstances, consider the implementation of an 
egalitarian principle of distribution morally repugnant. See G. A. Cohen, “How to Do Political 
Philosophy” in On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice and Other Essays in Political Philosophy, p.234.  
Similarly, in Nagel’s, “Equality”, p.108, he notes that “the promotion of equality may require 
objectionable means […g]reater equality may be attainable only by more general coercive techniques, 
including ultimately the assignment of work by public administration instead of private contracts”. 
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of other values would also sometimes be morally repugnant. We should not “let justice 
be done though the heavens fall”.26 
Second, one could posit that only moral duties (though not all duties) are permissibly 
enforceable by the state and deny that justice requires people to undertake particular 
occupations entails that they are under a moral duty to undertake it. People are not 
generally morally required to impose large burdens on themselves for the sake of 
bestowing an accumulation of small benefits on many other worse off individuals even if 
doing so would make things go best from an impartial perspective, and it is generally 
not thought to be permissible to force people to do so. One might maintain, however, 
that there is a moral duty to redistribute income, when the costs of doing so to each 
person are not large and the benefits to others are great. 
Third, one could say that the decisive reason to favour coercive redistributive taxation is 
not to remove intrinsic disvalue, but rather to remove the instrumentally bad effects of 
inequality, like inequality of power, social status or its detrimental effects on 
community. Such a position would be perfectly plausible, since few egalitarians would 
advocate, all things considered, a state policy of levelling down income or destroying 
wealth when doing so achieves no gains in terms of social equality. By contrast, one 
might maintain, forced labour in the name of equality would do little to remove the 
instrumentally bad effects of inequality. 
3.4.2 The Second Formulation 
A second way of formulating the forced labour objection is to say that Cohen lacks the 
normative resources to oppose the realisation of equality through forced labour as a 
matter of justice. This objection has been posed by Cécile Fabre, who argued that, by 
the lights of Cohen’s claims, a society in which distributive equality is legally enforced 
26 One might find this response unsatisfactory when it comes to egalitarianism as a theory of justice, 
rather than a view about the goodness of outcomes. We want to object to forced labour on the grounds 
of justice, rather than at the bar of an all things considered judgement about what is morally 
permissible. Some would regard it as a reductio ad absurdum of a theory of justice which allowed for 
its implementation to be morally repugnant. 
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through forced labour could be just.27 On this formulation, the forced labour objection 
is a claim is about what a just society is. But intuitively, for me at least, a society in 
which equality is enforced by forced labour would be an unhappy parody of a just 
society. 
Fabre suggests that there are typically three kinds of reasons to provide the legal 
freedom to refrain from doing what justice requires: enforcing the requirements of 
justice might be morally impermissible, all things considered, coercively enforcing the 
requirements of justice might be practically infeasible, or trying to coercively reduce 
injustice might be counterproductive by unintentionally worsening it. 
In terms of exegesis, it is unclear whether Cohen objected to the use of forced labour 
because he thought it was unjust or merely because he thought that forced labour was 
impractical or impermissible, all things considered. But I assume for the sake of 
argument that a plausible defence of Cohen will establish that a just society would not 
contain forced labour. 
The remaining challenge is to provide an account of how and why coercively enforcing 
the requirements of justice through forced labour would be counterproductive, in 
contrast to redistributive taxation. Fabre considers and rejects four attempts to do so. I 
will briefly summarise the arguments that Fabre considers and rejects, before explaining 
what I take to be better replies which Fabre overlooks. 
First, Fabre considers the idea that legally forcing people into productive jobs might 
deter them from acquiring the skills that they would need to perform those jobs in the 
first place. Coercive job allocation might therefore unintentionally but foreseeably 
worsen injustice rather than reduce it.  
Fabre points out however, that in the absence of coercion, people might be deterred 
from acquiring productive skills in non-ideal societies in which equality is coercively 
enforced, due to the absence of incentives to do so. She also observes that even in a 
society in which people held the egalitarian conviction that they ought to acquire the 
skills that justice requires, they might not be sufficiently motivated to act upon those 
beliefs. She points out that a society of weak-willed egalitarians in which the 
27 Fabre’s argument applies whether justice requires optimal equality or merely equality. Sometimes 
forced labour would serve to reduce inequality, rather than bring about an efficient distribution of 
labour. Fabre cites the example of forcing a well-off person to be a doctor in order to provide aid to 
those who are very badly off. Such conscription may serve to reduce inequality even if it does not also 
contribute to bringing about optimal equality. 
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requirements of justice are coercively enforced might be more just than a society of 
weak-willed egalitarians without any legal coercion. 
Second, Fabre considers the claim that the state could not acquire the information 
needed to legally conscript people into their most productive occupation. This epistemic 
constraint means that forcing people into particular jobs runs a high risk of worsening 
inequality rather than reducing it by burdening people with work that leaves them worse 
off than others. 
Fabre replies that we can make rough estimations of the burdensomeness of imposing a 
particular occupation on a person, much in the same way that we can roughly judge 
that, on average, higher income corresponds to higher welfare and justify egalitarian 
taxation on those grounds. Moreover, she points out that an epistemic aversion to 
imposing occupations is to the disadvantage of the worse off who stand to gain from the 
additional benefits provided by an increase in the social product and, on balance, a 
legally coercive policy is more likely to reduce inequality than legal freedom of 
occupational choice. 
Third, Fabre considers the claim that it is better if people do the egalitarian thing due to 
egalitarian motivations, rather than due to state coercion. Fabre points out, however, 
that although it is usually better that people do the right things for the right reasons we 
do not normally regard that as a moral barrier to legally enforcing certain moral 
requirements. She also adds that being legally compelled to do the right thing can 
gradually induce people to do the right thing without coercion (pointing to examples 
including legally coercive health and safety requirements in the workplace and anti-
discrimination legislation, which play some part in bringing about a change in attitudes 
and voluntary behaviour). 
Fourth, Fabre looks at the claim that coerced labour impermissibly uses people as a 
mere means to the end of justice. In reply, she says that one cannot hold that legally 
compelling people into conforming to the requirements of justice uses them as a mere 
means: she says to do so would condemn the legal prohibition of murder and assault, let 
alone coercive taxation. She suggests that the Kantian objection to forced labour must 
appeal to the fact that it involves the state intrusively interfering in people’s private lives, 
and rejects this on the similar grounds to Otsuka. 
It is, of course, objectionable, all things considered, to force someone to live in a way 
which runs contrary to how they choose to live their life. But, I repeat, Fabre’s 
formulation of the forced labour objection does not deny that claim. The objection says 




job allocation as a matter of justice. In my view, Fabre’s formulation of the forced 
labour objection can be overcome in thee ways. 
I think that one can coherently maintain that forced labour is unjust, even if it produces 
justice in distribution. There is a difference between egalitarian justice as an evaluative 
view which tells us which distributions are just and which are unjust and principles 
which tells us what we ought to do as a matter of justice; a difference between acting for 
reasons of justice and acting justly and unjustly. Justice can be both a deontological 
property of actions and an axiological property of distributions and it may sometimes be 
unjust to reduce injustice (for example, levelling down might be unjust even if it reduces 
distributive injustice). 
Relatedly, Fabre’s version of the forced labour objection can be resisted by 
distinguishing between a just distribution and a just society. One could agree that forced 
labour could reduce distributive injustice, but deny that it follows that a just society 
could contain forced labour. Cohen wrote: 
A just society […] is one whose citizens affirm and act upon the correct 
principles of justice but justice in distribution […] consists in a certain 
egalitarian profile of rewards. It follows that, as a matter of logical possibility, a 
just distribution might obtain in a society that is not itself just.28 
In a society in which distributive justice is realised by coercive job allocation, it need not 
be true that citizens affirm and act upon the correct principles of justice. This does, of 
course, commit one to the view that a society in which equality is realised through 
coercive income redistribution is less than fully just. But this is not a big bullet to bite; 
indeed, Cohen says that in a perfectly just society, coercive taxation would not be 
required.29 
Finally, Fabre’s formulation of the forced labour objection can be repelled by drawing 
on my proposal, in reply to the efficiency dilemma, that Cohen’s claims be amended in 
order to judge a Pareto suboptimal state of equality unjust when a Pareto optimal state 
of equality is possible through people acting in ways in which they are capable of acting. 
I would reject the claim that there is no difference, as a matter of justice, between a 
society in which equality is coercively enforced by redistributive taxation and a society 
in which equality is coercively enforced by forced labour on the following grounds. 
28 Cohen, If You’re An Egalitarian, How Come You’re So Rich?, pp. 131-132. 
29 Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, p.221. 
 
                                                             
86 
 
In non-ideal situations in which people will not voluntarily do what justice requires, 
forced labour achieves equality by supressing welfare. For any society in which equality 
is enforced by forced labour, there will typically be a feasible, equal, and Pareto superior 
state available which does not include forced labour. By contrast, this is not typically 
true of redistributive taxation.  
I believe that this response captures the core of people’s intuitive distaste for forced 
labour: we think that part of the injustice of coercive job allocation resides in the 
contingent fact that it would typically make everyone’s life equally bad. So the response 
has intuitive support and a plausible rationale. But to develop this line of response in 
more detail, we must first distinguish between varieties of non-ideality. Of course, there 
are many degrees of non-ideality along the spectrum from a perfectly just world to the 
opposite extreme but we can delineate some general types.30 
First, there are worlds in which every person does what they are required to do, as a 
matter of justice, and morality more generally, without compulsion.31 For instance, 
imagine a perfectly egalitarian society in which everybody holds egalitarian beliefs and 
voluntarily does what justice requires of them. In such a world, a coercive state would 
not be required, but there may nevertheless be a state for practical reasons (for example, 
to solve co-ordination problems). Cohen says that in a truly just society, people’s 
occupational preferences would coincide with what a Pareto optimal level of equality 
requires, rather than justice requiring people to act contrary to their prudential 
preferences due to their moral convictions. 32 
Second, there are morally blemished worlds in which every person does what they are 
required to do as a matter of justice, but do not fully comply with the requirements of 
morality more generally. Again, in these kinds of worlds, there would be no need for 
coercive taxation or forced labour, even though such worlds would be morally 
imperfect. In these kinds of worlds, we could try to remove the moral imperfection of 
the world through state coercion, this but in many instances this would only compound 
30 This discussion draws on similar distinctions made in Hillel Steiner’s “Levels of Non-Ideality”, The 
Journal of Political Philosophy (2017). 
31 We might even imagine a more perfect world than this: morally spotless worlds in which every 
individual does what is morally best, including carrying out morally supererogatory choices. 
32 He says that “[O]ne focus of the egalitarian ethos is to make conscious focus on the worst-off 
unnecessary. What rather happens is that people […] unreflectively live by, principles that restrain the 
pursuit of self-interest” in Rescuing Justice and Equality, p.73. 
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the world’s non-ideality by doing something which does not fall within the moral 
jurisdiction of the state. 
Third, there are morally tainted worlds in which some people do not voluntarily do 
what is required of them by justice (or morality in general) but all requirements of 
justice are coercively enforced by the state. In such worlds, justice may still not be fully 
realised because it would be impermissible for the state to coercively enforce justice 
across the board. For example, a society might have perfectly just anti-discrimination 
laws, but unjust discrimination nevertheless takes place in those spheres of everyday life 
in which it would be impermissible for the state to coercively interfere. 
We can divide these third kinds of worlds into two types. In one kind of world, people 
believe that they ought to do what egalitarianism requires, but, due to the psychological 
burden of carrying out acts of self-sacrifice, are not moved to so act. For example, 
imagine a society of weak-willed egalitarians in which everybody wants to do the job 
that justice requires of them but cannot muster the will to do so. 
In such a society, it may be objectionable to coercively give people the extra push 
required do the egalitarian thing that they justifiably believe that they ought to do. But it 
is less objectionable than coercing people who lack egalitarian beliefs. If a policy of state 
job allocation was agreed with democratic unanimity, for example, nobody would have 
grounds to complain once that had been legally assigned a job. So it cannot be that kind 
of non-ideality we have in mind when we recoil at the idea of forced labour.  
The type of non-ideality in which we especially object to the use of forced labour is one 
in which people generally don’t believe that they have an egalitarian obligation to do the 
job that optimal equality requires, and the state forces them do it anyway. Consider a 
world, not unlike our own, in which many people do not have egalitarian beliefs and 
would recoil at the idea of the state conscripting them into certain lines of work in the 
name of equality. Considering forced labour, Fabre says 
[T]hat which A is [forced] to do neither makes her worse off than the less 
fortunate nor violates her personal prerogative – any more than giving a share of 
her material resources to the less fortunate would do.33 
But this is misleading. There is typically a difference in burdensomeness between 
someone choosing an occupation because of their egalitarian convictions and being 
forced to forego their preferred occupation in spite of their inegalitarian convictions. 
33 Fabre, "Distributive Justice and Freedom”, p.399. 
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Moreover, there is a difference in burdensomeness between being coerced into 
expending one’s labour in a way one disprefers and having legal conditions attached to 
the accumulation of income. 
Many people in the actual world do not enjoy their jobs, but they are willing to do it for 
the sake of a higher income, even if, other things being equal, they would prefer to do a 
different job. It would be odd to say that, were we to force such individuals to do the 
same job for a lower income, this would not impose a large burden, merely because they 
are prepared to do the job for a price. One’s life would go much worse on plausible 
accounts of well-being if a person were forced to perform a particular occupation that, 
in the absence of egalitarian convictions, they do not want to do.34 
Consider an example. Suppose Bartleby is a talented scrivener. Compare two situations. 
In the first situation, Bartleby is morally motivated to copy legal documents due to his 
justified conviction that copying legal documents fulfils his obligation to make a 
productive contribution to society. In the second situation, Bartleby lacks the belief that 
he has an egalitarian obligation to make a productive contribution to society. He would 
prefer not to copy legal documents but the state coerces him into doing so. In this 
situation, Bartleby is forced to spend his working days doing something he would prefer 
not to do. It seems that Bartleby’s life is much worse in the second situation than the 
first. 
While forced labour has deleterious effects on one’s well-being that, under realistic 
conditions, reduce distributive injustice, the same cannot be said for the confiscation of 
one’s income. It is implausible to say that taxing a person with inegalitarian beliefs 
would have an equally deleterious effect on their well-being as forcing them to take an 
occupation that they object to. Forcing someone to spend their life toiling in an 
occupation that they don’t want to do diminishes their well-being. No comparable case 
can be made against redistributive taxation which confiscates income but leaves an 
individual free to otherwise lead their lives as they choose. 
We are now in a position to draw on these claims and combine them with the claims I 
advanced in response to the efficiency dilemma in order to complete this line of response 
34 My reply to the forced labour objection resembles a remark made by Cohen in the course of 
discussing whether the ethical solution is oppressive when he says: “it blights a person’s life to require 
her to do a job that she disprefers […] where the appeal is to the severity of the deprivation that the 
dispreferred job imposes, then no problem for egalitarianism is raised, because egalitarians take into 
account, when expecting or not expecting a person to do a job, the full costs of doing so for that 
person”, Rescuing Justice and Equality, p.213. 
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to the forced labour objection. To repeat, in response to the efficiency dilemma, I 
claimed that we could revise Cohen’s view such that justice always prefers a high level of 
equality to a low level of equality. Above, I argued that forced labour under certain 
types of non-ideal situations achieves equality at the price of suppressing well-being. As 
a result, as a matter of contingent fact, forced labour would typically bring about an 
unjustly low level of equality in comparison to some available alternatives, including 
those in which freedom of occupational choice is legally guaranteed and equality is 
brought about by the coercive redistribution of income. 
Accordingly, a society containing forced labour would typically not be just, when 
compared to the possible alternatives. By contrast, redistributive taxation typically 
would not bring about a low level of equality compared to the available alternatives. On 
the contrary, redistributive taxation would typically increase the sum total of welfare in 
society in addition to reducing inequality, due to the diminishing marginal utility of 
money. We can say that a society containing legally coercive job allocation will typically 
be unjust because Pareto superior states of equality will be contingently available. This 
feature distinguishes forced labour from the egalitarian redistribution of income. 
One might object to this line of reasoning in the following way: although it may 
contingently be true that the realisation of equality through forced labour would lead to 
a Pareto suboptimal level of equality, it is also contingently the case that the realisation 
of equality through forced labour is better, from the perspective of distributive justice, 
than any possible alternative. 
For in a society with legal freedom of occupational choice, many people are forced, not 
by legal conscription, but by economic circumstance, to do jobs that they would rather 
not do. If we are to condemn the realisation of equality through legally coercive job 
allocation on the grounds that it suppresses people’s welfare by forcing them to do jobs 
that they don’t want to do, must we also condemn the realisation of equality through 
the labour market in which some people’s welfare is similarly supressed? 
I grant that there may be circumstances in which we must choose between legally 
coercive job allocation and equivalent unfreedom in the labour market, and, in such 
circumstances we could not oppose the use of forced labour as a matter of distributive 
justice. It is also true, for example, that in some circumstances of extreme inequality, 
forcing someone to provide assistance to the worse off would reduce inequality by 
improving the lot of the worse off and decreasing the gap between them. 
Often we must choose between many non-ideal possible states of the world and reach a 




to Fabre demonstrates that, in many contingent circumstances, forced labour would be 
inimical to the realisation of a Pareto optimal level of equality of access to advantage. 
Accordingly, as a matter of contingent fact, a society containing forced labour would 
typically not be just. As a result, my reply strips Fabre’s objection of rhetorical force. 
3.4.3 Summary 
To summarise, one formulation of the forced labour objection says that, because Cohen 
does not believe in self-ownership, and the fact that forced labour involves violation of 
people’s private thoughts is not a decisive reason to oppose it, Cohen lacks the 
normative resources to oppose the realisation of equality through forced labour, all 
things considered. 
I argued that we can distinguish between the coercive enforcement of a just distribution 
of income and a just distribution of labour in four ways: (1) concede that forced labour 
could promote justice but oppose it, all things considered, due to the costs to freedom 
and autonomy, (2) deny that people are morally required to realise justice through their 
occupational choices, in contrast to choices concerning their income, and (3) defend 
redistributive taxation on grounds other than the fact that it promotes distributive 
equality. 
The second formulation of the objection says that Cohen lacks the normative resources 
to oppose the realisation of equality through forced labour as a matter of justice. I 
argued that we can resist this by (4) maintaining that forced labour is unjust even 
though it may promote justice in distribution, (5) distinguishing between a just 
distribution and a just society, and (6) pointing to the differences between redistributing 
income and welfare across different varieties of non-ideal societies. 
3.5 Conclusion 
G. A. Cohen claimed that we could bring about an egalitarian society without sacrificing 
economic efficiency or legal freedom of occupational choice if people were moved by an 
egalitarian ethos to make good use of their productive talents. The efficiency objection 
says such a society would require a productive ethos, in addition to an egalitarian ethos, 
and such an ethos is both beyond what justice could require, and is inconsistent with 
Cohen’s claim that justice is equality. The forced labour objection says that Cohen’s 
claims commit him to the view that a just society could contain forced labour in the 




We are now in a position to combine my arguments to form two potential lines of 
response to these objections, both of which allow us to retain the egalitarian spirit of 
Cohen’s claims. First, we could retain the claim that justice is equality, relinquish the 
claim that justice requires a productive ethos, and draw a distinction between a just 
distribution and a just society (as well as opposing the use of forced labour, all things 
considered). By doing this, we can hold on to the claims that equality, Pareto optimality, 
and freedom of occupational choice could be co-realised under realistic conditions and 
reject the claim that a just society could contain forced labour. 
Alternatively, we can relinquish the claim that justice is (only) equality and instead claim 
that justice is a second order property encompassing other values, including Pareto 
optimality, while affording lexical priority to equality. That allows us to maintain that 
justice requires a productive ethos and reject the claim that a just distribution could be 
brought about by forced labour, due to the detrimental effects of forced labour on 
welfare in non-ideal societies. 
3.6 Appendix The Equality Objection 
The central purpose of this chapter was to provide a defence of Cohen’s claim that we 
could bring about a Pareto optimal level of equality without using or endorsing legally 
coercive job allocation. I defended this claim from the efficiency dilemma and the forced 
labour objection. However, there is a further significant counterargument to Cohen’s 
claim that warrants a response, which I will call the equality objection. 
Egalitarians want to reduce distributive unfairness. But they also want to abolish 
stigmatising differences in social status and inegalitarian social hierarchies.35 Some have 
argued that these two aspects of egalitarian concern can come into conflict. They point 
out that reducing distributive inequality can sometimes worsen social inequality, because 
doing so requires the humiliating and undignified unveiling of people’s flaws and 
shortcomings. For example, Jonathan Wolff has pointed out that in order to realise 
distributive fairness in the actual world, we may need to intrusively gather information 
about the worse off in order to scrutinise whether their disadvantage is due to their 
35 See, for example, O’Neill, “What Should Egalitarians Believe?”, and T. M. Scanlon, “The Diversity 
of Objections to Inequality” in The Difficulty of Tolerance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003). 
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responsible choices or due to brute bad luck, dividing people into the “deserving poor” 
and “undeserving poor”.36 
Of course, an egalitarian is not committed to saying that we should do whatever it takes 
to bring about a fair distribution. So, if realising a fair distribution requires treating 
people in an undignified way, or carries other morally intolerable costs, then we should 
not realise a fair distribution either as a matter of equality, or all things considered. 
There are egalitarian constraints against the full realisation of distributive fairness. 
Emily McTernan has argued that this observation raises a problem for Cohen’s solution 
to the trilemma of co-realising equality, Pareto optimality, and legal freedom of 
occupational choice. She argues that a society with a productive ethos would be likely to 
contain inegalitarian hierarchies which rank people in terms of their productive 
contribution to society, where one’s social status is tied to the extent of one’s 
contribution. Call this the equality objection. 
Now, it should first be clarified that this objection does not apply to a society with a 
merely egalitarian ethos, since an egalitarian ethos does not induce the belief that each 
person ought to make a productive contribution to society, it merely induces the belief 
that everybody should be equal in terms of access to advantage (or so I have argued). 
The objection does, however, apply to a society with a productive ethos. 
McTernan thinks that two kinds of inegalitarian hierarchies would be likely to emerge 
in a society with a productive ethos.37 First, there would be an inegalitarian hierarchy 
between those who fully carry out their productive obligation and those who, for good 
reasons, do not. She cites the example of people who choose to refrain from taking paid 
employment in favour of providing full-time unpaid care for the young, the old, and the 
infirm. McTernan says that, despite being admirable, this is “often unlikely to be an 
individual’s most socially productive role”.38 I think the same might be said of 
untalented artists, musicians, poets, gardeners, philosophers, and many others. 
In a society with a productive ethos, one can imagine that people might raise the 
following complaint against those who choose not to take paid employment, or choose 
36 Jonathan Wolff, “Fairness, Respect, and the Egalitarian Ethos”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 27.2 
(1998), 97-122. 
37 Emily McTernan, "The Inegalitarian Ethos: Incentives, Respect and Self-Respect", Politics, 
Philosophy and Economics, 12.1 (2013), 93-111. 
38 McTernan, “The Inegalitarian Ethos”, p.99. 
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an occupation which does not make good use of their talents: “I am contributing my fair 
share by making good use of my productive talents, even though, egalitarian obligation 
aside, I would prefer to do a different job. Why should others be allowed to shirk their 
obligation by refusing to make a fair productive contribution?” 
To illustrate, it is a social norm in the United Kingdom at the time of writing that people 
who receive an income from society ought to take a job if one is available and they are 
capable of doing it. Those who receive an income without working, even when they are 
capable of doing so, are, rightly or wrongly, subject to social disapproval. We can 
imagine that something similar might happen if it was a social norm that everybody 
ought to make good use of their productive talents for the common good. McTernan 
points out that in an ideally egalitarian society, people should be free to refrain from 
carrying out their productive obligation in full (including the choice not to take paid 
employment) without suffering diminished social status. 
Second, McTernan says that there would be an inegalitarian hierarchy between “the 
untalented”, who make a comparatively small productive contribution to society, and 
“the talented” who contribute a comparatively large amount. This thought is motivated 
by the observation that, in a socialist market economy of the kind which may be 
required to realise Cohen’s vision in practice, pre-tax incomes would reveal the size of 
each person’s productive contribution to society. Knowledge that one’s productive 
contribution to society is smaller than others might diminish people’s sense of self-
respect, and lead “the talented” to regard “the untalented” as their social inferiors. She 
concludes that 
Cohen appeared to combine capitalism’s efficiency with socialism’s equality and 
motivation for the common good. But in incorporating capitalism’s market 
structure, Cohen preserves its [unjust] hierarchical ordering [and] its 
inegalitarian consequences.39 
McTernan contemplates two ways in which someone might try to resists her arguments. 
First, she considers whether choosing not to make good use of one’s productive talents 
falls within the sphere of moral permissions granted by each person’s personal 
prerogative to refrain from doing what justice requires. She dismisses this on the 
grounds that the personal prerogative is not so extensive as to permit people to opt out 
of paid employment altogether. 
39 McTernan, "The Inegalitarian Ethos", p.107. 
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Second, she considers whether providing unpaid care for the young, old, and infirm 
should simply be counted as fulfilment of one’s productive obligation. But she rejects 
this idea on the grounds that typically people who voluntarily opt out of paid 
employment would be capable of making a more productive contribution to society. Or, 
if they really are incapable contributing more, would feel ashamed of this fact, because it 
reveals a lack of “talent”. 
I think that this is an insightful objection. It may well be the case that, the facts being as 
they are, it would be impossible to realise an egalitarian society of the kind described by 
Cohen in the actual world without giving rise to inegalitarian social hierarchies. Cohen 
argued that what we ought to believe about the requirements of justice is independent of 
whether justice could, or should, be realised. Perhaps the ethos serves an illustrative 
function, by helping us to clarify what we ought to believe about what justice requires, 
but we should not try to bring about such a society, once all aspects of equality are 
taken into account, or all things considered. 
However, I will now argue that Cohen’s claims can be defended against McTernan’s 
challenge. Since McTernan specifically mentions social inequality between “the 
talented” and “the untalented”, and between the optimally productive and justifiably 
unproductive, I will restrict my reply to those two kinds of hierarchies. I will not 
consider other kinds of inegalitarian hierarchies that might arise. Before proceeding, I 
will say a little bit more about the constitutive parts of a productive ethos in order to 
illuminate the following discussion. The ethos can be broken down into four distinct 
parts.  
(1) First, an ethos consists of widely shared beliefs and attitudes. A productive 
ethos would induce all or most people believe to that justice requires a Pareto 
optimal level of equality, and that each has an obligation to make choices, 
including occupational choices, which contribute to bringing that about. It 
would induce people to hold attitudes which contribute to the realisation of 
justice. 
(2) Second, an ethos also requires motivations. An ethos would ensure that 
people are generally motivated to act upon their egalitarian beliefs. It is possible 
that people might have egalitarian beliefs but are not ultimately motivated to act 
upon them, (for example, due to weakness of the will). 
(3) Third, an ethos consists of a set of choices. That is, the choices required of 
individuals to ensure that an optimal level of equality is realised. These could 




choices that egalitarianism requires, but be motivated by something other than 
egalitarian beliefs. Moreover, one might hold egalitarian beliefs and be 
motivated to act upon them, but fail to successfully make egalitarian choices, 
due to imperfect information or poor decision-making.  
(4) Finally, an ethos requires that all or most people hold egalitarian beliefs, and 
are motivated to act on those beliefs, and act upon them successfully. If only a 
small number of people in a society hold egalitarian beliefs which they 
successfully act upon, equality would not be realised. 
What McTernan seems to have in mind is situations in which most people hold 
egalitarian beliefs, or, in her words, have “internalised” the productive ethos, but not 
everybody makes the choices that are required to realise a Pareto optimal level of 
equality.  
First, I will argue that we don’t have good reasons to think that social inequality would 
arise between the “the talented” and “the untalented” in a society with a productive 
ethos. To start, we should remember that “talent”, in this context, refers to the skills 
and abilities that are in lesser supply within a particular distribution of skills and 
consumer preferences; it does not imply that there is something intrinsically valuable 
about a particular kind of work. In a socialist market economy, high pre-tax wages 
would indicate which talents are less commonplace than others; it would not denote 
which talents or occupations are valuable. So why should we believe that people with 
less “talent” would feel ashamed of this fact?  
The objection works if we assume that people hold particular beliefs about the 
relationship between “talent” and worth. But we should not assume that the population 
of a society with a productive ethos would hold beliefs which resemble the ones that 
many people have in the unjustly unequal societies that exist in the actual world. In 
anticipation of this point, Jonathan Wolff wrote  
what is considered shameful is socially relative and contingent […] What counts 
as a productive talent may vary from society to society, but what seems less 
variable is that those who are unable to make a significant contribution may feel 
at least somewhat ashamed of this fact […] Now in an enlightened society of 
equals such attitudes might be considered an unfortunate fact about our 
barbaric prehistory. This, though, is psychological speculation and we have 
little, if any, good reason to believe that it is true.40 
40 Wolff, “Fairness, Respect, and the Egalitarian Ethos”, pp.114-115. 
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Without wishing to deny that we can only speculate about the attitudes that the 
residents of an imaginary society would hold, it seems less likely that people in an 
egalitarian society of the kind described by Cohen would hold these attitudes. By 
stipulation, in a society with a productive ethos, most people would hold egalitarian 
beliefs and attitudes.41 A part of holding egalitarian beliefs and attitudes is to believe 
that natural talent endowments are arbitrary from a moral perspective. People guided by 
a productive ethos would believe that it is a matter of brute luck what one’s natural 
talent endowments are, and how abundant or scarce those talents happen to be in the 
circumstances in which they find themselves. 
It is difficult to see how, on the one hand, people could believe that we ought to 
eliminate morally arbitrary disadvantage and, on the other hand, believe that an 
unchosen lack of marketable skills as something to be ashamed of. If people didn’t 
believe that natural endowments are arbitrary from a moral perspective, it is difficult to 
see why they would be motivated to make a productive contribution to society for an 
egalitarian wage without coercion. I would posit that believing that a lack of “talent” is 
something to be ashamed of seems inconsistent with the kinds of beliefs people would 
have in a society with a productive ethos. 
To be sure, it’s possible, indeed common, for people to regard some aspect of themselves 
as arbitrary from a moral point of view but also a shortcoming to be regarded with 
shame or embarrassment. For example, people often regard physical imperfections as 
something to be ashamed of while at the same time believing that those things are 
morally arbitrary. And McTernan rightly points out that people regarding their talents 
as inappropriate objects of both shame and pride would alienate people from important 
aspects of their personality.42 
But it is not talents per se that people with egalitarian beliefs would regard as 
inappropriate objects of shame or pride, but the marketability of those talents. One can 
be both proud of their talents and indifferent to their marketability. For example, a 
person might be proud of their philosophical talents and at the same time feel no shame 
about the fact that those talents are not marketable. 
Moreover, in any society with a market economy which provides information about 
how much everybody contributes, there could be social division between those who 
41 For a more comprehensive defence of this point, see Joanna Firth, “What’s So Shameful About 
Shameful Revelations?”, Law, Ethics, and Philosophy, 1 (2013), 31-51. 
42 McTernan, “The Inegalitarian Ethos”, p.206. 
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contribute more and those who contribute less. The best way to break the links between 
“talent”, productive contribution, and perceived worth, is to try to change people’s 
beliefs, in order to recognise that the market value of unchosen talents are arbitrary 
from a moral perspective. A society in which egalitarian beliefs are widespread would 
surely score better on that front than many others we can imagine. 
I now turn to whether we should expect an inegalitarian hierarchy to emerge between 
those who carry out their productive obligation in full, and those who do not: either by 
choosing not to take paid employment or by choosing not to make the most of their 
talents. I will argue that we should not expect such a hierarchy to emerge. 
Take the example of providing unpaid care that McTernan uses to illustrate her central 
claim. We need not assume that choosing to provide unpaid care for the young, old, and 
infirm, counts as a failure to fulfil one’s productive obligation. The fact that a person 
chooses not to not contribute to producing wealth to the full extent that they are able 
to, does not, by itself, establish that the choice fails to fulfil their productive obligation. 
This would conflate productive efficiency with Pareto optimality. 
The point of the productive ethos is not to ensure that society produces as much wealth 
as possible, but to ensure that we cannot make anyone better off, in terms of access to 
advantage, without making someone worse off. A society could have a Pareto optimal 
distribution of access to advantage but a very low productive output in terms of wealth. 
For example, if everyone in society preferred a lot of leisure time, then a Pareto optimal 
distribution of advantage could exist without much wealth being produced. In fact, 
there may be cases where we should level down the amount of wealth in society for the 
sake of realising a Pareto optimal distribution of advantage. 
To illustrate, consider Cohen’s example of a person who can choose to between working 
as a doctor and working as a gardener.43 Suppose we consider an analogous case of 
someone who can choose either to be a doctor or to refrain from paid employment in 
order to raise their children. One might want to conclude that since Cohen says that 
egalitarian justice requires the agent to choose doctoring over gardening he must also 
say that justice requires people to choose to be a doctor instead of opting out of paid 
employment to raise their children. 
But in Cohen’s example, the agent is better off than others regardless of whether they 
choose to be a doctor or a gardener, but by choosing to be a doctor, they reduce the gap 
between themselves and others by benefitting people. Importantly, Cohen stipulates that 
43 Cohen, Rescuing Justice and equality, pp.184-185. 
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the agent would not be required to be a doctor if doing so would make them worse off 
than others. The case also excludes, by stipulation, other choices which may be 
available, including the choice to refrain from paid employment altogether. 
For an analogous case in which the agent can choose whether to either doctor or 
provide unpaid care, we would need more information about the situation. Is the person 
who opts out of paid employment going to be better off than others regardless of what 
they do? Are the recipients of care going to be better or worse off if the person chooses 
to undertake paid employment instead? How much would it blight their lives to take 
paid employment contrary to their preferences? Without knowing the answers to these 
questions, we cannot say whether or not opting out of paid employment would count as 
a failure to fulfil one’s productive obligation.44 
McTernan says that if people were motivated to provide unpaid care from a sense of 
social obligation, it would introduce “one thought too many”, and would simply show 
that people are acting for the wrong kind of reasons. The same could be said of artists, 
musicians, doctors, nurses, teachers, and many others occupations. 
But that’s a question of motivation. True, it would be odd if people were motivated to 
give up a paid job in order to care for their children because they thought it was their 
social duty to do so. But, as I pointed out, people can make choices in accordance with 
what egalitarianism requires even if they are not motivated to do so by egalitarian 
beliefs. Moreover, people could provide care for loved ones for the right kinds of 
reasons, but still think that, by happy coincidence, that they are making a contribution 
to society. 
Second, even if we assume for the sake of argument that occupational choices which 
appear to be suboptimal are in fact suboptimal, those who make such choices would be 
no better or worse off than anybody else, when all aspects of advantage are taken into 
account. Their overall share of the currency of justice would be the same as everybody 
44 Although I argued that justice requires Pareto optimal equality, a weaker reading of Cohen’s claims 
says that justice permits, but does not require, a move from Pareto suboptimal equality to a state of 
Pareto superior equality, but forbids moves from equality to Pareto superior inequality. In Cohen’s 
vision of a just society, the incentive to do what one believes to be one’s egalitarian obligation replaces 
inequality-creating income incentives. So if an inequality-creating Pareto improvement is possible 
through at least one person working more productively for an inequality-creating incentive, then an 
equality preserving Pareto improvement is possible through at least one person working more 
productively without an inequality-creating incentive. This would help to bring about roughly the same 
degree of economic efficiency that would be brought about by the incentive of a higher income. 
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else’s. It is therefore difficult to see why people who voluntarily choose to refrain from 
productively contributing to the full extent to which they are able, would regard this 
choice as something to be ashamed of. And it is difficult to see why others would 
disapprove of this choice, given that they have freely chosen to contribute to the full 
extent to which they are able, and are compensated accordingly with other aspects of 
advantage. 
Third, it would not be transparent to each whether or not other people are making good 
use of their productive talents because each person’s talent endowment is not 
transparent. People would simply lack knowledge of whether or not each person is 
carrying out their productive obligation, even if they would regard such choices as 
something to be ashamed of (which, I have claimed, they would not). 
In summary, I do not think we have good reasons to worry that a society with a 
productive ethos would contain social division between the more productive and the less 
productive. To be sure, in possible non-ideal societies between the actual world and 
Cohen’s imagined one, some of these problems may arise, and I cannot show that the 
equality objection is mistaken. But insofar as we can speculate about what would 
happen in societies unlike any that currently exist, I do not think that we have good 
reasons to worry that the realisation of optimal equality through a productive ethos 
would be inimical to social equality. 
Finally, we should bear in mind the following. If it were true that a society with a 
productive ethos would be unjustly hierarchical, in which worth was tied to productive 
contribution, this would show that, under realistic conditions, we could not co-realise 
social equality, distributive fairness, Pareto optimality, and legal freedom of 
occupational choice. It would not, however, show that we should not aim to bring 
about such a society. For other kinds of societies may be even worse, both regarding 




4 KILLING AND DUCKING: SELF-DEFENCE AND MORAL 
EQUIVALENCE 
4.1 Introduction 
I now turn away from the redistribution of benefits and burdens in the domain of 
distributive justice towards a related problem concerning the imposition and 
redistribution of harm in the domain of normative ethics. More exactly, I turn to a 
problem in the morality of imposing and redistributing harm in self-defence. 
Many people think that two acts of self-defence can differ in permissibility even if they 
bring about the same distribution of harm, because the mode of agency used to bring 
about an outcome can make a moral difference. Consider the following cases. 
Killing 
You are trapped at the bottom of a deep well. An innocent person is, through no 
fault or choice of their own, falling down the well. If they land on you, they will 
survive, but you will be killed. You can survive only by vaporising the falling 
person with a ray gun.1 
Ducking 
You are trapped at the bottom of a deep well. An innocent person is, through no 
fault or choice of their own, falling down the well. If they land on you, they will 
survive, but you will be killed. You can survive only by stepping aside to allow 
the person to fall to their death.2 
Some people judge it morally permissible to defend your life in both cases. But according 
to the moral immunity thesis, it would be wrong to kill the falling person in the first 
case, on the grounds that doing so is morally indistinguishable from killing an innocent 
1 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, p. 34. 
2 The morality of “ducking” harm is explored in Christopher Boorse and Roy A. Sorensen, “Ducking 
Harm”, The Journal of Philosophy, 85.3 (1988), 115-34. 
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bystander in the course of defending one’s life.3 Instead, you must allow yourself to be 
killed by the falling threat. 
By contrast, some proponents of the moral immunity thesis plausibly maintain that it is 
permissible to evade the threat to your life in the second case, even though you foresee 
that an innocent person will be killed as a result. On the face of it, these two positions 
appear easy to reconcile; after all, there are clear moral differences between the two 
cases. In the first case, you kill an innocent person by creating a new and distinct 
harmful sequence which violently imposes upon the bodily sovereignty of the victim. In 
the second case, you allow an innocent person to die as a side-effect of redistributing 
harm, without even touching the victim.  
However, I believe that, contrary to appearances, the two judgements cannot be easily 
reconciled by the lights of the moral immunity thesis. I defend this scepticism by arguing 
for the following central claim. 
The moral immunity thesis maintains that killing an innocent threat in self-
defence is morally indistinguishable from killing an innocent bystander in self-
defence. If this is so, then both killing an innocent threat and killing an innocent 
bystander in self-defence are, in terms of permissibility, indistinguishable from 
ducking a threat. 
I shall defend this central claim on the grounds that, by the lights of the moral immunity 
thesis, there is no moral feature which is both (a) essentially present in ducking but 
typically absent from defensive killing, and (b) makes a difference to the permissibility of 
acting in self-defence.4 
If this central claim is true, then it shows that the moral immunity thesis reaches a highly 
counterintuitive conclusion. This would give us a good reason to suspect either that the 
moral immunity thesis is mistaken in some way, or, less plausibly, that the judgement 
that ducking is permissible should be revised.5 
3 Michael Otsuka, “Killing the Innocent in Self-Defence”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 23.1 (2004), 
74-94, and Jeff McMahan, “Self-Defence and the Problem of the Innocent Attacker”, Ethics, 104.2 
(1994), 252-90. 
4 The significance of the distinction between moral properties which are essentially present, and only 
contingently present, was identified in Frances Kamm, “Harming, Not Aiding, and Positive Rights”, 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 15 (1986), 3-32. 
5 John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza defend the view that ducking harm is morally equivalent to 
killing in “Ducking Harm and Sacrificing Others”, Journal of Social Philosophy, 25.3 (1994), 135-45. 
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The chapter is divided into three main sections. In what remains of the first section, I 
explain the distinctions between innocent threats, innocent bystanders, killing and 
ducking. In the second section, I set out the moral immunity thesis in more detail and 
provide preliminary support for my claim that, by the lights of that account, ducking is 
morally equivalent to killing threats and bystanders, in terms of permissibility. In the 
third section, I consider five ways in which the moral immunity thesis might be defended 
from my claim, and argue that they do not succeed. 
All references to victims, threats and bystanders will refer to innocent people and all 
references to killing and ducking will refer to acts of self-defence. References to “moral 
equivalence” refer to moral equivalence in terms of permissibility. One act may be easier 
or harder to justify than another even though both acts have the same moral status – are 
morally equivalent - in terms of permissibility. I focus on cases in which the indivisible 
harm at stake is the loss of life to only one person, but it may be possible to generalise 
the arguments to cases of non-lethal harm in which the expected harm or burden 
suffered by any one individual is of an equivalent magnitude. 
4.2 Innocent Threats, Innocent Bystanders, Killing & Ducking 
An innocent threat is someone who threatens lethal harm without justification but is not 
morally responsible for doing so, because they did not intend to pose a threat and 
exercise no agency; they pose a threat simply through the movement of their own body, 
which they cannot control.6 An innocent bystander is someone who plays no causal role 
in the creation or sustainment of a threatening sequence of events and has not done 
anything else to make them liable to defensive harm. 
One kills an innocent threat or bystander when one creates, sustains, or inserts 
somebody into, a sequence of events which results in the death of a person.7 One ducks 
a lethal threat when, without killing as so-defined, one evades a threat to one’s life with 
the foreseeable result that an innocent person is killed instead. This includes moving 
This was the subject of a reply by Christopher Boorse in “Ducking Trolleys”, The Journal of Social 
Philosophy, 25.3 (1994), 146-52. 
6 We can distinguish innocent threats from innocent aggressors or attackers, who pose a threat through 
their intentional agency, but who are not morally responsible for their agency at the time. I concentrate 
on innocent threats and do not make any attempts to morally differentiate threats from aggressors. 
7 I follow Otsuka in employing this definition of killing. “Killing the Innocent in Self-Defence”, p.76, 
footnote 7. 
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oneself out of the path of a moving threat (such as a projectile) but also removing 
oneself from a threatening situation with the foreseeable effect of exposing another 
person to the impending hazard.  
The killing and ducking distinction is a factual one which correlates with several morally 
significant distinctions, some of which are essential to the factual classification of each 
kind of self-defence and others which are contingently, but unusually, present. For 
example, it is true by definition that ducking a threat does not involve creating a new 
threat. 
But one might feel differently about the permissibility of ducking a threat when certain 
contingent features are present. Consider evasive actions which violate a widely accepted 
norm or make use of an object or resource other than one’s own body. Imagine a 
sinking ship without enough lifeboats to save all of the passengers. One might find it 
objectionable if someone were to jump an orderly queue and grab a lifeboat for 
themselves, thereby condemning somebody else to drown. This would violate a norm of 
holding a fair procedure to distribute the scarce resources required for survival. 
Ducking may also be objectionable when the resultant harm is intended or when the 
ducker was morally responsible for another action which created the threat. For 
example, suppose you intend the death of a rival and you place yourself into the path of 
an oncoming projectile, obscuring your rival’s view of the danger to come. At the 
moment before the projectile collides with you, you step aside and ensure that it fatally 
collides with your rival. These might be unusual examples of impermissible ducking. 
Nevertheless, “pure” ducking cases, which lack these atypical features, are intuitively 
permissible. 
4.3 The Moral Immunity Thesis 
Three desiderata of an account of self-defence are that it (1) tells us when it is 
permissible and when it is wrong to kill in self-defence, (2) provides a rationale which 
explains why a particular act of self-defence is permissible or wrong, and (3) provides 
results which coincide with our intuitive judgements in a range of cases. 
According to the moral immunity thesis8: 
8 I use the phrase “moral immunity thesis” to refer specifically to the claim that killing an innocent 
threat is wrong because of its similarity to killing an innocent bystander. This claim is typically 
associated with proponents of “the moral responsibility account of liability to defensive killing”, which 
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(1) It is wrong to kill innocent bystanders in the course of defending one’s own life 
(the inviolability of a bystander thesis). 
(2) Other things being equal, killing a person who innocently threatens one’s life is 
morally equivalent to killing an innocent bystander in the course of defending 
one’s own life, in terms of permissibility (the moral equivalence thesis). 
(3) It is wrong to kill innocent threats in the course of defending one’s own life. 
The rationale for these claims is that it is permissible to kill someone in self-defence 
without their consent only if they are morally responsible for posing a threat without 
justification; otherwise, it is wrong. This is because people who are not morally 
responsible for posing a threat retain a right not to be killed and acting in defence of 
one’s own life is not a sufficient justification for overriding that right.  
The striking feature of the account is that it says that one is morally required to allow 
oneself to be killed when the only alternative is to kill an innocent person in the course 
of preserving one’s life. Yet some proponents of the moral immunity thesis maintain that 
ducking an imminent threat is morally distinguishable from killing. For example, 
Michael Otsuka says: “It is, I think, permissible to duck out of the way of an oncoming 
javelin even if you foresee that, by ducking, you will allow the javelin to impale a 
Bystander standing behind you [and] to move out of the way of a falling Threat even if 
you foresee that doing so will result in that Threats death”.9 And Jeff McMahan says 
that ducking a threat “is self-preservation by a form of redirection. It is generally 
permissible – primarily, I believe, because it normally involves allowing unintended 
harm to occur.”10 
Notice that the moral equivalence thesis need not deny that there are some moral 
differences between killing threats and bystanders. It simply states that if there are moral 
differences, they are not sufficient to render self-defence permissible in one case but not 
the other. Similarly, I do not deny that killing in self-defence is harder to justify than 
says that moral responsibility for posing a threat to someone is a necessary condition for liability to 
defensive harm. But that account does not, by itself, tell us when there is sufficient justification to kill 
or bring about harm to someone in any particular case. That is why I refer to the moral immunity 
thesis instead. Thanks to Susanne Burri for emphasising this point. 
9 Otsuka, “Killing the Innocent in Self-Defence”, p.76, footnote 7. 
10 McMahan, “Self-Defence and the Problem of the Innocent Attacker”, p.253. 
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ducking. What I deny is that those differences translate to a difference in permissibility 
in self-defence cases, by the lights of the moral immunity thesis in particular.11 
My defence of this claim is largely a negative one: I will argue against five ways in which 
one might try to morally differentiate killing from ducking, by the lights of the moral 
immunity thesis. However, before proceeding with my negative argument, I will briefly 
offer a positive one which provides some preliminary support for my claim. Consider 
the following case which acts as an intermediary between the two cases which I 
presented at the beginning of the chapter. 
Barrier 
You are trapped at the bottom of a deep well. An innocent person is, through no 
fault or choice of their own, falling down the well and will crush and kill you if 
they land on you. They will survive the fall if they land on you. You can survive 
only by interposing a barrier between yourself and the falling threat. The barrier 
will shield you from harm, but the falling threat will be killed upon colliding 
with it.12 
According to the moral immunity thesis, it would be wrong to interpose the defensive 
shield, since doing so would kill the person who innocently threatens one’s life. This 
case is analogous to one presented by Otsuka in which he says that it would be wrong to 
continue to hold a flagpole which will impale a falling person: “I do not believe that 
continuing to hold the flagpole is, except perhaps trivially, morally less bad than 
shooting one’s ray gun”.13  
I do not think it is plausible to maintain that interposing the barrier is wrong but 
stepping aside to allow the person to fall to their death is permissible. There may be 
superficial differences between the two actions, but this does not seem to me to amount 
to a difference in moral status. One can therefore proceed, by a transitive relation of 
11 I do not, for instance, argue that the factors discussed lack moral significance or that because killing 
and ducking are equivalent in permissibility when it comes to self-defence, they are equivalent in other 
situations. Nor do I argue that my claim extends to other accounts of the morality of self-defence. 
12 This is inspired by an example in Jonathan Quong, “Agent Relative Prerogatives to Do Harm”, 
Criminal Law and Philosophy, 10 (2016), 815-829, (p.819). 
13 Otsuka, “Killing the Innocent in Self-Defence”, p.89 
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moral equivalence, from the claim that killing the threat with a ray gun is wrong to the 
claim that ducking the falling threat is wrong.14 
Now, to resist this claim, a proponent of the moral immunity thesis must establish that 
there is some moral factor typically present in ducking which differentiates it from 
killing, or vice versa, without also undermining the moral equivalence thesis or the 
inviolability of a bystander thesis. In the rest of the chapter, I consider five moral 
features which a proponent of the moral immunity thesis can use to try to draw a moral 
disparity between killing and ducking and argue that none of the attempts succeed in a 
way which coheres with the account. 
This is an argument by elimination and there could, of course, be additional features 
which I do not consider; my argument does not show that the moral immunity thesis is 
mistaken. However, it does (if persuasive) undermine its appeal. The moral immunity 
thesis draws appeal from its coherence with other moral convictions, like the belief that 
it is morally impermissible to kill an innocent bystander when acting in self-defence. If, 
as I contend, the account counterintuitively implies that ducking a lethal threat is 
equivalent to killing the innocent in self-defence, then we have a good reason to be 
sceptical of the account, particularly if other plausible accounts of the permissibility of 
self-defence do not have similarly counterintuitive implications. 
4.3.1 The Right of Self-Ownership 
An immediately appealing way of distinguishing between killing and ducking is by 
pointing to a right of self-ownership over one’s own body, and the correlative moral 
permissions and immunities which flow from this right. This right is significant in two 
respects when it comes to self-defence. 
First, a right of self-ownership grants moral permission to do what one wishes with 
one’s own body, providing that one does not violate the rights of others. So, one might 
say: “By ducking a threat, I act permissibly, because my body belongs to me and I am 
entitled to do as I please with it, as long as I do not use it to violate the rights of others. I 
do not enjoy the same rights over other people’s bodies or objects to which others have 
a rightful claim, or which have no prior claims attached to them”. 
14 A very similar argument is briefly made by Helen Frowe, in Defensive Killing (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), pp. 64-66. 
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Second, a right of self-ownership provides moral immunity from having one’s body 
imposed upon without one’s consent. One might maintain that the right not to be 
imposed upon is what could morally prohibit killing the innocent in self-defence, even 
when such harm is a side-effect of one’s action. One could say: “It is unjustifiable to 
impose upon another person in self-defence, but it is justifiable to shift a threat to 
another innocent person in self-defence if one can do so without imposing upon them. 
Killing involves wrongful imposition, whereas the act of ducking a threat does not 
involve such imposition.”15 
To test the first claim, let’s consider an act of self-defence in which one ducks a threat by 
using something other than (merely) one’s own body.  
Car 
You are trapped inside an abandoned car on trolley tracks through no fault or 
choice of your own. The car does not belong to anybody. A trolley hurtles 
towards the car and will kill you if it collides with the car. An innocent person is 
tied further down the trolley tracks, and is afforded protection by the car. You 
drive the car out of the path of the trolley, which then foreseeably kills the 
innocent person.16 
This case seems morally indistinguishable from ducking a projectile using only one’s 
own body. Yet in this case, rather than merely their own body, the agent makes use of 
an object which belongs to nobody. This implies that it is not the right of self-ownership 
which exclusively grants moral permission to evade a threat to one’s life. Rather, one is 
sometimes permitted to evade a threat even when doing so requires the use of an object 
to which nobody has an exclusive claim. 
Now let’s consider the second aspect of the self-ownership thesis. If a right against 
bodily imposition helped to differentiate between permissible and wrongful ways of 
killing others in self-defence, then it should be harder to justify defensively killing 
someone through directly imposing on their bodily sovereignty than it is to kill them 
15 Indeed, Otsuka says that “it is a right of self-ownership not to be imposed upon [which makes killing 
threats and bystanders wrong] rather than a right not to have made use of something to which one has 
a rightful claim – whether it be one’s body or the space one occupies” in “The Moral Responsibility 
Account of Liability to Defensive Killing”, in The Ethics of Self-Defence ed. By Christopher Coons and 
Michael Weber (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p.14. 
16 This case is borrowed from Kai Draper, “Rights and the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing”, 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 33.3 (2005), 253-80 (p.262). 
 
                                                             
108 
 
without such imposition and, moreover, this difference in justifiability must amount to a 
difference in permissibility, other things being equal. We can test this claim by 
considering a case of killing a bystander as a result of acting in self-preservation, when 
there is no clear bodily imposition. 
Nitrous Oxide 
You are trapped in an airtight room. Nitrous oxide is being released into the 
room which will soon suffocate you because of the resultant displacement of 
oxygen. An innocent bystander, whose life is not presently endangered, is 
trapped in a nearby room. You can turn a dial which will disable the release of 
nitrous oxide into the room. However, the dial will also foreseeably release 
nitrous oxide into the nearby room which, through the displacement of oxygen, 
will kill the innocent person trapped inside. 
Consider some of the morally significant aspects of this case. First, the agent kills the 
victim without imposing on their bodily sovereignty. Second, the harm inflicted upon 
the victim is a side-effect of action aimed at self-preservation, and the side-effect itself 
does not contribute to the survival of the agent. Third, the harm is inflicted by 
unblocking a threat (aspects which I examine in more detail below). My own intuitive 
judgement is that this is no different in permissibility from killing a bystander as a side-
effect through direct imposition upon their body: if one is permissible then so is the 
other and if one is impermissible then so is the other. 
One might respond to this case in one of three ways. First, one might say that the 
Nitrous Oxide case is an example of the violation of a person’s right of self-ownership. 
This suggests that it is not imposing upon someone’s bodily sovereignty without their 
consent which is morally amiss but also causing physical harm to take place, without 
laying a hand on the victim. Yet this would render the harm brought about by ducking a 
violation of a right of self-ownership since on a plausible difference-making 
counterfactual account of causation, ducking is a cause of the harm to the victim: if you 
duck, the victim will be killed. If you do not, the victim will survive. 
Second, one might say that a right of self-ownership is not violated in this case on the 
grounds that the agent does not touch the victim. This would concede that the presence 
or absence of bodily imposition is not crucial to determining the permissibility of acting 
in self-defence. Note that this claim would be curious since initiating threats which go 
on to inflict harm on a person - for example, pulling the trigger of a gun which is aimed 
at someone - would typically count as violations of their right of self-ownership, even if 




flow from one’s intentional agency play a relevant causal role in the harm that 
ultimately befalls the victim. 
Third, one might grant that the act of self-defence does not violate rights of self-
ownership on the grounds that the harm imposed upon the victim is a side-effect of 
one’s act of self-defence and the side-effect itself does not contribute to the survival of 
the agent. One might maintain that one violates another person’s right of self-ownership 
only when using them or harming them as a mere means.17 This claim requires a more 
detailed examination, which I will now provide. 
4.3.2 The Side-Effect Principle 
A second way of drawing a clear and plausible moral distinction between killing and 
ducking is by pointing to the fact that harm brought about by ducking a threat is a side-
effect of action aimed at self-preservation. Ducking a threat involves, in Warren Quinn’s 
terminology, indirect harm.18 By contrast, when killing a threat or bystander, the agent 
directly harms a person in order to secure survival: whether by opportunistically using 
the victim as a mere means (what Quinn calls direct manipulative agency) or by 
eliminating a threat or obstacle that the victim presents (what Quinn calls direct 
eliminative agency).19 
To elaborate, some instances of killing in self-defence opportunistically exploit the 
presence of an innocent bystander as a means of securing survival: consider grabbing a 
bystander to use them as a human shield against a threat.20. Other instances of killing do 
not opportunistically use a bystander as a means, but do eliminate a bystander whose 
presence is an obstacle to survival; consider a case in which a person is driving at speed 
17 Otsuka advocates this formulation of the right of self-ownership in Libertarianism Without 
Inequality, p.15. 
18 Warren Quinn, “Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect”, Philosophy 
and Public Affairs, 18 (1989), 334-51. In light of Quinn’s convincing revisions to the doctrine of 
double effect, I set aside the distinction between intending harm and merely foreseeing harm. 
19 Judith Jarvis Thomson, “Self-Defense” in Philosophy and Public Affairs, 20.4 (1991), 283-310 
(pp.289-290). It is true that in such cases one inflicts harm on an innocent threat as a means of 
securing survival but you do not use them, or exploit their presence, for your own advantage. Helen 
Frowe draws the distinction between harming as a means and using as a means, in “Equating Innocent 
Threats and Bystanders”, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 25.4 (2008), 277-90. 
20 Thomson, “Self-Defense”, pp.289-290. 
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to elude a threat and runs over an innocent bystander on a narrow bridge who obstructs 
their path to safety. 
A further class of cases, which are important for present purposes, are those in which 
harm is inflicted on a bystander as a side-effect, in which the death of the victim does 
not causally contribute to the survival of the agent. One might plausibly contend that 
using a person as a mere means is harder to justify than eliminating them, and, 
moreover, that eliminating someone is harder to justify than killing them as a side-effect. 
One might further hold that the difference in justifiability between direct harm (in either 
sense) and harming as a side-effect translates to a difference in permissibility when it 
comes to self-defence.  
Accordingly, one might say the following: “it is unjustifiable to directly harm a person 
by opportunistically exploiting their presence, or by eliminating the threat or obstacle 
that they innocently present. It is, however, justifiable to kill someone as a mere side-
effect of action aimed at self-preservation.”21 
This picture is complicated by the existence of ducking cases in which the harm that 
befalls the victim does not fall easily into any of the categories described above. There 
are cases of apparent ducking which may also be classified as opportunistically 
exploiting a bystander. For example, suppose an agent is threatened by a non-human 
projectile and the only way to survive is to step behind a bystander, without touching 
them, so as to benefit from their presence as a human shield.22 The moral status of this 
action is intuitively unclear. 
Even if we set aside this complication, I do not think that the moral immunity thesis can 
appeal to these claims in order to differentiate ducking from other kinds of self-defence. 
The reason for this is that the most powerful argument in favour of the moral 
21 Some reject the moral immunity thesis by claiming that, contrary to what the account says, it is 
permissible to employ eliminative agency in defence of one’s life, but impermissible to employ 
opportunistic agency in defence of one’s life. This difference in permissibility can be used to draw a 
moral disparity between opportunistically using innocent bystanders as human shields and eliminating 
the danger posed by an innocent threat. See Jonathan Quong, “Killing in Self-Defence”, Ethics, 119.3 
(2009), 507-37, for this argument. 
22 Similarly, Boorse and Sorensen open their article on ducking with the example of a grizzly bear in 
pursuit of two people. The first person outruns the second, who is subsequently caught and eaten by 
the bear. This provides a welcome distraction which allows the first person to escape unharmed. In this 
case, I would be inclined to describe the harm suffered by the victim as a side-effect, even though the 
victim’s death contributes to the survival of the agent. 
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equivalence thesis rests on the claim that the indirect killing of a bystander as a side-
effect of one’s act of self-defence is morally equivalent to eliminating an innocent threat. 
Consider the following example of such an indirect killing. 
Dynamite 
You are trapped on trolley tracks and a runaway trolley is hurtling towards you. 
It will kill you if it collides with you. The only way to save yourself from the 
threat of the trolley is to hurl a stick of dynamite in order to destroy it. 
Regrettably, the explosion will foreseeably kill a person who stands nearby. 
The moral immunity thesis seems committed to condemning this indirect killing of a 
bystander. Indeed, Otsuka says that "even in cases in which the Bystander's body is of 
no use to you, but you know that you will survive only if you initiate a sequence of 
events that you know will kill her, it is impermissible to do so”. So it seems that the 
moral immunity thesis does not discriminate between indirectly harming as a side-effect 
and direct eliminative harm. 
It is true that one could infer the moral impermissibility of killing an innocent threat 
exclusively from its similarity to eliminating a bystander who obstructs one’s path to 
safety. However, if it were permissible to indirectly kill an innocent person as a side-
effect of defending one’s own life, then the moral immunity thesis would have to be 
qualified to permit those instances of killing a bystander.23 But this revision would 
clearly be unsupported by the underlying rationale for the account. As innocent 
bystanders who pose no threat or disadvantage to anybody, their moral status is not 
reduced and, accordingly, they retain a right not to be killed. 
One might, however, employ more finely tuned distinctions between varieties of 
harming as a side-effect. For instance, one might distinguish hurling the stick of 
dynamite from ducking on the grounds that the harm from hurling the bomb is 
“causally sidestream from” the outcome of self-preservation while the harm from 
ducking is easier to justify because it is causally downstream from the outcome of self-
preservation.24 
Similarly, we could say that, in the dynamite case, the death of the bystander is an event 
caused by a new sequence of events that one has initiated, whereas in a ducking case, the 
23 Otsuka suggests that he accepts this revision in “The Moral Responsibility Account of Liability to 
Defensive Killing”, pp. 55 to 57. 
24 McMahan, The Ethics of Killing, p.408. 
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death of the bystander is the flip-side of shifting a pre-existing threat.25 I now turn to 
consider the moral significance of these distinctions between causal sequences in more 
detail. 
4.3.3 The Redistribution Principle 
One might try to vindicate a difference in permissibility between killing and ducking by 
pointing to moral differences in how harmful sequences causally unfold. For example, 
one might say the following. “The presumption against creating, sustaining, or inserting 
somebody into a threating sequence is much stronger than the presumption against 
merely redistributing a pre-existing threat from one person to another. Other things 
being equal, this difference in justifiability amounts to a difference in permissibility 
when it comes to self-defence. Killing involves creating, sustaining, or inserting 
somebody into a lethal sequence but ducking merely redistributes a pre-existing threat 
from one person to another”. 
To be clearer about what these terms mean, you create a lethal sequence of events if 
your act sets in motion a sequence of events which culminates in lethal harm. You 
sustain a lethal sequence of events if your actions or inactions causally contribute to the 
continuation of a lethal sequence that would otherwise come to a halt. You insert 
somebody into a threatening sequence if you move somebody into the path of an 
existing threat. You redistribute a threat when you switch the victim of a pre-existing 
threat without interfering with the threat itself. I assume for the sake of argument that 
these distinctions are metaphysically robust. 
This explanation coheres well with some other widely held moral beliefs. For example, 
many people believe that it is permissible to redirect a threat away from five people 
towards one person. By contrast, many believe that it is wrong to insert one person into 
the path of a threat (for example, by moving them into the path of a runaway trolley) in 
order to save five others from being killed.26 But note that redistributing a threat differs 
from redirecting a threat. In both classes of cases, the victim of a pre-existing threat is 
25 Frances Kamm, Morality, Mortality Volume II: Rights, Duties and Status (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), p.174. 
26 There is disagreement about whether redirecting a trolley away from oneself towards one other 
innocent person is permissible. For instance, Thomson thinks that substituting a bystander by 
redirecting a threat is wrong (“Self-Defence”, pp.289-290), but Quong thinks it is permissible (“Killing 
in Self-Defence”, p.512). 
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changed, but redirection moves a threat into the path of the victim and redistribution 
substitutes one victim for another, without interfering with the threat. 
The first problem with trying to differentiate killing from ducking using these 
distinctions is that the factual categories are not exclusive. Inserting somebody into a 
causal sequence is, like ducking, a variety of redistributing a pre-existing threat. So one 
cannot differentiate killing from ducking merely on the grounds that the latter 
redistributes harm. 
We can test the claim that redistributing lethal harm in self-defence is generally 
permissible by considering a case of killing a bystander through the redistribution of a 
threat. Consider the following case. 
Rope 
You are standing on trolley tracks and unfortunately a runaway trolley is 
speeding towards you. Fortunately, you are able to step out of the path of the 
trolley. However, you are tied to a nearby innocent bystander by a piece of rope. 
By stepping out of the path of the trolley, you will drag the bystander into its 
path (the innocent bystander does not shield you: their death does not contribute 
to your survival). 
My own judgement is that, although easier to justify, this act of redistribution does not 
differ in permissibility from grabbing somebody to use them as a human shield against a 
projectile. 
In any case, by itself, the distinction between creating and redistributing a threat is 
factual, rather than normative; an underlying rationale is required in order to morally 
distinguish between them. I submit that there are two plausible moral rationales for 
distinguishing between creating and redistributing a threat in self-defence, both of which 
create problems for the moral immunity thesis. 
First, the moral difference might be explained by pointing to the fact that redistributing 
a threat brings about harm as a side-effect. But, as I argued above, the moral immunity 
thesis seems committed to the claim that the difference in justifiability between direct 
killing and side-effect killings does not translate to a difference in permissibility. Here, 
the search for a rationale to explain why the presumption against redistributing a pre-
existing threat and harming as a side-effect seems weaker than other ways of causing 




Second, and more plausibly, the difference might be explained by maintaining that we 
are especially responsible for what we do, rather than what we allow to happen. 
Creating, sustaining and insertion all typically involve doing harm whereas 
redistribution of a pre-existing threat by ducking merely allows harm (this does not 
explain a moral difference between the redirection and creation of a threat, because both 
of those might plausibly be regarded as varieties of doing harm). Since this explanation 
requires a more thorough examination, I move on to consider it separately. 
4.3.4 Killing & Letting Die 
One might suggest that the creation and redistribution distinction only approximates the 
moral boundary between permissibility and impermissibility in self-defence cases. 
Perhaps the creation and redistribution distinction is significant only insofar as it 
sometimes correlates with the distinction between killing and letting die. Accordingly, 
one might say the following. “Killing an innocent person in self-defence is harder to 
justify than letting someone die in self-defence. Ducking a lethal threat does not kill 
anybody; it merely allows harm to befall an innocent person. At worst, ducking is the 
justified removal of protection.”27 
Now, it would be a mistake to assume that ducking is a case of letting die because it 
seems easier to justify than killing; our factual classification of cases into either killing or 
letting die is easily influenced by our moral appraisal of a situation. First, we need a 
factual account of which acts count as killing, which acts count as letting die, and which 
acts fall into neither category. Second, we need a moral explanation of when and why 
killing is harder to justify than letting die when it comes to self-defence.  
Let’s start with the factual account. There are at least two broad types of letting die. 
First, one can forbear to prevent a lethal sequence of events from occurring. Second, one 
can remove a protective barrier, thereby unblocking or releasing a lethal threat. The 
latter is typically called enabling harm.28 Enabling harm is conceptually intermediate 
27 I believe it is easier to justify withdrawing aid that one has deliberately intervened to provide, than to 
remove protection that one is unintentionally providing. The former involves restoring a situation to 
the status quo that obtained before one’s intervention (in terms of the distribution of prospective 
harm). It undoes one’s own well-intentioned actions. The latter involves disrupting the status quo in 
one’s own favour, shifting a prospective harm from oneself to another person. 
28 These distinctions were drawn by Philippa Foot in “The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of 
Double Effect” reprinted in Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2002), pp. 26-27. 
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between killing and letting die through forbearance to prevent, but there is disagreement 
over whether enabling death is morally equivalent to killing, morally equivalent to 
letting die through forbearance, or has a moral status which lies somewhere between the 
two.29 
Ducking is an action, rather than an inaction, which exposes someone to a threat who 
was otherwise protected from it. Rather than being a forbearance to prevent a harmful 
sequence of events, ducking is better described as the enabling of harm through the 
removal of protection from a pre-existing threat.  
Ducking does, however, differ from other paradigmatic cases of enabling harm because 
it involves situations in which there is an active threat and an agent can shift it from 
themselves onto another person. This differs from unblocking a threat which is being 
“held back”. It is not true of enabling harm in general that harm will inevitably occur. 
The fact that harm to someone is inevitable, and that the act of enabling is aimed at self-
preservation, makes enabling by ducking more easily justifiable than enabling harm in a 
non-threatening situation, or for some end other than self-defence, other things being 
equal. Nevertheless, ducking is a form of enabling harm, rather than a forbearance to 
prevent harm. So, a defence of the moral immunity thesis would need to say the 
following. “Killing an innocent person in self-defence is impermissible, but letting 
someone die by removing a protective obstacle in the course of preserving one’s life is 
permissible.” 
Now, in order to establish that the killing and letting die distinction justifies a 
permission to duck a threat, but not to kill, we need a case of killing a threat or 
bystander in which harm is enabled in self-defence, to see whether that is permissible. 
Consider the following case adapted from an example provided by Kasper Lipper-
Rasmussen.30 
29 Arguments for the claim that enabling harm is often morally equivalent to letting die can be found in 
Samuel C. Rickless, “The Moral Status of Enabling Harm”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 92 (2011), 
66-86. 
Arguments for the contrary claim that enabling harm is sometimes morally equivalent to killing can be 
found in Jonathan Bennett, “Morality and Consequences”, in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 
Volume Two (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1981), p.89, Shelly Kagan, The Limits of 
Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p.101, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, “Are Enabling 
and Allowing Harm Morally Equivalent?”, Utilitas, 27.3 (2015), 365-83, and Jason Hanna, “Enabling 
Harm, Doing Harm, and Undoing One’s Own Behaviour”, in Ethics, 126 (2015), 68-90. 
30 Lippert-Rasmussen, “Are Enabling and Allowing Harm Morally Equivalent?”, p. 372. 
 




You and an innocent bystander are trapped in cages which do not belong to 
anybody. A hungry bear lurks outside the cages. Unfortunately for you, the door 
to the cage which contains you is unlocked, and the bear is able to get inside. 
The other cage, which contains the bystander, is secured by a heavy padlock 
which prevents the bear from reaching him. You remove the padlock to the 
bystander’s cage in order to secure your own cage. The bear eats the bystander. 
Taking the lock seems wrong, despite the fact that it involves the redistribution of a 
threat through the removal of protection. Moreover, the death of the bystander is a side-
effect of the agent taking the lock. This suggests that the fact that ducking a threat 
involves enabling harm by removing a protective object does not, by itself, make 
ducking a threat justifiable. 
One might resist this conclusion by denying that the Hungry Bear case should be classed 
as a case of enabling harm. One might maintain that the killing and enabling distinction 
is more complicated than the foregoing discussion suggests because it correlates with a 
further underlying feature: whether a person deprives somebody of an object that they 
are rightfully entitled to use.31 
In McMahan’s detailed examination of removing or withdrawing aid or protection, he 
says that the killing and letting die distinction depends upon a variety of subfactors, 
suggesting that some cases of enabling harm by removing a barrier count as killing, 
whereas others count as letting die.32 He proposes that an agent kills somebody if they 
remove an obstacle that another agent or event provided, or the protective obstacle is 
operative and self-sustaining. By contrast, an agent lets someone die if they have 
provided the protection, and the protection requires further contributions from the 
agent to remain effective.33  
31 The suggestion that the distinction between killing and letting die is underpinned by the deeper moral 
significance of rights is made in Fiona Woollard, “If This is My Body: A Defence of the Doctrine of 
Doing and Allowing”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 94 (2013), 315-41, Timothy Hall, “Doing 
Harm, Allowing Harm, and Denying Resources”, Journal of Moral Philosophy, 5 (2008), 50-76, Kai 
Draper, “Rights and the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing” and Kagan, The Limits of Morality, pp.101-
106. 
32 Jeff McMahan, “Killing, Letting Die, and Withdrawing Aid”, Ethics, 103.2 (1993), 250-79. 
33 McMahan, “Killing, Letting Die, and Withdrawing Aid”, p.257. 
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These distinctions help explain why taking the lock to the cage seems wrong. Since the 
lock to the cage was not provided by the agent, does not require further contributions 
from the agent to remain effective, and is already actively providing protection from a 
potential harm, the agent’s interference with the lock is a variety of killing. 
However, while McMahan’s account successfully accommodates the Hungry Bear case, 
a problem for this view is presented by the Car case described earlier. In that case, the 
agent is not responsible (either morally or causally) for providing the protection, and the 
protection provided by the car is both operative and self-sustaining; it requires no 
further contribution from the agent to remain effective. So, on McMahan’s account, the 
Car case is, factually, an instance of killing. 
Yet the Car case seems intuitively morally equivalent to “pure” cases of ducking harm – 
that is, ducks which involve only the use of the one’s body. Pure cases of ducking are 
examples of enabling on McMahan’s account. Since the Car case does not seem to differ 
in permissibility from a “pure” ducking case, one can infer that the killing and enabling 
distinction, as formulated by McMahan, does not make a difference to the permissibility 
of acting in self-defence. Whichever formulation of the killing and enabling distinction is 
employed, the moral immunity thesis runs into difficulties. 
4.3.5 Property Rights and the Fair Distribution of Chances 
One might resist the conclusion reached above by objecting that, contrary to 
appearances, the Car case is morally inequivalent to a “pure” ducking case. One could 
do this by combining the self-ownership thesis explored above with an additional 
account of rights over the external world. One could say: “When an indivisible object or 
resource is at stake, to which nobody has an exclusive claim, the right thing to do is to 
hold a fair lottery to decide who gets to use it. By contrast, it is justifiable to duck a 
threat without a lottery when evasion requires only the use of one’s body. That is 
because each person has a property right in their own body; it is not a common resource 
to be used by others.” 
One might accordingly maintain that in the Car case, the right thing to do would be to 
hold a fair lottery to decide whether to leave the car in place or allow the person trapped 
inside to move it away from the threat.34 This runs counter to the intuitive judgement 
34 The view that defensive harm against innocent threats may be justified after a fair lottery is defended 
by Susanne Burri in “The Toss-Up Between a Profiting, Innocent Threat and His Victim”, The Journal 
of Political Philosophy, 23.2 (2015), 146-65. She does, however, say that one is permitted to duck a 
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that it is permissible to move the car without holding a fair lottery. However, one might 
be willing to bite this bullet in the interest of reconciling the various judgements 
presented so far. Moreover, the analysis is supported by two good arguments. 
First, people’s judgements may shift between cases in which an agent removes a 
protective object which belongs to them, cases in which it belongs to the victim, and 
cases in which neither the agent, nor the victim, has a prior claim to the object.35 For 
instance, suppose we modify the Car case so that the car is the rightful property of the 
prospective victim further down the tracks. One might think it is wrong to move the 
victim’s own property in self-preservation when it is protecting them from a threat. One 
might also think that if neither the agent nor the prospective victim has an exclusive 
claim to the car, the right thing to do is to distribute the opportunity to use the object 
equally.36 Ducking a threat usually differs from other cases of enabling harm in an 
important respect: one’s own body is the object to be removed and so the other person 
had no claim to use it. 
I would resist this first move for two reasons. First, although something does seem 
morally amiss about contributing to the death of a bystander by using an object or 
resource to their detriment, this does not seem sufficiently important to override the 
partiality that each person has over their own lives.37 Even when fairness requires that 
the prospect of harm be equally distributed, prospective victims may usually give 
priority to their own lives by securing survival without a fair lottery, as long as this does 
not involve actions which are independently wrong. If that were correct, then it would 
be permissible to use the car to evade the threat without a lottery. From this, one could 
conclude that the Car case is, after all, morally equivalent to a “pure” duck. 
threat without a fair lottery, on the grounds that one may only impose a chance of harm if an agent 
would be morally required to suffer harm in order to avoid imposing it on others. 
35 For examples of this shift in judgement, see Woollard, “A Defence of the Doctrine of Doing and 
Allowing”, p.318, and Draper, “Rights and the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing”, pp.259-263. 
36 For his part, Otsuka denies that fairness can justify overriding moral constraints against bodily 
incursion (in “Killing the Innocent in Self-Defence”, p.76, footnote 9) but he says that fairness can 
justify wresting a life-saving benefit from somebody after a favourable and fair coin toss, if one can do 
so without incursion on the person’s body (in “The Moral Responsibility Account of Liability to 
Defensive Killing”, p.13). 
37 This proposed solution to the ducking puzzle is raised in D. W. Haslett, “Boulders and Trolleys”, 
Utilitas, 23.3 (2011), 268-87 (p.280). The solution is also contemplated by Boorse and Sorenson in 
“Ducking Harm”, pp.122-124. 
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Moreover, once it is conceded that fairness requires us to equally distribute the chance 
to use an indivisible object, it becomes difficult to resist the conclusion that fairness 
requires the equal distribution of the indivisible good of continued survival itself. After 
all, it is not the use of the lock or car per se that agents are interested in, it is the 
prospects for survival offered by the use of those objects. Each person’s claim to life-
saving resources is a surrogate for a claim to the outcome in which they live, and 
fairness requires that the prospects of each outcome should be fairly distributed.  
A second argument for the claim that the Car case is inequivalent to a “pure” ducking 
case is to suggest that the Car case is structurally equivalent to the Hungry Bear case. In 
each case, the agent moves an object which is benefitting the potential victim, and which 
they do not have an exclusive right to use. Yet while the Car case seems permissible, it 
seems wrong to take the padlock in the Hungry Bear case. So, if the cases are indeed 
factually equivalent, one of the intuitive judgements must yield to the other. 
I would, however, resist this move. It is true that the cases are alike in several respects. 
However, they differ in the following way. In the Car case, the fate of each person is tied 
together by the object; the car which affords protection for the person on the tracks is 
the very same object which traps the other person in the path of the threat. Indeed, the 
presence of the car is part of the threatening sequence from the perspective of the agent 
trapped inside.38 It would be better from their perspective if the car was absent from the 
scene. 
By contrast, although the lock in the Hungry Bear case could afford protection to either 
person, it is not a part of the causal sequence which exposes the agent to the threat. The 
presence of the lock is potentially beneficial to the agents (or at least, to whichever agent 
uses it). I conclude from this that the agent’s claim to take the lock in the Hungry Bear 
case is much weaker than the agent’s claim to move the car, and that this explains the 
difference in judgement between the cases. 
4.4 Two Objections 
I have concluded my examination of the five moral features to which I think one might 
appeal in order to morally distinguish killing from ducking. However, there are two 
final lines of defence to which a proponent of the moral immunity thesis may appeal to 
resist my arguments. First, one might protest that while individual features might 
establish moral parity between in individual cases of killing and ducking, it is the 
38 Thanks to Fiona Woollard for emphasising this point. 
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accumulation or cluster of these morally significant features which amounts to a 
difference in moral status. Since each feature identifies one respect in which one act may 
be harder to justify than another, these features, taken together, amount to a difference 
in permissibility, even if none of the features alone can mark a boundary between 
permissible and impermissible self-defence.  
Typically, ducking enables harm as a side-effect of redistributing of a pre-existing threat. 
Yet even when we take all of these features together and export them into a case of 
killing a bystander, we still find that they do not appear to make a difference to 
permissibility. This is illustrated by the Nitrous Oxide and Hungry Bear cases, both of 
which contain each of those factual features, but nevertheless appear to be impermissible 
acts of self-defence. 
A second line of defence for the moral immunity thesis is to deny that ducking is a cause 
of harm, or, alternatively, to maintain that its causal contribution to harm is less 
morally significant than killing. Directly “acting on” someone seems to be a kind of 
causation with moral significance, whereas bringing something about by “acting at a 
distance” intuitively lacks the same moral significance. For example, one might suggest 
there is no “spatiotemporally continuous causal chain” from ducking to the harm that 
befalls the victim.39  
Yet this line of resistance would have potentially wide-reaching implications for the 
moral status of enabling harm through the removal of protection: it would be highly 
counterintuitive to deny that unblocking a threat by removing a protective obstacle is a 
cause of any subsequent harm. Alternatively, if ducking is a cause of harm, but a 
morally insignificant one, this would be best explained by the further moral factors I 
have already explored (for example, the differences between direct harms and side-effect 
harms, or the differences between creating a new threat and redistributing a pre-existing 
threat). 
Before concluding, I must point out that the mere fact that the moral immunity thesis 
has a counterintuitive implication is insufficient reason to reject it, since other accounts 
of the morality of self-defence may have similarly counterintuitive implications. 
However, as I see it, the moral status of ducking presents a difficulty for the moral 
immunity thesis in particular; other accounts of the morality of self-defence are well 
placed to accommodate the judgement that ducking is usually permissible, without 
equivalently counterintuitive implications of their own. 
39 Draper, “Rights and the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing”, pp. 266-267. 
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For example, Jonathan Quong has argued that it is wrong to kill someone in the course 
of defending one’s own life if one uses a person or their rightful property (including the 
space that they occupy) as a means of securing survival. Accordingly, it is wrong to use 
people as human shields and ride roughshod over innocent bystanders who obstruct 
one’s path to safety. 
By contrast, he says it is permissible to kill the innocent in self-defence when one does so 
without using them or their property. So it is permissible to kill people who innocently 
threaten one’s life, to duck threats and even to kill bystanders as a side-effect of action 
aimed at self-preservation. The rationale for these claims is simply that each person is 
morally permitted to exercise partiality when acting in defence of their life, provided 
that certain conditions are met. This account has a plausible rationale and provides 
results which coincide with considered judgements in a range of cases. 
The crucial difference between Quong’s account and the moral immunity thesis as it 
pertains to ducking is that Quong’s account permits the killing of bystanders as a side-
effect of action aimed at self-preservation. Consequently, the arguments that I provide in 
Section 4.3.2 do not apply to Quong’s view. This might move us to conclude that the 
moral immunity thesis has shortcomings which should push us to favour Quong’s 
account instead. 
4.5 Conclusion 
At the outset, I contrasted two cases in which a person who is endangered by an 
innocent threat can defend themselves using different modes of agency in each case: by 
killing the innocent threat in the first case and by ducking the threat in the second case. I 
pointed out that some maintain that it would be wrong to kill the innocent threat, on 
the grounds that doing so is morally indistinguishable from killing an innocent 
bystander in the course of defending one’s own life, but that most believe that it is 
permissible to duck the threat. 
I then set out my central claim: if killing an innocent threat is morally equivalent, in 
terms of permissibility, to killing an innocent bystander, then both are equivalent to 
ducking a threat. As a result, if the moral immunity thesis is correct, then ducking the 
threat is impermissible. Since this is highly counterintuitive, I suggested that we should 
instead reject (or revise) the moral immunity thesis. 
I offered a brief positive defence of this claim and then considered five ways in which a 




of self-ownership, the side-effect principle, the redistribution principle, the distinction 
between killing and letting die, and the moral significance of fair chances and property 
rights. Using counterexamples, I argued that none of these factors make a difference to 
the permissibility of self-defence without undermining the moral immunity thesis. 
Although ducking a threat intuitively differs in moral status from killing innocent 
threats and bystanders, this intuition is difficult to accommodate with the moral 
immunity thesis without relinquishing either the moral equivalence thesis or the 
inviolability of a bystander thesis. Since this is a serious shortcoming, I submit that the 
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